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The PhD dissertation consists of three separate chapters. Each chapter is a self-
contained academic work and can be read in isolation. The common theme across
the three chapters is the desire to master the techniques and methods for a rigorous
and causal assessment of economic policies.
The first chapter is a co-authored work with Professor Harald Hau from the Uni-
versity of Geneva, and Professor Yi Huang from the Graduate Institute in Geneva.
The paper evaluates the impact of the Chinese minimum wage policy on consump-
tion of low wage household for the period 2002-2009. Using a representative house-
hold panel, we find that the consumption response to minimum wage hikes is in-
creasing in the minimum wage share of household income. In particular, we find
that poorer households fully consume their additional income. This large marginal
propensity to consume is driven by households with at least one child, while child-
less poor households save two thirds of a minimum wage hike. The expenditure
increase is concentrated in health care and education with potentially long-lasting
benefits to household welfare
The second chapter is a joint work with Ana Paula Cusolito and David McKenzie
both from The World Bank Group. We conduct a five-country randomized experi-
ment in the Western Balkans that works with 346 firms and delivers an investment
readiness program to half of these firms, with the control group receiving an inex-
pensive online program instead. Investment readiness programs attempt to help
firms to become ready to attract and accept outside equity funding through a combi-
nation of training, mentoring, master classes, and networking. A competition event
was held for these firms to pitch their ideas to independent judges. The invest-
ment readiness program resulted in a 0.3 standard deviation increase in the invest-
ment readiness score, with this increase occurring throughout the distribution. Two
follow-up surveys show that these judges’ scores predict investment readiness and
investment outcomes over the subsequent two years. Treated firms attain signifi-
cantly more media attention, and are 5 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to have
made a deal with an outside investor, although this increase is not statistically sig-
nificant (95 confidence interval of -4.7 p.p., +14.7p.p.).
The third chapter is a single-authored piece and studies the economic policies
in the European banking sector. Specifically, the first chapter describes the method-
ology and results of an impact evaluation of macroprudential capital regulation on
bank capital, risk taking behaviour, and solvency. The identification relies on the pol-
icy change in bank-level capital requirements across systemically important banks
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in Europe. A one percentage point hike in capital requirements leads to an aver-
age CET1 capital increase of 13 percent and no evidence of reduction in assets. The
increase in capital comes at a cost. The paper documents robust evidence on the ex-
istence of substitution effects toward riskier assets. The risk taking behavior is pre-
dominantly driven by large and less profitable banks: large wholesale funded banks
show less risk taking, and large banks relying on internal ratings based approach
successfully disguise their risk taking. In terms of overall impact on solvency, the
higher risk taking crowds-out the positive effect of increased capital.
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1Chapter 1
Consumption Response to
Minimum Wages: Evidence from
Chinese Households
1.1 Introduction
In China, a minimum wage policy was firstly introduced in 1994 and today oper-
ates in a labor market of close to 800 million individuals.1 By 2012, approximately
18% of urban households had at least one household member with a wage near the
minimum wage. Extrapolated to the overall Chinese household population, this
proportion means that an estimated 82.5 million households are affected by mini-
mum wage legislation comprising approximately 265 million household members.2
In this paper we seek to understand how effective China’s minimum wage policy is
in improving income and consumption of low income households.
As in the Western societies, minimum wage policies are controversial also in
emerging countries for fears about unemployment effects, threats to industrial com-
petitiveness, and employment substitution into the informal labour market, Rama,
2001, Comola and De Mello, 2011, Fang and Lin, 2015. These concerns may have
negative effects on the transmission of minimum wages into consumption, more-
over there are additional concerns why higher minimum wages may fail to translate
into higher levels of consumption: first, higher minimum wages may simply sub-
stitute for other social transfers so that the effective income increase is considerably
attenuated, for the U.S. see for instance Dube, 2017. Second, the disposable income
effect of higher minimum wages may be perceived as transitory - particularly in
emerging countries with higher price inflation. Consumption smoothing may then
result only in a modest consumption increase. Third, higher minimum wages can
0This is a joint work with Harald Hau and Yi Huang. We thank Jean-Louis Arcand, Marius Brülhart,
David Card, Olivier Cadot, Andrew Clark, Conchita D’Ambrosio, Giacomo De Giorgi, Tony Fang,
Eric French, Wei Huang, Gian-Paolo Klinke, Dirk Krueger, Rafael Lalive, Albert Park, Yu Qing, Do-
minic Rohner, Li Shi, Stephanos Vlachos, Xiaobo Zhang, Shenghao Zhu, Gewei Wang, Shangjin Wei
for valuable comments on earlier drafts of the paper. We also thanks seminar and conference partici-
pants at the 2017 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, 4th Potsdam PhD Workshop in Empirical
Economics/EVA-MIN Summer School, 2017 Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Hong Kong Uni-
versity, ILO-Geneva Labor and Development Workshop, Peking University, University of Trier, 2018
China Meeting of the Econometric Society. This research project benefited from a Sinergia Research
Grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).
1Source: International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database, using World Bank population esti-
mates. Labor data retrieved in March 2017 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.
IN?locations=CN
2See for instance the National Bureau of Statistics NBS, 2013. China Statistical Yearbook 2013. Bei-
jing: China Statistics Press. Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexeh.htm
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increase household unemployment risk, trigger precautionary savings, and attenu-
ate the consumption effect. Finally, a higher frequency of unemployment can make
some households much worse off than in the previous policy regime.
China provides a particularly rich institutional setting for research on the con-
sumption effect of minimum wages. The Chinese minimum wage is set at the county-
level and is frequently adjusted in order to keep pace with price inflation and rais-
ing standards of living in a high growth environment. For the period 2002-2009, we
identify more than 13,874 changes of county-level minimum wages across China’s
2,183 counties and 285 cities and match them to the urban household survey (UHS)
which covers 73,164 urban household-year observations. No other labour market
in the world can rival China’s in the frequency, heterogeneity, and magnitude of
local minimum wage changes. In this study we use the Chinese urban household sur-
vey which provides a detailed breakdown of both income and consumption along
several categories at the household level. The UHS reports also the amount of in-
come transfers to household stemming from other social policies. This allows us
to disentangle the confounding effect of other transfer policies from the impact of
the minimum wage policy on income and consumption and study the interactions
between minimum wage increases and other social transfers. A caveat is that indi-
vidual level data for consumption are not available in the UHS, and our modelling
choice are therefore restricted to household level consumption. This feature of the
data implies that we cannot disentangle the individual marginal propensity to con-
sume of each household earner.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate the consumption
and income response of Chinese households to cross-sectional and intertemporal
variation of China’s minimum wages.3 Our main focus is on household consump-
tion since it provides a particularly relevant metric of welfare and is often better
measured and less volatile than income, Deaton, 1997, Deaton and Grosh, 2000.
Moreover, in the development economics literature, consumption is the standard
metric used to assess the relative poverty of households: the World Bank relies on
consumption measures to construct the international extreme poverty line, Raval-
lion, Chen, and Sangraula, 2009.
We perform two-stage least square estimations (2SLS), which use the minimum
wage increase as an instrument for household income shock in the consumption
3Research on developing countries has examined the role of the minimum wage on the wage distri-
bution and labor income inequality without documenting its effect on consumption. For instance, us-
ing labor survey data from Indonesia, Rama, 2001 estimates the impact of a doubling of the minimum
wage on the entire wage distribution, and finds that wages above the minimum wage also increased
between 5-15%. Bosch and Manacorda, 2010 find that growth inequality of income earnings in Mex-
ico is due to the decline in the real value of the minimum wage. Engbom and Moser, 2016 study the
impact of minimum wage changes in Brazil on the reduction of earnings inequality and conclude that
minimum wages help reduce earnings inequality in formal sectors of the economy. Previous work on
low income households in developing countries has considered alternative income shocks to estimate
consumption responses. Wolpin (1982) uses weather induced income shocks in India to estimate an
income elasticity of consumption in the range 0.91-1.02 depending on the definition of consumption.
Our results for minimum wage changes in China are consistent with these findings. Related work by
Paxson (1992) studies weather shocks in Thailand to estimate the saving propensity to income shocks
related to weather conditions; the estimated saving propensity to positive and non-transitory weather
induced income shocks is found to be greater than zero, but small. However, the persistence of disaster
related income shocks is not always easy to assess and might be confounded by associated policies of
disaster relief.
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function.4 All our estimates of consumption impact are unconditional on employ-
ment status, that is we keep in the sample both workers who retain their jobs and
workers who lose their jobs after minimum wage hike. The results indicate that min-
imum wage increases in China are a very effective policy tool for increasing income
and consumption levels of households dependant on the minimum wage. Our esti-
mates show a marginal propensity to consume out of a minimum wage shock of one
- implying that low income households spend the entire additional income stem-
ming from a higher minimum wage. For the same type of minimum wage house-
hold this compares to the marginal propensity to consume of only RMB 0.35 for RMB
1 increase in labor income. The high marginal propensity to consume due to a mini-
mum wage hike is at odds in comparison to the aggregate low consumption figures
in China.
The paper investigates further whether liquidity constraints may be driving the
consumption response as in Zeldes, 1989 and Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010, however
the marginal propensity of consumption due to minimum wage does not differ sig-
nificantly for liquidity constrained households - suggesting that the consumption
effect is not driven by liquidity constrained households. The study finds that a large
share of more than 30% of the incremental income due to minimum wages is con-
sumed in health and educational expenditure, which is likely to improve the long-
run income of the family since these categories of expenditures are closely associated
with investment and savings as shown by Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura (2007)
and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008). Only for the 6.5% of households with-
out a child we find an economically large saving effect. These households save two
thirds of the income increase due to minimum wages.
The results show a higher consumption responses to minimum wage hikes in
China than commonly found in U.S. data.5 We rationalize the relatively higher ef-
fects of minimum wages on consumption in China in three different ways: low lev-
els of minimum wages relative to the median wage, relatively poor living conditions
coupled with a weak health and education systems, and a complementarity of min-
imum wages and other social transfers.
A low level of minimum wages relative to the U.S. implies that the cost of min-
imum wage labor is substantially lower in China. We do not find that minimum
wages have a significant impact on unemployment, this is true also for more vul-
nerable individuals such as urban migrants.6 The absence of unemployment effects
suggests that the low cost of minimum wage labor in China is not salient with respect
to general equilibrium effects in the labor market. At the same time, the absence of
4In our setting, consumption changes only due to a shock to household income, however there may
be other influences such as peer and network effect which our data does not allow to compute, for
network effects on consumption see De Giorgi, Frederiksen, and Pistaferri, 2016.
5The impact of minimum wages on income and consumption for U.S. states has been studied by
Aaronson, Agarwal, and French, 2012. The authors estimate a positive expenditure effect for mini-
mum wage dependent U.S. households with an elasticity lower than one, and conclude that most of
the consumption effect can be traced to durable expenditures such as vehicle purchases. Alonso, 2016
employs aggregate county-level U.S. sales data to find that a 10% increase in minimum wages increases
non-durable consumption by 1% in the aggregate, and finds that this aggregate effect is larger in poorer
counties. Dube, 2017 examines the relationship of U.S. minimum wages to family income and in par-
ticular its distribution among minimum wage households. He concludes that higher minimum wages
alleviate poverty by reducing the share of individuals below federal poverty threshold.
6For the effects of minimum wages on employment in the U.S. see for example the contributions of
Krueger and Card (1995) and Card and Krueger (2000) juxtaposed to Neumark and Wascher (1992) and
the recent evidence of Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010), Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011), Neumark,
Salas, and Wascher (2014a), Neumark, Salas, and Wascher (2014b), Allegretto et al. (2016).
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unemployment effects reinforces the results on the marginal propensity of consump-
tion since the potential precautionary savings motive due to negative employment
effects cannot be sustained.
In the 1990s the real minimum wage in China was still close to the international
poverty line of USD 1 per day and remains comparatively low during our data pe-
riod 2002-2009. Urgent consumption needs yield a large consumption response and
marginal propensities to consumption are in general larger on the lower end of the
income distribution. This is further accentuated by a high propensity to consume
in health and education expenditures stemming from a minimum wage increase -
a consequence of a rather underdeveloped health and costly education systems as
suggested Chamon and Prasad, 2010. Health insurance coverage in China was only
29.7% in 2003, see for instance Meng et al., 2012, at the same time in the U.S. an
estimated 84.8% percent of the population had health insurance coverage in 2002
according to the U.S. Current Population Survey, Mills and Bhandari, 2003.
We argue that another reason for a higher impact of minimum wages on income
and consumption in China is the complementarity of minimum wage increases and
other social transfers to poorer households. Minimum wage hikes tend to be associ-
ated with higher social transfers in China, while in U.S. higher minimum wages are
usually counterbalanced by a reduction of other type of household transfers.7 We
find a positive impact of minimum wages on transfer income, a RMB 1 increase in
minimum wages increase transfer income by RMB 0.49 per household member, the
impact is doubled if there are two minimum wage workers in a household. These
results are consistent with the evidence discussed in Leung, 2006, Hao, 2009, Meng,
2012 and Qu and Zhao, 2017, describing that after 200, the Chinese central and lo-
cal (province, city or county level) governments implemented several employment
protection and social programs for urban households. For instance, in addition to
minimum wage policies, China’s first Unemployment Insurance Act was issued by
the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China in 1999, since then, laid off work-
ers collect their unemployment payment from central offices and this is the period
when we observe the UHS survey, see Meng, 2012. Another example is the imple-
mentation, in October 1999, of the State Council Regulation on the Minimum Living
Allowance System in Urban Areas as described in Leung, 2006 and Hao, 2009.
Minimum wage change captures these complementary social policies at central
and local (provincial, city or county wide) governments levels, which together with
minimum wages, are the driving forces behind the large increases in consumption.
This is particularly more relevant for individuals at the low end of the wage distri-
bution since they are more likely to be affected by the set of these new policies and
programs, this is shown in Qu and Zhao, 2017 for the period 2003-2006.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the China’s minimum
wage regulation and the urban household survey. Section 1.3 discusses the research
design. Section 1.4 presents the main results on the impact of the minimum wage
level on total household consumption. Here we also highlight the important role of
minimum wages in determining a household’s health and education expenditure.
The role of household heterogeneity for consumption behavior is discussed in Sec-
tion 1.5 with a focus on financial constraints and household structure. Employment
effects are investigated in Section 1.7, while in Section 3.7 we run a placebo test.
Section 1.8 concludes.
7For the U.S., Dube, 2017 documents that a reduction in public assistance partly offsets minimum
wage income gains. The latter are on average 25% lower when the author includes tax credits and
non-cash transfers in the equation.
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1.2 Institutional Framework and Data
1.2.1 China’s Urban Household Survey
China’s Urban Households Survey (UHS) represents a comprehensive and represen-
tative survey of urban workers and households managed by the Chinese National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The UHS is conducted via stratified randomization sam-
pling, it records a wide range of demographic and socioeconomic conditions of Chi-
nese urban households, including detailed information on different income sources,
wages and granular consumption items for households on an annual basis. In this
paper, we restrict the analysis to eight consecutive years of the UHS from 2002 to
2009. Prior to 2002, the survey does not provide a panel structure and we exclude
the earlier years from the econometric analysis. We then merge the urban house-
hold survey with the minimum wage data which are observed at an hourly rate and
then aggregated at annual frequency, a more detailed presentation of the minimum
wage dataset is given in Section 1.2.3. Further, Appendix 1.B provides a detailed
description of the merged sample and the data filters applied.
To analyze the impact of minimum wages on household consumption, we distin-
guish households in terms of their reliance on wage income near the local minimum
wage. Let the variable S denote the share of total non-property income earned by
the two best-paid household members from wage near the minimum wage.8 Labor
income of any household member is considered to be near the local minimum wage
and counted towards the nominator of S if it falls within the range 50%-150% of the
county minimum wage.9
We calculate the share S for the first year a household enters the survey to limit
any endogeneity due to self-selection or composition effects. The fact that S is cre-
ated based on the first year observations is important since it keeps constant the
exposure to the minimum wage in all years. In latter years of the panel, income can
decrease because of job loss potentially induced by the minimum wage. To over-
come this potential bias all our estimates of consumption are unconditional on em-
ployment status, i.e. we keep in the sample both workers who retain their jobs and
workers who lose their jobs. By keeping the exposure to minimum wage constant
and including unemployed individuals in all our specifications we make sure that
the sample is not restricted to workers who keep their job after a MW hike.10 Never-
theless, a mechanical relationship between S and income is present in the first year
which might bias the estimates, for this reason we drop the first year a household is
observed.
To maintain the panel structure we include in the sample households that have
been surveyed for at least two years and that have at least two household members
observed in each survey. Formally, let Em,h,c denote the annual labor income and
wm,h,c the wage of the two best paid household members m = 1, 2 in household h in
8 Aaronson, Agarwal, and French (2012) use a similar definition for the minimum wage workers.
9The upper bound of 150% is consistent with the findings of spillover/ripple effects of minimum
wages on the wage distribution whereby workers earning just above the minimum wage tend to have
an upgrade when the minimum wage is increased, Krueger and Card (1995).The lower bound of 50%
is applied to reduce measurement errors and to include workers in firms that do not comply fully with
the minimum wage policy. The results are robust to other thresholds for minimum wage ripple effect
(we experimented with 0.5-1.2 and 0.5-1.3).
10The results are robust to other definitions of the treatment, we experimented with treatment status
changing every year according to the above thresholds, and with assignment to treatment only if the
household earns a minimum wage salary in every year she is observed in the panel. Table 1-VII shows
that the proportion of households within different categories of S dose not change significantly across
these three different treatment definitions
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county c. For a dummy variable D[.] = 1 indicating a wage in the range 50%-150%
of county minimum wage MWc, we define minimum wage income share as
Sh,c =
1
Total Incomeh,c
∑
m=1,2
Em,h,c × D [0.5MWc ≤ wm,h,c ≤ 1.5MWc] (1.1)
where Total Incomeh,c in the denominator represents the sum of the total disposable
income of the two top earners in the household.11 By definition, the minimum wage
income share Shc is between 0 and 1; a higher share implies that the household tends
to be poorer and her income more subject to any variation in the minimum wage
policy. In the case where both the household head and spouse work at the minimum
wage, the share S approaches one.12 Throughout the analysis, we consider house-
holds without any minimum wage income (S = 0), the complementary set of house-
holds with at least some income related to the minimum wage (S > 0), households
with at least half of their income from wages near the minimum wage (S > 0.5), and
households very dependent on the minimum wage for their subsistence (S > 0.75).
The last two groups are the main focus of interest and we can expect the consump-
tion response to minimum wage changes to be most pronounced for this group.
It is instructive to compare household characteristics across the four different
household groups (S = 0, S > 0, S > 0.5 and S > 0.75) that increase their depen-
dence on minimum wage income as the share S increases. Table 1-V in Appendix
1.B reports the differences in the structure of household income and spending, Table
1-VI illustrates the differences in demographic structure.
Households with S > 0.5 (S > 0.75) account for 6% (5%) of all observations, but
earn only 2.6% (2.4%) of all labor income, whereas households without minimum
wage income represent 72% of the sample and earn 81.9% of all labor income. An
advantage of the urban household survey data is that it records also transfer income
and sub-components of transfer income such as social assistance income, unemploy-
ment benefit, dismissal compensation, indemnity insurance income, subsistence al-
lowance etc. In the sample, and as expected, poorer households (with S > 0.5 or
S > 0.75) feature a lower share of disposable income earned from labor income and
rely more on social transfer income from the authorities; almost 20% of their dis-
posable income comes from social transfers. Moreover, minimum wage dependent
households tend to consume a higher proportion of their disposable income (82%)
compared to households with S = 0 (70%).13
In terms of demographic characteristics, minimum wage households tend to be
only slightly larger with 3.3 members compared to 3.1 for the household S = 0.
This suggests that the one child policy was implemented consistently across income
groups. Unsurprisingly, minimum wage household show lower house ownership
rates and their migration to the urban area is typically more recent. We also highlight
that minimum wage dependent households are much less likely to work for state-
owned enterprise (SOE), in fact these tend to pay higher wages than the private
11Disposable income is composed by the sum of labor income, property income, operating income
and transfer income. We observe all of these sub-categories of income in the household survey.
12If all members of the household are unemployed in the first year the household enters the panel,
the sum of the best two earners results in a zero labor income and consequently S = 0. We eliminate
these households from the data set (i.e. only 166 observations or 0.2% of the overall sample) to avoid
any confounding effects with households earning labor income above the minimum wage.
13In Table 1-V and throughout the analysis, consumption is defined as expenditure on: food, clothes,
household services, medical care, education, transportation and living. This is consumption net of
purchasing property, transfer expenditures, social contributions and personal social expenditure. It is
also net of investments, the latter can be confounded with savings.
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sector. Finally, the educational level and work experience of the head of household
tends to be lower for minimum wage dependent families.
1.2.2 Minimum Wage Regulation
Minimum wage changes in China originate in an administrative and political pro-
cess that is not subject to an open public debate. The law only stipulates the re-
quirement of regular review of the minimum wage level, not a mandatory change
or wage level. When the decision of a higher nominal minimum wage is taken upon
proposal by the local government and approval by the provincial authorities, imple-
mentation follows swiftly with a delay of only two months after a local government
announcement. Following the announcement, the information is spread via local
government websites, local radio and TV channels. This decision process implies
that little public information is generated that would allow households to anticipate
well in advance minimum wage changes and modify their consumption behavior
accordingly, Du and Jia (2016).
Chinese minimum wage legislation was first promulgated in 1994 following a
wave of economic liberalization policies and the transition from predominantly state-
owned production to a mixed economy with a growing private sector. However, the
first implementation was ineffective since it lacked provisions and rules for the ad-
justment to price inflation and local economic conditions. It also suffered from lax
enforcement and extensive non-compliance. Rawski (2003), Du and Wang, 2008, Sun
and Shu (2011), Ye, Gindling, and Li, 2015.
The access of China to the World Trade Organization and the related boom of the
manufacturing sector added pressure for a more efficient minimum wage regulation.
In December 2003, the central government opted for a reform of minimum wage reg-
ulation, and in March 2004, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security introduced the
new Minimum Wage Regulations (MWR) into Chinese Labor Law. The most signifi-
cant provisions required indexation of the minimum wage to the cost of living and a
minimum wage level sufficient to support basic daily needs of employees. Local au-
thorities were required to review the minimum wage at least every two year in light
of local economic conditions and propose a revised minimum wage to the provin-
cial authorities. Moreover, implementation of the new MWR was strengthened by
increased control at the local administrative level and firm level in pursuit of better
compliance. Penalties for non-compliance increased from 20-100% of the statutory
minimum wage to 100-500%.
Figure I illustrates the proportion of counties that increase their nominal annual
minimum wage between 1996 and 2012. In line with the reformation of the MWR,
trade liberalization and the large productivity growth of the booming manufactur-
ing sector, real minimum wage growth in China was higher after the reform. Real
minimum wage grew at 5.08% in the period 1996-2003 and accelerated to 8.57% in
the period 2004-2012. In monetary terms, the average annual real minimum wage
was only RMB 1,259 ($441 under PPP) in 1996, but had increased to RMB 4,610
($1,309 under PPP) in 2012.14 In the same period, the annual real growth rate of
Chinese labor productivity was 8.9%, while real GDP oscillated around 9.7%.15 In
14Effective annual nominal minimum wage increased from RMB 2,628 ($921 under PPP) in 1996 to
RMB 13,224 ($3,756 under PPP) in 2012.
15Purchasing power parity conversion factors are from the World Bank’s International Comparison
Program Database, data on growth are from the World Bank World Development Indicators, produc-
tivity data are from the OECD.stat Productivity Archives, see http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=PDB_LV.
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other terms, China’s average real minimum wage started slightly above the interna-
tional poverty line set at $1 per day in 1996, and increased to a remarkable $3.55 per
day in two decades. In the following section we try to estimate the household use of
this increase.
1.2.3 Minimum Wage Data
The data used in this study are collected by Chinese Ministry of Human Resources
and report the hourly local minimum wage in 2,183 counties and 285 cities for the pe-
riod 1994-2012.16 The workers are subject to heterogeneous minimum wage changes
across counties: in a given year, those working in counties with a minimum wage
hike constitute the treatment group and those working in counties with no change
in minimum wage policy the control group in a given year.17
We aggregate the observed hourly minimum wages to a yearly wage to match
the frequency of the annual reporting of the household survey data and for an eas-
ier interpretation of our estimates. The UHS reports separately income stemming
from bonuses or overtime working hours, this means that a reported worker’s labor
income is not affected by working extra hours which are classified separately as in-
come arising from bonuses. We exploit this data feature in addition to the the rules
of the Chinese Labor Law and assume a 40 hours working week for each full-time
worker. Note that this aggregation rule is consistent with Article 36 of the same law
establishing that "The State shall practise a working hour system wherein labourers
shall work for no more than eight hours a day and no more than 44 hours a week on
average".18
To check formally whether the assumption of a 40 hour work week (or 160 hours
per month) is innocuous for our inference, we compare the reported monthly hours
worked of full-time workers (available for a subset of workers in the period 2002-
2006) with and without a minimum wage hike and report them in Table 1.1. The
reported average monthly working hours tend to be slightly but not significantly
above 160 working hours for the sample of full-time workers as shown in Panels A
(all households) and B (S > 0 households) of Table 1.1. Importantly, in each panel
there is no statistically significant difference in hours worked between counties with
and without minimum wage hikes.
Only for the year 2002 we find a weak statistical difference of minimum wage
workers labor supply between treated and non-treated counties. This is likely due
to the mechanical positive correlation between minimum wages and income in the
first year the household is observed as described in Section 1.2.1, also for this reason
we drop the first year the household enters the panel throughout the later empirical
analysis.
Panel C of Table 1.1 reports the evolution of the minimum wage bite (i.e., the
ratio of the Chinese minimum wage relative to county median income) in our sam-
ple. Chinese minimum wages are generally set at a very low level relative to the
median wage. The average ratio of the minimum wage relative to the median wage
16The province is the highest administrative division in China, followed by cities and counties. There
are 34 provinces in the Chinese administrative subdivision as of April 2015, 333 prefecture-level cities
and a total of 2,862 county-level divisions in China.
17For their uncertain treatment and control group status, and as described in Appendix 1.B, we also
ignore self-employed individuals; retired household members; retired and then re-employed house-
hold members, incapacitated persons, homeworkers, soldiers, social volunteers, students and other
household members undergoing training.
18Details on Chinese Labor Law can be consulted at: http://www.china.org.cn/living_in_china/
abc/2009-07/15/content_18140508.htm
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fluctuates around 20% in the period 2002-2006 and then declines to 17.6% in 2009.
In China, Minimum wage bites never approach the much higher levels observed
in some developed countries, where the minimum wage bite ranges from around
30% in the U.S. to 60% in France and Sweden, Dickens (2015). Therefore, the labor
income conditions of minimum wage workers in China are much worse in relative
terms compared to minimum wage workers in high income economies. In absolute
terms, the Chinese real minimum wage income of a single worker is close to the in-
ternational poverty line (see Section 1.2.2). It follows that any policy measure that
increases the consumption level of these extremely poor households represents a re-
duction in poverty by definition. At the same time, the low bite of the minimum
wage can suggest that its level is not salient with respect to general equilibrium ef-
fects in the labor market. Section 1.7 explores the impact of the minimum wage on
employment in more detail.
For the benefit of our inference, minimum wages in China were subject to large
and heterogeneous local variation. Our empirical analysis focuses on the years 2002-
2009 for which the urban household data is available as a stratified panel and can
be matched with county-level minimum wage data. During this period, 79.5% of all
county-year events increased their minimum wage in a given year, which translates
into a total of 13,874 minimum wage increases. Figure I presents a diagram with the
annual share of counties and cities that change the nominal minimum wage in the
range of 0-10% or 10-20% or more than 20%. During the period almost one quarter
of China’s 2,183 counties (and 285 cities) in the sample raised the nominal minimum
wage by more than 20%.19
1.3 Research Design
1.3.1 Descriptive Evidence
Various economic channels could potentially generate a spurious relation between
both variables and could obscure a causal effect of minimum wages on consumption.
Before we explore the causal link from minimum wages to household consumption,
it is useful to establish that minimum wages and consumption change together only
for minimum wage dependent households. To convince the reader that spurious
relations for non-minimum wage households do not obstruct the analysis, we apply
a simple event analysis based on a two-step procedure.
In a first-stage regression, we regress the county-level real minimum wage MWct
on a set of interacted province fixed effects DProvince and year fixed effects DYear. The
resulting residuals identify if the minimum wage level in a country (or city) is high
relative to the province average in a given year. Formally,
MWc,t = α0 + α1 [DProvince × DYear] + uc,t. (1.2)
19While none of the counties featured a decrease in the nominal wage, local inflation combined with
a constant minimum wage can decrease the real wage if the nominal wage stays constant. From 2002
to 2009, an average of 20.5% (3590) county-year events show a constant nominal minimum wage —
implying a worsening of purchasing power of minimum wage workers. Yet, most local authorities
appear attentive to the erosion of the minimum wage by inflation and tend to adjust the minimum
wage by more than the rise in consumer prices: of the 13,874 county-year events with a minimum
wage increase, only 1,235 had minimum wage increases below the inflation rate in the county. In real
terms, approximately half of county-year increases implied a real minimum wage change in the range
0-10%, one-third of minimum wage increases was in the range 10-20%, and only a tenth above 20%.
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In a second step, we fit household consumption changes ∆Cb to the changes in
county-level residuals ∆uc,t. In the absence of other economic channels, a positive re-
gression coefficient between the minimum wage change and consumption changes
should appear only for households depending on minimum wages (S > 0). To
visually inspect this fit, we sort the residual county changes ∆uc,t into 40 bins of
counties with a similar residual and calculate the bin average ∆ub for each bin b.
Accordingly, we calculate for all counties in the same bin the corresponding average
changes of household consumption ∆Cb. In this aggregation, we distinguish min-
imum wage dependent households (S > 0.5) from those without minimum wage
income (S = 0). Averaging within the bins yields average consumption changes
∆CS>0.5b and ∆C
S=0
b . Note that, within a bin, the two groups of households share the
common minimum wage change ∆ub relative to the province-level average. Figure
II illustrates the binned scatter plots for the two regressions
∆CS>0.5b = β0 + β1∆ub + e (1.3)
∆CS=0b = γ0 + γ1∆ub + e, (1.4)
where we our test requires β1 > 0 and γ1 = 0. Consumption changes for non-
minimum wage households, ∆CS=0b , show a coefficient estimate of −0.03 with the
relative minimum wage change ∆ub, whereas minimum wage dependent house-
holds show a positive coefficient of 1.42. A standard t-test for the statistical dif-
ference of the two slopes produces a t-statistic of 1.56. Despite the weak statistical
significance, it can be inferred from the scatter plot that minimum wage increases
are indeed associated with higher household consumption for minimum wage de-
pendent households.
A further refinement of the procedure distinguishes two subsamples: (i) counties
in which the nominal minimum wage was constant from one year to another, (ii)
those where local authorities implemented nominal minimum wage hikes. In the
former case, the county minimum wage decreases with respect to the province-year
average, whereas in the latter case, the county minimum wages increase relative to
the province average. The implications for household consumption differ in the two
subsets: we expect a positive relationship (β1 > 0) between consumption changes
in minimum wage households and county minimum wage changes only in counties
which actively implemented a minimum wage hike. In Figure III, we compare the
regression lines for cases (i) and (ii) and confirm the conjectured relationship. Only
counties with a local minimum wage increase feature a regression coefficient be-
tween consumption changes in minimum wage households and the residual change
∆ub. Minimum wage households show no consumption changes in counties where
the nominal minimum wage was constant.
To sum up, the descriptive analysis indicates that a positive change of household
consumption happens only in counties where a local minimum wage was increased.
Within those counties, the positive change in consumption is linked only with min-
imum wage dependent households. The two results together suggest that the in-
crease in the minimum wage may be the causal effect behind the increase pattern of
consumption. In order to shed more light on this link the next section presents the
evidence controlling for county trends and household specific characteristics.
1.3.2 Panel Data Methods
We design a difference-in-difference specification which compares household con-
sumption across counties subject to minimum wage hikes (treatment group) and
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not (control group). In light of the heterogeneous household exposure to minimum
wages. The household sample is segmented into groups according to their share S
of total income received from minimum wage labor. Households without any min-
imum wage related income (S = 0) represent a placebo control group relative to
those household with S > 0.5 (S > 0.75) which earn more than 50% (75%) of their
total income from minimum wages.
A more general approach relates household consumption to household income
by using the minimum wage change as an instrument to explain variation in house-
hold income. In the minimum wage case, the advantage of the 2SLS approach, on
top of being robust to measurement error and omitted variable bias, is that it ac-
counts explicitly for the channel through which minimum wages affect consump-
tion. In other terms, the 2SLS uses the minimum wage hike as an instrument for
the household income shock and then estimates the induced consumption response
to this income shock. Whether the households decision is to consume the income
shock or saves it, the minimum wage is a good instrument for the overall increase
of disposable income form which increase consumption and saving decision would
follow.
In order for the 2SLS to have a clear causal interpretation two assumptions need
to be satisfied. Firstly, the instrument should be correlated with the instrumented
variable. In China, the large and frequent variation of the real minimum wage guar-
antees in principle that the explanatory power of the first-stage regression is suffi-
ciently large to satisfy the first assumption. This can be tested, and the next section
looks at the power of our first stage and the correlation of the minimum wage hike
with labor income, it is expected that the instrument has a stronger effect on la-
bor income the more the household relies on minimum wage earnings. Second, the
minimum wage change is uncorrelated with other determinants of the dependent
variable, see Angrist and Pischke, 2008a, for instance minimum wage change can
rise in areas with good economic progress or in counties with a general increase in
wages. It can be shown that minimum wage is not predicted by standard county
level macroeconomic determinants, while this is not a formal test, it helps in il-
lustrating that minimum wage changes cannot be easily predicted by household.
In other terms, households cannot reasonably predict whether in a particular year
the minimum wage would change in their county and consequently smooth their
consumption. In Appendix 1.A, we look at county-level determinants of minimum
wage change. Tables 1-I, 1-II and 1-III shows for a wide range of regression specifi-
cations that the decision to change the minimum wage is not predicted by standard
county-level socio-economic or political determinants that may a priori affect and
hence predict the minimum wage change.
Formally, the 2SLS first explains household labor income using a first-stage re-
gression:
LIh,c,t = α+ βFS MWc,t + Xm,h,tΛ+ Xh,tΘ+ Xcity,tΞ+ φc · t + ηh + δp,t + εh,c,t, (1.5)
where LIh,c,t is housheold Labor Income of household h in county c at time t, and
in the second stage relates the predicted income variation ̂Incomeh,c,t induced by
minimum wage variation to account for household consumption, therefore
Ch,c,t = α+ β2SLS ̂Incomeh,c,t + Xm,h,tΛ+ Xh,tΘ+ Xcity,tΞ+ φc · t + ηh + δp,t + εh,c,t.
(1.6)
The household survey data provide a rich set of demographic and socio-economic
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characteristics (Xm,h,t) for the two main labor income earners (m = 1, 2) in the house-
holds. For the purpose of the analysis, we use as controls their age and age squared,
gender, years of work experience and work experience squared, years since migra-
tion to the city and its squared value. Additional categorical covariates include mar-
ital status, level of education, occupation and industry of occupation. The observed
household characteristics (Xh,t) include household size measured by the number of
household members, and a house ownership dummy. One of the advantages of the
urban household consumption and income survey data is that we observe directly
transfer income to households and its sub-components. We exploit this data richness
to identify the consumption response to minimum wage changes by controlling for
transfer income and studying interrelations between the two. In addition to trans-
fer income, we also observe and control for household net operating income from
business, household income from lending activity and income from property.
At the city-level, we dispose of a variety of macroeconomic variables that we use
as controls in some specifications (Xcity,t): population size, city real GDP, city real
average wage and city unemployment rate. These variables are not available at the
more granular county-level. To overcome this we allow for different growth trends
at the county-level including the interaction of a county dummy and a time trend
(φc · t) in the regression.
The inclusion of county-level time trends φc · t is important also to control for
diverging county level trends in a difference-in-difference setting. We thus control
for county-specific consumption trends as macroeconomic control variables at the
local level are not available. If we do not allow for heterogeneous trend growth,
the real minimum wage level MWc,t becomes the only county-level regressor, and
could subsume county-level heterogeneity and bias the inference. Before proceed-
ing with the exposition of main results of the paper, it is straightforward to illustrate
this specification issue by comparing first-stage income regressions with and with-
out county time trends; the results are shown in the Appendix 1.C. In the standard
two-way specification with only time fixed effects, without county trends and in-
teracted province-year fixed effects, the regression coefficient of the real minimum
wage is highly significant even for the household groups not earning any minimum
wage income (S = 0), see Column (1) of Table 1-IX. By contrast, after including
county trends and province-year fixed effects in Columns (5)-(8), which capture un-
observed heterogeneity across counties and provinces, any spurious consumption
response of high income households is eliminated. As a consequence of this result,
in the following of the paper all specifications include both linear county trends and
province-time fixed effects.
The specifications also account for household fixed effects ηh and province-year
fixed effects δp,t to allow for heterogeneous economic developments across China’s
main geographic regions. All monetary variables, including the minimum wage, are
defined in real terms using the province-level consumer price index.
1.4 Main Results
1.4.1 First-Stage Income Regressions
Table 1.2 presents estimates for the first-stage regression for different definitions of
household income. We distinguish among pure labor income in Columns (1)-(3),
transfer income in Columns (4)-(6) and the sum of labor and transfer income in
Columns (7)-(9) as the dependent variables. We consider three household groups:
those that receive at least 25% (S > 0.25), at least 50% (S > 0.5), or at least 75%
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(S > 0.75) of their total income from minimum wages, respectively. All specifi-
cations include county trends and province-year fixed effects to account for unob-
served heterogeneity, in all specifications in the paper the standard errors are clus-
tered at the county level, i.e. the level of the policy change.20
The first-stage regressions provide information on the strength of our instrument
and also on which components of household income (labor and transfer incomes) are
affected by the minimum wage change. The results of the first-stage regressions in-
dicate a positive effect of minimum wages on labor income in Columns (1)-(3). This
increases in the minimum wage share S of household income, and is significant only
for households earning more than half of their disposable income from minimum
wages. The coefficient of 1.56 in Column (3) suggests a larger than one marginal
propensity to consume for households with a strong minimum wage dependence.
This can be explained by the presence of multiple minimum wage earners in the
same household. Given the standard error of 0.743, the t-statistic is 2.104 and signals
a sufficiently strong instrument.21
In the U.S., minimum wage increases can crowd-out transfer income if the lat-
ter is subject to eligibility requirements that depend on the labor income, see Dube,
2017. However the Chinese context is rather different, as documented by Leung,
2006, Hao, 2009, Meng, 2012 and Qu and Zhao, 2017, after 2000 minimum wage
increases are accompanied with higher social transfer payments (i.e. income relief
programs, unemployment benfits, minimum living standard subssidies etc.) as part
of a more comprehensive social security benefits policy, these benefits generally tar-
get individuals at the low end of the wage distribution as shown by Qu and Zhao,
2017. For instance, in our sample, the level of transfers is RMB 690 (23.5%) higher
for S > 0.5 households living in minimum wage treated counties with respect to
the same category of households living in counties where minimum wage was not
increased. This corresponds to 4.3% of overall disposable income of the households
in the control group.
The evidence for this is shown in Columns (4)-(6) of Table 1.2.22 The estimates
show a large positive effect of minimum wages on transfer income within the same
household group. A positive coefficient of 0.984 in Column (6) for households with
more than 75% of their disposable income stemming from minimum wages implies
that a RMB 1,000 increase in the annual minimum wage comes with an equally large
increase in social transfers at households. It follows that for the combined effect of
minimum wages on labor and transfer income we find larger coefficients. The total
household income effect of minimum wage is roughly 2.25 times the increase in the
annual minimum wage. For a county clustered standard error of 0.823, the t-statistic
approaches the value of 3 and the F-statistics is close to 10. This further implies
that we dispose of a better instrument if we focus on the sum of labor and transfer
incomes as a combined endogenous variable and the related 2SLS estimates will be
more precisely estimated as shown later in Section 1.4.3.
20All our estimates are robust to two-way clustered standard errors at county and city-year level
and two-way clustered standard errors at county and province-year level, results are available from
the authors.
21Note further that a single instrument 2SLS is median-unbiased and hence less prone to weak in-
strument critique, Angrist and Pischke (2008a). A more formal test of the validity and relevance of first
stage instruments is from Kleibergen and Paap, 2006 and is provided in the 2SLS regressions in Table
1.4
22Transfers are intended net of pension or retirement benefits. The measure of net transfers includes
social assistance income, dismissal compensation, income insurance, income from donations and other
transfer income.
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Minimum wages capture the effect on transfers for two reasons: first the simul-
taneity of the re-evaluation of central and local social policies, second because we
are not able to fully capture their simultaneity with our controls despite we include
county trends, city-year fixed effects and the set of our household and city-level con-
trol variables. As a result, this simultaneous effect on transfers is picked up by the
minimum wage policy change in the first stage regression of the minimum wage on
transfer income.
The social policy programs increasing transfers particularly relevant for our sam-
ple of households with the share of disposable income from the minimum wage
above half of the, i.e. the S > 0.5 households. For them, the majority of dispos-
able income comes from minimum wages, but this is complemented, since most of
the second members of the household are unemployed, by another portion of in-
come coming from several social programs described below. The Annex Table 1-VIII
shows that in our sample, when looking only at the best two earners within the
household, more than 19% of members from S > 0.5 households are unemployed,
the corresponding share for S < 0.5 households is only 3.2%. This implies that at
least 19% of households receive some supplementary income assistance form one of
the additional income relief programs.
1.4.2 Reduced Form Regressions
In this section we present the reduced form estimates for the relationship between
the real minimum wage and consumption. This helps in reconstructing the 2SLS
estimates presented in the next section as the ratio of the reduced form on the first
stage. Moreover, it helps also to track the source of the difference in the estimated
coefficients of the 2SLS between the specification with and without transfer income.
The reduced form specification of the household consumption equation is the
following:
Ch,c,t = α+ βRF MWc,t + Xm,h,tΛ+ Xh,tΘ+ Xcity,tΞ+ φc · t + ηh + δp,t + εh,c,t, (1.7)
Table 1.3 presents the results with two different specifications. First, Columns (1)-
(4) report the standard specification adopted in the minimum wage literature on the
impact of minimum wages on some outcome of interest, Aaronson, Agarwal, and
French, 2012, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2011 and Neumark, Salas, and Wascher,
2014a. This work controls for all non-labor income sources. The second group of
estimates in Columns (5)-(8) exclude transfer income as a covariate and therefore
allow the effect of transfer income on consumption to be captured by the minimum
wage change itself. The resulting coefficient is inflated upwards since the minimum
wage estimate captures the additional effect of (correlated) net transfers. Note that
in Columns (5)-(8), the point estimates increase noticeably only for households with
S > 0.5 suggesting that net transfers have a significant contribution in terms of
consumption exclusively for households with a higher minimum wage dependence.
This is consistent with the descriptive statistics as shown in Table 1-V in Appendix
1.B, for these highly minimum wage dependent households, the relative incidence of
net transfers on consumption is substantial given that net transfers (net of pensions)
constitute around 20% (8%) of household disposable income
In both specifications of Table 1.3 the point estimate for the annual real mini-
mum wage effect on household consumption increases in the minimum wage share
S. For the households most dependent on minimum wage income (S > 0.75), the
coefficient of interest becomes 1.91 (standard error 0.91) if we control separately for
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transfer income in Column (4); the estimate increases to 2.32 (standard error 1.02) in
Column (8) where the minimum wage simultaneously captures variations in trans-
fer income and its complementary consumption effect.
1.4.3 Two-Stage Least Square Estimates
In this section we present 2SLS estimates for the effect of minimum wage hikes on
consumption. A consequence of the 2SLS estimator is that only the part of the vari-
ation in household labor income induced by the minimum wage is used to estimate
the marginal propensity to consume. As in the previous sections, we operate with
different definitions of household income. Note that in the 2SLS specifications both
labor income and consumption are measured at the household level and allow for a
more intuitive interpretation of results without the need for scaling for the number
of household members on a minimum wage.
Table 1.4 presents the 2SLS estimates of household consumption as a function
of real labor income in Columns (1)-(4) and as a function of the sum of labor and
transfer income in Columns (5)-(8). We additionally report robust results for differ-
ent type of clustering of standard errors: two-way clustered at county and city-year
level and two-way clustered at county and province-year level in Appendix Table
1-XVII.23
We note that the marginal propensity to consume is more precisely estimated as
the minimum wage share S increases, this is a consequence of the improved quality
of the instrument as S increases. For households earning more than three-quarters of
their disposable income from minimum wages a RMB 1000 rise in income increases
consumption by RMB 1301. Estimating consumption response as a function of the
sum of labor and transfer income yields consumption elasticities closer to unity and
considerably smaller standard errors. For minimum wage dependent households
with S > 0.75 in Column (8), the point estimate is 1.065 with a robust standard
error of 0.409. The lower standard errors in Columns (5)-(8) result from higher ex-
planatory power of the minimum wage instrument if we use a more comprehensive
definition of the income shock which include transfers.
In both sets of specifications, we reject the null hypothesis of irrelevant or weak
instrument using the Kleibergen and Paap, 2006 test only for households earning
more than half of their disposable income from minimum wage labor. We note how-
ever that p-values of the weak instrument test are generally lower in Columns (5)-(8)
when the minimum wage instrument is used to fit labor and transfer income simul-
taneously. This suggests that the minimum wage is a stronger instrument when both
labor and transfer income are fitted in the first stage. Finally, the lack of strength in
the minimum wage instrument for households with S < 0.5 suggests that the min-
imum wage as an instrument for labor income shock should be interpreted with
caution for this group. This is also expected, since for them, the minimum wages
represents a minor proportion of their disposable income.
Overall, we infer from the 2SLS estimates that minimum wage dependent house-
holds in China fully spend their labor and transfer income changes induced by the
minimum wage increase. Since the minimum wage income increases show unan-
ticipated and persistent behavior (see Table 1-II and Appendix 1.A), we can also
interpret these results as consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, Jappelli
and Pistaferri (2010).
23All our estimates presented in the paper are robust to this type of clustering, results are available
from the authors.
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In conclusion, it is also instructive to compare the 2SLS estimates of consump-
tion propensity to minimum wage income with similarly specified OLS estimates
showing consumption propensity to labor and transfer income changes. The OLS
estimates are reported in Table 1-X in Appendix 1.D, they show that the correlations
between labor income and consumption are considerably smaller, they fall within
a range between 0.33 and 0.44. What can explain this large difference between the
2SLS and OLS estimates? First, expected labor income changes that do not origi-
nate from minimum wage variation could generally be more transitory and therefore
subject to more consumption smoothing, for instance bonuses, which would imply a
lower marginal propensity to consume. Second, reporting and measurement errors
with respect to household income itself can attenuate the OLS estimate. At the same
time, such measurement errors are likely to be orthogonal to the minimum wage
variation, making the 2SLS estimate asymptotically consistent.
1.4.4 Health and Education Expenditure
An extensive economic literature has documented a positive relationship between
health and education on the one hand and productivity and long-run income on the
other, Mincer (“Investment in human capital and personal income distribution”),
Bloom and Canning (2000). Therefore, health and educational expenditure present
a particular item of interest indicative of the welfare of a household and its children.
The household survey data allow us to examine these consumption items separately
and document their relationship to the minimum wage level. From a public pol-
icy perspective, higher consumption of both health and educational expenditure of
low income households in China is particularly desirable given the relative weak-
ness of China’s public health system and often costly access to quality education as
documented for instance by Chamon and Prasad, 2010.
As shown by Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura (2007) and Blundell, Pistaferri,
and Preston (2008), education and health expenditures are characterize by a more
durable nature that closely assimilates them to investment and saving activities. De-
composing health and education expenditures in durable and non-durable items is
not a straight forward exercise. Some of the health related expenditures are non-
durable (i.e. drugs, medicines, treatments) however others have a more durable
nature (i.e. medical and health care appliances, health insurances). Similarly, edu-
cation expenditures may be either non-durable (i.e. stationery, educational activities
and other cultural goods), or have an intrinsic durable utility (i.e. tuition fees, text-
books, educational hardware and software, musical instruments).
For all the above reasons we opt not to classify health and education within ei-
ther durable or non-durable goods, but we provide estimates of the impact of min-
imum wages on health and education separately from durables and non-durables.
We further provide a detailed breakdown between components of health, education,
durables and non-durables in Appendix 1.E to describe in more detail the consump-
tion behavior of Chinese households as a reaction to a minimum wage hike. Table
1.5 reports 2SLS estimates of the household consumption equation for annual real
health and education expenditure in Columns (1)-(3), for non-durables expenditure
in Columns (4)-(6) and for durables expenditure in Columns (7)-(9).
For households with the highest minimum wage dependence (S > 0.75), we find
that a RMB 1,000 higher annual minimum wage is associated with a higher health
and education expenditure of RMB 313, that is more than 30% of any minimum wage
increase is spent either on health or education. The standard error is 0.159 and the
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estimate is significant at 5% level. Increased health and educational spending rep-
resent substantial portion of the overall consumption response to minimum wage
increases. The 30% expenditure share for a marginal minimum wage income hike is
double when compared to the much lower 15% average expenditure share of health
and educational spending combined, cfr. Table 1-V in Appendix 1.B. Moreover, as
shown in a more detailed breakdown in Appendix Table 1-XI for health expendi-
tures, and in Appendix Table 1-XII for education expenditures, the majority of the
expenditures in these two categories stems from drugs and medicines, educational
goods such as books, textbooks and stationery. Educational courses, CPU and soft-
ware expenditures have also relatively large coefficients albeit not significant.
In Columns (3)-(6) we report the estimates for the aggregated non-durables cate-
gory. Households earning more than half of their disposable income from minimum
wages spend between RMB 0.34-0.41 for a RMB 1 increase in minimum wages. Re-
sults are significant at 5% level. Appendix Table 1-XIII shows a more detailed break-
down for non-durables with a significant coefficient for food in a range of RMB
0.26-0.32 increase for RMB 1 raise in the minimum wage. The point estimate for
non-durable services is also significant at 0.09. Coupled with the results on health
and education expenditures this suggests that food consumption is a poor proxy for
total consumption.
The effect of the minimum wage hike on durable expenditures is not significant.
The coefficients of Columns (8)-(9) in Table 1.5 are large (0.32-0.34) and in line with
the magnitude of the estimates for health-education and non-durable expenditure,
nevertheless, the standard errors are somewhat less precisely estimated not allowing
to reject the null of no impact at standard significance levels. The point estimate of
the durables component however suggests that the increase in minimum wages is
approximately equally split between health and education, non-durable and durable
expenditures. Interestingly, Appendix Table 1-XIV shows that approximately 10%
of the minimum wage increase can be associated with expenditures on televisions.
In comparison to the U.S., where Aaronson, Agarwal, and French, 2012 find that
minimum wage households spent their increase in income in vehicles tied to collat-
eralized loans, this finding is illustrative of the relative difference in average living
standards across the two countries. In our setting, when a relatively poor house-
hold relying on minimum wages for most of their disposable income is faced with
a persistent increase in the minimum wage it opts for investing a large share of that
windfall in educational and health expenditures.
The result on health and education confirms the findings of Chamon and Prasad
(2010) that associate costly education and poor public health provisioning with the
high saving rates of Chinese households.24 We interpret the finding of the large ed-
ucational expenditure share for additional minimum wage income as a strong inter-
generational bequest motive with respect to human capital. Educational spending is
regarded as an investment into a higher future household income. In the context of
the one-child-policy, parental aspirations typically focus on a single child and edu-
cational investment in the child may also serve as a retirement insurance for parents.
24In a separate set of regressions we interacted health and education expenditure with the number of
children in the household. The estimates show that around 25% of the combined health and education
response to minimum wages comes from households with children. However the interaction terms
are not significant at standard confidence levels.
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1.5 Household Heterogeneity
1.5.1 Liquidity Constraints
Consumption effects of incremental disposable income documented in Section 1.4
could be the result of borrowing constraints, Zeldes, 1989, Jappelli and Pistaferri,
2010. In a high income growth environment like China, households may expect a
life-time income which justifies a desired consumption level larger than current dis-
posable income, but borrowing constraints enforce a lower consumption level equal
to disposable income. A higher minimum wage alleviates these expenditure con-
straints and this may explain the high consumption propensity. Indeed, minimum
wage households are inherently liquidity constrained due to their low proceeds from
labor and generally a lack of collateral to pledge against a loan. It is therefore pos-
sible that the findings in the previous section are driven by the inability to smooth
consumption over time.
If financial constraints contribute to higher consumption propensities, we expect
financially unconstrained households to feature lower consumption propensities of
minimum wage income. We identify three variables as proxies for financially un-
constrained households, namely those with access to additional liquidity. First, we
define a dummy indicating that the household has property income. Property serves
as collateral in credit relationships and may be used to guarantee a loan. In the sam-
ple, roughly 14% of low income households with S > 0.5 dispose of property income
and may therefore be less likely to face borrowing constraints.25 Second, we iden-
tify households with interest, dividend or insurance income. The respective dummy
variable takes on the value one for 7% of all households with S > 0.5. Third, we
define outright home ownership households as those who own a house and do not
have to make mortgage payments. Contrary to non-owners or owners with mort-
gage debt, outright home owners can pledge their property as collateral to obtain
loans and smooth consumption behavior over the life-cycle. Yet, ownership rates
are extremely high at 76% even among relatively poor minimum wage households
(S > 0.5) and the house value may often be so low that even outright ownership
does not necessarily imply access to credit.
Table 1.6 reports how the three proxies for credit access interact with the con-
sumption propensity in the 2SLS setting. Columns (1)-(3) show that, when inter-
acted with the property income dummy, the consumption response to minimum
wage induced changes in labor and transfer income differs from the baseline 2SLS
coefficient of Table 1.4. Households with property income above the median and
with S > 0.5 or S > 075, consume roughly 30% less of the induced income variation
compared to households without property income. Columns (4)-(6) mark minimum
wage households with financial assets; but their consumption propensity is not sta-
tistically significantly different from other minimum wage dependent households.
Finally, outright house ownership reported in Columns (7)-(9) does not appear to
matter much for a household’s consumption propensity. The coefficient of −0.121
for the interaction term in Column (9) is economically small and again statistically
insignificant. These results suggest that variations in liquidity access (identified by
our proxies) do not seem to matter for the high propensity to consume addition min-
imum wage income. Overall, we find little empirical support for the hypothesis that
liquidity constraints drive the high consumption propensities found in Section 1.4.
25Among households with some income from property, the mean income from property is RMB
2,957 per year, and the median RMB 630. We construct the dummy (=1) if income from property is
above the median of RMB 630 per year.
1.5. Household Heterogeneity 19
1.5.2 Household Structure
The large household propensity to spend a higher minimum wage income on edu-
cation suggests that household structure matters for the consumption behavior. The
one-child policy implies a predominance of single child households: the majority
of households in the UHS sample have one child (77%), households with two chil-
dren represent 14.5%, childless households are 6.5%, and only 2% of household have
more than two children.26
The Chinese one-child policy is often blamed for an unbalanced gender ratio
between girls and boys because abortions are practiced more frequently if the fetus
is female. Some authors claim that this gender imbalance has consequences for the
marriage market in which competition for brides requires young unmarried men to
demonstrate wealth and real estate ownership. The marriage motive could generate
higher savings rates among households with a male child and in particular with a
male child of adult age, Wei and Zhang, 2011, Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2014.
Table 1.7 reports the marginal propensity to consume out of the minimum wage
change when fitted labor and transfer income is interacted with a dummy for house-
hold with children, Columns (1)-(3); with a dummy for a male child, in Columns
(4)-(6); and with a dummy identifying households with an adult male child of at
least 24 years of age, in Columns (7)-(9). The 2SLS estimates in Column (3) provide
evidence that a high consumption propensity of minimum wage income is related
to children in the household. In fact, childless families with the highest minimum
wage dependency (S > 0.75) show a lower point estimate and only households with
at least one child show a marginal propensity to consume close to one.27 We infer
from Column (6) that the male gender of a child makes only an economically small
and statistically insignificant difference to consumption behavior. Male children of
adult age increase rather than reduce consumption on average, but the estimated
effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
While children in a household boost propensity of consumption of minimum
wage income considerably, there is no support for a gender-based saving bias in low
income households dependent on minimum wages. Consistently, our identification
strategy does not allow us to generalize this finding to wealthier families for which
minimum wages do not matter. As aggregate saving rates depend mostly on the
saving behavior of middle and high income families, we need to be careful not to
extrapolate these findings for low income families to the Chinese aggregate macroe-
conomic saving behavior as a whole.28
26Besides simple non-compliance, a series of exceptions to the one-child policy can be highlighted
and are documented for China. For instance a time distance of four to six years between two births
may provide a justification for two children, rural families can have two children if the first baby is a
girl, and further exemptions exist on ethnic and economic considerations, Gu et al., 2007.
27In a separate set of regressions we also test for incremental minimum wage effects on consump-
tion in the one-child household group and compare it to households without children. The estimated
interaction coefficient of the dummy for one child is larger than the generic dummy for children in
Table 1.7. Moreover, we compare one-child households with multiple children households to see if the
one-child saving motive holds; yet we do not find significantly different consumption responses across
these household groups.
28We tried to explore further the heterogeneity of the minimum wage impact on consumption by
looking at interactions with urban immigrant households, household with one or both members work-
ing for an SOE, households with debt, female headed households and the education of the head of the
households. None of these characteristics have significant interactions with the minimum wage.
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1.6 Robustness
1.6.1 Parallel Trends
The difference-in-difference estimation requires the parallel (common) trend assump-
tion to hold, whereby the outcome variable in the treatment and control group should
exhibit similar trends before treatment occurs, and these trends persist in the absence
of treatment. Anticipation effects of policy change or diverging pre-existing trend
can bias the inference. We therefore seek to show a high degree of synchronization
between consumption changes and minimum wage changes.
To validate our research design, we nest household consumption in a more gen-
eral specification, which allows for asynchronous effects in a two year window around
the implementation of the minimum wage change. Formally, we estimate the aug-
mented reduced form
Ch,c,t = α+
+2
∑
k=−2
βRFk MWc,t+k + Xm,h,tΛ+ Xh,tΘ+ Xcity,tΞ+ φc · t + ηh + δp,t + εh,c,t,
(1.8)
where the parameter of interest βRFk takes on different time subscripts to capture
a persistent or anticipated consumption response relative to the date of minimum
wage changes. We use time lags of k = −1,−2 years or time leads of k = +1,+2
years. The lead coefficients are like placebo events for the parallel trend assumption
and should exhibit a zero consumption response to rule out confounding parallel
trends, hence βRFk = 0 for k > 0. The lagged coefficients instead provide information
on the duration of the impact, i.e. if the minimum wage effect on consumption is
persistent over time. By including county linear time trends in the regression, φc · t,
our specification seeks to identify a sharp contemporaneous relationship between
variation of consumption and minimum wage variation even under confounding
county-level trends.
Table 1.8 reports the augmented specification. Columns (1)-(4) presents marginal
propensities to consume for two periods of lagged response (k = −1,−2), and for
two periods of lead response (k = +1,+2). In both specifications the contemporane-
ous response is positive, statistically significant, and consistent with the findings in
Section 1.4. By contrast, the first lag and lead of the minimum wage have a negative
sign and are statistically insignificant; nor the second lag or lead matter from a sta-
tistical point of view. Only the first lag for the category S > 0.5 shows a marginally
significant negative effect. We therefore find no evidence for policy anticipation ef-
fects on household consumption. Instead we find that the consumption response
occurs contemporaneously to the minimum wage change and is not affected by di-
vergent trends.
1.6.2 Attrition
Attrition of households from the sample can severely bias the results. In this section
we construct a dummy for attrition and test whether minimum wages have an effect
on the attrition rate.
The UHS is based on a multi-stage probabilistic sample and stratified design.
The Chinese national Bureau of Statistics draws a sample of households randomly
every three years. After being drawn into the UHS, the households already know for
how many years they are expected to be part of the survey. As a general rule, every
year one third of the households of the big sample is replaced by other households.
This implies that there is a structural attrition in the sample and that is challenging
1.6. Robustness 21
to disentangle it from the attrition due to voluntarily refusing to take part in the UHS
for the predetermined amount of years.29
In the following we study attrition by looking at the attrition of household before
the minimum three year observation period. We construct a dummy variable for
attrition if the worker has stayed in the panel only one or two years. To avoid sample
composition bias, some caveats in the construction of the attrition dummy are due:
first, our panel starts in 2002 and terminates in 2009. For 2002 we do not observe if
the household is part of a the 2002 or an older vintage of the UHS, therefore we drop
all households that were already in the UHS in 2002. Second, from 2003 we keep in
the sample only new vintages of households. Third, we cannot track for at least three
years households entering the panel in 2008 or 2009. We therefore drop form this
regression households entering the UHS in 2008 and 2009 since we cannot observe
them for three years in a row and cannot define precisely the attrition dummy for
them. For new vintages of households for which we can observe at least three years
of data, we switch on the attrition dummy when a household is observed only for
one or two years and zero if it has at least three years of observations.
The Table 1.9 shows individual level estimates of a proxy for attrition on the nat-
ural logarithm of the minimum wage. Results indicate that minimum wage changes
do not affect attrition. The results are consistent across all the groups of minimum
wage dependency and hold in both the sample of household composed only by best
two earners and the full sample of household members.
1.6.3 Minimum wages and Hours Worked
Higher minimum wages may affect labor allocation also on the intensive margin by
affecting labor demand and supply. On one hand, employers may demand more
hours from their employees after a hike in minimum wages; on the other hand,
higher minimum wages may provide incentives for workers to switch from full-time
to part-time employment or vice versa. In order to show the impact of the minimum
wage on labor supply we regress Equation 1.7 using monthly hours worked as the
dependent variable and we take the natural logarithm of minimum wages for easier
interpretation of estimates. We keep in the sample both employed and unemployed
individuals since hours worked may be affected by the loss of employment caused
by higher minimum wages. Results are reported in Table 1.10.
They illustrate that there is no significant evidence of either an increase or a de-
crease in hours worked. At the same time it can be observed that there is a general
tendency of decreasing working hours as the share of minimum wage income in-
creases. In Column (4) when the workers belong to households with share S>0.75 a
one percent increase in minimum wages is associated with a reduction of monthly
working time of 4.6 hours. In order to put this estimate into perspective it should be
recalled that the average annual increase of real minimum wages is approximately
7.35% (see Table 1.1), on a monthly basis, this translates in a 0.61 percent increase of
the real minimum wage.
29More specifically, the Chinese national Bureau of Statistics draws a first-stage sample (the “big
sample”) of households randomly every three years. A small sample is then randomly selected from
the big sample for more recurrent interviews and diary-keeping. As a general rule, from 1986 to 2005,
every year one third of the households of the big sample is replaced by other households. In addition,
as pointed out by Feng, Hu, and Moffitt, 2017 and Ding and He, 2018, this rotation design has not
always been strictly enforced resulting in a lower rotation ratio than what was originally planned. For
instance, some provinces may have delayed withdrawing and replacing the first-stage sample at the
end of the three-year period for funding reasons.
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1.7 Minimum Wages and Employment
The UHS collect consumption information only at the level of the household. How-
ever, workers’ employment status, occupation and industry of employment is avail-
able at individual level. In this section we exploit this more granular structure to
estimate the impact of minimum wages on employment in both extensive and in-
tensive dimensions.
As shown, higher minimum wages are associated with an increase in the labor
income of minimum wage dependent households. All previous regressions include
both employed and non employed best two earners in a household implying that
the results hold unconditionally from the employment status. It can therefore be in-
ferred that household consumption does not seem negatively affected by potential
negative employment effects stemming from higher minimum wages. To corrobo-
rate this finding, in this section we disentangle the wage effect from the employment
effect and run separate estimates for employment.30 Evidence of significant negative
employment effects would be a relevant objection to an active minimum wage policy
and would not be consistent with the finding of previous sections.
Table 1.11 reports individual level regressions where the dependent variable is
the employment dummy equal to one for employed household members, a zero
dummy identifies workers within the labor force declaring to be unemployed at the
time of the survey. The zero group includes all adult household members who do
not earn any income, but excludes those in training (for example university stu-
dents) and homeworkers. The independent variable is the log of the county real
minimum wage. Column (1) considers workers/employees from households not
depending on minimum wage income as a placebo group, while Columns (2)-(4)
focus on workers in households of various degrees of minimum wage dependency.
Columns (5)-(8) focus on the migrant population of workers who migrated into the
urban area less than 10 years ago. The latter groups can be described as more vul-
nerable and exposed to minimum wage increases, Orrenius and Zavodny, 2008. All
specifications include worker and province-year fixed effects and we add additional
county-level trends and city-level macroeconomic controls.
In Column (1) there is a weak positive impact of minimum wages on employ-
ment for households not earning a minimum wage. Nevertheless the estimates is
rather small, a 10% increase in minimum wages would contribute to a 0.27 percent-
age points increase in employment. We interpret this result with caution given that
S=0 is our placebo group. Columns (2)-(4) show increasingly negative point esti-
mates for the real minimum wage for more minimum wage dependent households.
Households with the highest minimum wage dependency in Column (4) feature
a coefficient of -0.076: a 10% real minimum wage hike decreases the likelihood of
employment by less than 0.8%. The coefficient is economically and statistically in-
significant. The standard error on the coefficient is nevertheless precisely estimated
at 0.037, which implies that we can exclude large adverse effects of minimum wages
on the unemployment risk of a worker.
The employment regressions for migrant workers in Columns (5)-(8) produce a
more negative impact of the minimum wage level on employment albeit insignifi-
cant. For minimum wage dependent migrant households with S > 0.75 in Column
30Previous research on China has related higher minimum wages to more instances of lay-off based
on firm survey data, Huang, Loungani, and Wang (2014). But unlike our household survey data,
firm based surveys do not track individual workers and therefore cannot address questions on worker
turnover rates or prolonged unemployment spells. Welfare implications are very different in these two
cases.
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(8), the point estimate is −0.635, which implies that a 10% larger minimum wage
increases the risk of unemployment by 6.35 percentage points. However, also in
this case we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the total unemployment effect is
zero.31
One interpretation of these findings is that the level of minimum wages in China,
set at around 20% of the median wage, is low by international standards and has
little bite. The low bite of the minimum wage coupled with the evidence on the
absence of unemployment effects suggests that the minimum wage level in China
is not salient with respect to general equilibrium effects in the labor market. The
absence of unemployment effects reinforces the previous results on consumption,
since the potential precautionary savings motive due to unemployment effects is
not sustained.
Under the circumstances of a relatively low cost of minimum wage labor, mini-
mum wage hikes may contribute to labor reallocation without triggering significant
unemployment risk for low wage workers. To test this reallocation effect we can ex-
amine the relationship between minimum wage level and occupation switching by
defining an occupation switching dummy (=1) if the worker has changed occupation
from the previous year and zero otherwise.
Table 1.12 reports employment switching regressions as a function of the mini-
mum wage level. Columns (1)-(4) are based on the sample of all workers in house-
holds of different minimum wage dependency S whereas Columns (5)-(8) focus only
on migrant workers. We use here the full sample of all migrants and not only the re-
cent flow of immigrants to maximize statistical power through sample size.32 Work-
ers in the most minimum wage dependent households with S > 0.75 have higher
rates of switch in occupation for a higher minimum wage. The wage coefficient is
positive at 0.407 albeit standard errors are too large to confirm significance at con-
ventional levels of confidence.
Interestingly, for minimum wage dependent migrant workers the wage coeffi-
cient is larger: a one percent increase in the real minimum wage is associated with
1.92 percentage points increased probability to switch occupation. The coefficient is
statistically significant at 5% confidence level. This evidence suggests that for more
vulnerable workers there are some reallocation effects helping to change occupation
if faced with unemployment risk due to minimum wages.
1.8 Conclusions
This study provides evidence on the consumption and income response of Chinese
households to the large cross-sectional and intertemporal variation of China’s mini-
mum wages. For the period 2002-2009, we identify more than 13,874 changes in the
local minimum wage across China’s 2,183 counties and 285 cities, and match them
31All regressions are performed using linear OLS. Non-linear binary dependent variable models are
computationally difficult due to the high dimensionality of fixed effects included in the specification.
We perform further robustness tests of these finding using county or household level fixed effect:
the goodness of fit of these estimates is considerably lower while the point estimates have similar
magnitudes. We also experiment with county-level aggregate regressions using a distinct separate
county-level dataset on unemployment rate and obtain a point estimate of −0.064 with a standard
error of 0.087 for S > 0.75. We also test if the minimum wage unemployment effect is present when
we restrict the sample to a younger teenager population, we run several estimates for teens with age
greater than fifteen but lower than twenty and up to twenty-four. All teen estimates do not show
negative employment effect significant at conventional confidence levels.
32In a separate set of robustness estimates we drop sequentially the fixed effects and the county
trends from the regression and obtain similar results to those in Table 1.12.
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to the urban household survey (UHS) which covers 73,164 urban household-year
observations.
The main finding of the analysis shows that higher household incomes due to a
minimum wage hike are fully spent by minimum wage dependent households. The
magnitude of the estimates is consistent with the estimates of the literature on in-
come shocks in developing countries, see Wolpin (1982) and Paxson (1992), suggest-
ing that under similar labor market conditions the results can be reasonably applied
to a comparable group of households.
This study finds that the relationship is stronger for households composed of
two minimum wage earners and the effect is driven by households with children,
whereas households without children feature higher saving rates. The study also
finds that roughly 30% of additional minimum wage income is in fact invested in
health care and educational spending with potential long-term benefits for house-
hold welfare.
We test if the consumption effect of a minimum wage hike is driven by borrowing
constraints. In fact, any excess sensitivity of consumption to incremental disposable
income could be the result of liquidity constraints and inability to smooth consump-
tion over the life cycle. However, we find that the consumption response do not
differ significantly when we compare more or less liquidity-constrained households
showing that the impact is not driven by liquidity constraints.
The study finds also evidence of complementarity between minimum wages and
other transfers from social policies. Local minimum wage increases are associated
with increased (rather the decreased) social transfers for households earning more
than 75% of their disposable income from minimum wages. For this group, social
transfers therefore magnify the income effect of minimum wage hikes on consump-
tion. This suggests that local minimum wage increases in China are often part of a
more comprehensive social policy towards low-income households. In fact, house-
holds earning less than 25% of their income from minimum wages do not experience
commensurate effects in their transfer income when minimum wages increase.
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FIGURE 1.1: Minimum Wage Variation
Proportion of counties increasing their nominal minimum wage in China, 1996-2012. We plot
by year the percentage of China’s 2,183 counties and 285 cities in our sample with a strictly
positive minimum wage change between 0 and 10%, between 10% and 20%, and above 20%,
respectively. The column height represents the combined share of counties experiencing an
increase of their nominal minimum wage in a given year.
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FIGURE 1.2: Household Consumption and County Minimum Wages
- I
Average real consumption changes are plotted for minimum wage dependent households
(S > 0.5, red crosses) and those without minimum wage income (S = 0, blue dots). We
sort all households into 40 bins according to the magnitude of the local real minimum wage
increase relative to province-level average minimum wages. The dashed line represents the
fitted linear relationship for minimum wage dependent households and the solid line for
households without minimum wage income. N=32,355 household-level observations. A
standard t-test for the statistical difference of the two slopes produces a t-statistic of 1.56
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FIGURE 1.3: Household Consumption and County Minimum Wages
- II
After sorting counties into those with and without a nominal minimum wage change in a
given year, we proceed as in Figure 2: average real consumption changes are plotted for min-
imum wage dependent households (S > 0.5, red crosses) and those without minimum wage
income (S = 0, blue dots). In each panel households are sorted into 40 bins according to the
magnitude of the local real minimum wage increase relative to province-level average min-
imum wages. The dashed line represents the fitted linear relationship for minimum wage
dependent households and the solid line for households without minimum wage income.
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TABLE 1.1: Labor Supply and Minimum Wage Bite
The table reports the monthly supply of working hours for the entire cleaned sample of
urban full-time workers (Panel A) and only for the subset of workers in minimum wage
households (Panel B). For both groups, the monthly hours worked are reported for counties
that have a change in the minimum wage (treated) compared with counties without min-
imum wage change (control). A t-test for the difference of the means between these two
groups is also presented with clustered standard errors at the county-level in parenthesis.
Labor supply in terms of monthly hours worked is not available for the years 2007-2009.
Panel C reports also average minimum wage bite by year and the annual growth rate of
the real minimum wage. The minimum wage bite is computed as the ratio of the minimum
wage (MW) to the median wage in each county and then averaged across counties. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Panel A: Workers in all households
Monthly hrs MW treated counties 167.2 166.0 164.3 167.7 168.2 − − −
(54.48) (58.62) (58.19) (57.14) (56.38)
Monthly hrs control counties 164.3 163.7 167.8 165.1 177.8 − − −
(58.16) (56.78) (56.21) (60.34) (69.02)
T-test 2.99 2.33 −3.48 2.61 −9.59 − − −
(2.35) (2.04) (1.99) (2.40) (6.12)
Observations for t-test 31657 41654 43808 44027 38910 − − −
Panel B: Workers in MW households (S>0)
Monthly hrs MW treated counties 162.1 160.7 160.0 163.8 164.1 − − −
(63.11) (68.41) (66.04) (65.41) (64.94)
Monthly hrs control counties 156.5 160.3 162.4 159.2 174.5 − − −
(68.33) (62.72) (64.27) (73.56) (76.96)
T-test 5.60 0.46 −2.45 4.61 −10.37 − − −
(2.57)* (2.49) (2.51) (4.31) (7.51)
Observations for t-test 8065 10406 10705 10828 9240 − − −
Panel C: MW bite and Real MW growth
MW relative to median wage 0.202 0.201 0.197 0.198 0.201 0.185 0.189 0.176
(0.042) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.053) (0.045)
Real MW growth (p.p.) 10.42 4.65 5.55 10.29 7.51 8.65 8.80 2.93
(8.55) (6.71) (8.96) (8.08) (6.86) (8.11) (6.20) (4.09)
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TABLE 1.2: Household Labor and Transfer Income and the Minimum
Wage
We regress the levels of household real annual labor income in Columns (1)-(3), trans-
fer income in Columns (4)-(6), and their sum in Column (7)-(9), on the local effective
real minimum wage level. The samples consist of all households for which the labor in-
come share S from minim wages is zero (S = 0), or more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more
than 75% (S > 0.75) of household disposable income. All regressions include house-
hold, county and interacted province-year fixed effects, city-level controls and county time-
trends as specified in Equation (7). Standard errors clustered at county-level in parentheses.
Dep.var.: Household Labor Income Household Transfer Income HH Labor & Transfer Income
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Minimum Wage -0.022 1.378 1.529 -0.071 0.733 0.984 -0.110 1.904 2.247
(0.574) (0.632)** (0.692)** (0.222) (0.512) (0.521)* (0.623) (0.811)** (0.823)***
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44288 3699 3374 44288 3699 3374 44288 3699 3374
N clusters 625 346 335 625 346 335 625 346 335
N households 20450 1785 1627 20450 1785 1627 20450 1785 1627
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.700 0.705 0.064 0.244 0.247 0.226 0.672 0.681
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TABLE 1.3: Household Consumption and the Minimum Wage
Reduced form specifications regress the annual real household consumption in RMB
on the real local minimum wage level where Columns (1)-(4) control for all non-labor
income and Columns (5)-(8) for non-labor income without transfer income. The samples
consist of all households for which the labor income share S from minimum wages
is zero (S = 0), more than 25% (S > 0.25), more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than
75% (S > 0.75) of household disposable income. All regressions include household,
county and interacted province-year fixed effects, city-level controls and county time-
trends as specified in Equation (6). Standard errors clustered at county-level in parentheses.
Dep.var.: Household Consumption
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minimum Wage -1.039 1.224 1.605 1.914 -1.090 1.325 1.861 2.317
(0.631) (0.564)** (0.798)** (0.912)** (0.640)* (0.575)** (0.892)** (1.017)**
Controls:
All non-labor income Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Non-labor income
excluding transfers No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44375 12072 3700 3375 44375 12072 3700 3375
N clusters 626 491 346 335 626 491 346 335
N households 20530 5686 1785 1627 20530 5686 1785 1627
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.429 0.553 0.583 0.223 0.417 0.567 0.604
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TABLE 1.4: Household Consumption under Labor Income Shocks
We report 2SLS level regressions in which real annual household consumption is alter-
natively regressed on the household’s annual real labor income level in Columns (1)-(4),
or the annual real labor income plus transfers level in Columns (5)-(8). The samples
consist of all households for which the labor income share S from minimum wages is
zero (S = 0), more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75) of household
disposable income. All regressions include city-level controls, household fixed effects,
interacted province-year fixed effects, and county time-trends as specified in Equation
(8). Standard errors clustered at county-level in parentheses. The p-values in the last line
refer to a test under the null hypothesis of weak instruments (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
Dep.var.: Household Consumption
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor Income 61.461 3.314 1.217 1.301
(1986.224) (4.232) (0.574)** (0.648)**
Labor and 9.258 2.271 1.053 1.065
Transfer Income (45.461) (1.990) (0.405)*** (0.409)***
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41709 11309 3442 3137 41709 11309 3442 3137
N clusters 597 469 323 314 597 469 323 314
N households 17871 4927 1528 1390 17871 4927 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.975 0.529 0.031 0.026 0.845 0.396 0.019 0.009
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TABLE 1.5: Household Health & Education, Non-durables and
Durables Expenditure
The table reports the same 2SLS level regressions of Table 1.4 using sub-components
of household consumption as dependent variable. Expenditure on health and ed-
ucation is shown in Columns (1)-(3), non-durable goods in Columns (4)-(6) and
expenditure on durable goods in Columns (7)-(9). All regressions include city-level
controls, household fixed effects, interacted province-year fixed effects, and county
time-trends as specified in Equation (8). The samples consist of all households for
which the labor income share S from minimum wages is zero (S = 0), more than 50%
(S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75) of household disposable income. Standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered at county-level. Weak instrument row shows the
p-value of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test under the null of weak instrument.
Dep.var.: Health & Educ. Exp. Non-durables Exp. Durables Exp.
S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Labor and Transfer Income 2.110 0.228 0.313 2.034 0.413 0.344 0.164 0.316 0.336
(4.749) (0.165) (0.159)** (9.677) (0.189)** (0.175)** (1.363) (0.232) (0.236)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36624 3055 2779 41709 3442 3137 36624 3055 2779
N clusters 290 228 224 597 323 314 290 228 224
N households 15821 1361 1236 17871 1528 1390 15821 1361 1236
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.661 0.044 0.022 0.845 0.019 0.009 0.661 0.044 0.022
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TABLE 1.6: Household Consumption, Minimum Wage Income Shock
and Liquidity Constraints
We report 2SLS level regressions as Table 1.4. Here real annual household consumption
is regressed on the household’s annual real labor and transfer income and on additional
interaction terms identifying liquidity constrained households. The interaction terms are
property income dummy in Columns (1)-(3), a capital income dummy for interest, dividends
and insurance income in Columns (4)-(6), and a dummy for (debt-free) house ownership in
Columns (7)-(9). The samples consist of all households for which the labor income share S
from minimum wages is zero (S = 0), more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75)
of household disposable income. All regressions include city-level controls, household
fixed effects, interacted province-year fixed effects, and county time-trends as specified
in Equation (8). Standard errors clustered at county-level in parentheses. The p-values
in the last line refer to a test under the null of weak instruments (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
Dep.var.: Household Consumption
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Labor and 5.989 1.070 1.068 6.615 0.907 0.956 8.552 1.082 1.153
transfer income (17.128) (0.380)*** (0.383)*** (24.340) (0.416)** (0.435)** (41.467) (0.497)** (0.506)**
Labor and
transfer income -0.480 -0.356 -0.356
× property dum. (1.648) (0.178)** (0.194)*
Labor and
transfer income -0.204 -0.101 -0.110
× capital income dum. (0.902) (0.072) (0.078)
Labor and
transfer income 0.825 -0.036 -0.110
× house ownership dum. (3.800) (0.189) (0.195)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41709 3442 3137 41709 3442 3137 41709 3442 3137
N clusters 597 323 314 597 323 314 597 323 314
N households 17871 1528 1390 17871 1528 1390 17871 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.741 0.022 0.011 0.797 0.024 0.014 0.843 0.018 0.009
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TABLE 1.7: Household Consumption and Household Structure
We report 2SLS level regressions as in Table 1.4. Here real annual household consump-
tion is regressed on the household’s annual real labor and transfer income and on ad-
ditional interaction terms identifying household structure. The interaction terms are a
dummy for one or more children in the household in Columns (1)-(3), an additional
dummy for one or more male children in the household in Columns (4)-(6), or an ad-
ditional dummy for one or more male children older than 24 years in Columns (7)-(9).
The samples consist of all households for which the labor income share S from minimum
wages is zero (S = 0), more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75) of house-
hold disposable income. All regressions include city-level controls, household fixed ef-
fects, interacted province-year fixed effects, and county time-trends as specified in Equa-
tion (8). Standard errors clustered at county-level in parentheses. The p-values in the
last line refer to a test under the null of weak instruments (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
Dep.var.: Household Consumption
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Labor and 11.722 0.463 0.349 10.460 0.431 0.309 34.987 0.447 0.325
transfer income (56.254) (0.550) (0.498) (44.459) (0.509) (0.452) (505.309) (0.547) (0.493)
Labor and
transfer income -3.084 0.655 0.798 -2.893 0.619 0.743 -11.590 0.639 0.784
× children dum. (16.180) (0.386)* (0.315)** (13.583) (0.397) (0.333)** (171.106) (0.374)* (0.301)***
Labor and
transfer income 0.290 0.064 0.090
×male child dum. (1.418) (0.129) (0.147)
Labor and
transfer income 9.741 0.048 0.052
× adult male child dum. (140.027) (0.123) (0.148)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41709 3442 3137 41709 3442 3137 41709 3442 3137
N clusters 597 323 314 597 323 314 597 323 314
N households 17871 1528 1390 17871 1528 1390 17871 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.837 0.021 0.011 0.816 0.018 0.009 0.945 0.020 0.009
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TABLE 1.8: Parallel Trends and Anticipation Effects
Reduced form specifications regress the annual real household consumption on the contem-
poraneous real local minimum wage level including lags and leads for one and two years.
The samples consist of all households for which the labor income share S from minimum
wages is zero (S = 0), more than 25% (S > 0.25), more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than
75% (S > 0.75) of household disposable income. All regressions include household, county
and interacted province-year fixed effects. We control for all other type of income including
transfers, we add city-level controls, and county time trends as specified in Equation 1.8.
Standard errors clustered at county-level in parentheses.
Dep.var.: Household Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
Minimum wage -0.818 1.412 1.769 2.056
(0.672) (0.774)* (1.044)* (1.192)*
Minimum Waget−1 0.341 -0.481 -1.865 -1.778
(0.719) (0.612) (1.111)* (1.131)
Minimum waget−2 0.983 0.860 0.579 0.526
(0.908) (0.731) (1.568) (1.648)
Minimum Waget+1 -0.815 -0.100 -0.934 -0.941
(0.504) (0.490) (0.892) (0.989)
Minimum waget+2 -0.192 -0.142 0.017 0.098
(0.392) (0.322) (0.457) (0.580)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43621 12086 3685 3315
N clusters 626 491 346 335
N households 20530 5686 1785 1627
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.442 0.563 0.588
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TABLE 1.9: Attrition
The table shows individual level estimates of a proxy for attrition on the natural log-
arithm of the minimum wage. Standard errors clustered at county-level are shown
in parentheses. All regressions include province-year fixed effects, and a linear
county time trend. We include time varying worker characteristics for family size,
outright house ownership, age, age squared, a gender dummy, years of education,
years of education squared, years of work experience, work experience squared,
years since migrating to urban area, years since migrating to urban are squared,
categorical dummies for industry, occupation and marital status. city-level controls
are city population, city real GDP, city real average wage and city unemployment rate.
Dep.var.: Attrition (1/0)
HH Best 2 Earners All HH Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
Ln(Minimum Wage) -0.056 0.069 -0.024 -0.102 -0.052 0.040 -0.038 -0.106
(0.091) (0.108) (0.158) (0.169) (0.094) (0.108) (0.153) (0.160)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 89657 17861 6184 5562 93393 19057 6659 6016
N clusters 312 289 240 237 312 290 241 238
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.311 0.357 0.361 0.296 0.307 0.350 0.354
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TABLE 1.10: Minimum Wages and Hours Worked
We report individual level estimates when the dependent variable is monthly hours
worked using equation 1.7. We keep in the sample both employed and unemployed
individuals since hours worked may be reduced due to loss of employment from higher
minimum wages. The exogenous variable is the log of the minimum wage level. Re-
gressions in Columns (1)-(4) include the best two earners in the household and those
in Columns (5)-(8) include all workers. Standard errors clustered at county-level are
shown in parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects, province-year fixed
effects and a linear county time trend. We include time varying worker characteristics
for family size, outright house ownership, age, age squared, a gender dummy, years
of education, years of education squared, years of work experience, work experience
squared, years since migrating to urban area, years since migrating to urban are squared,
categorical dummies for industry, occupation and marital status. city-level controls
are city population, city real GDP, city real average wage and city unemployment rate.
Dep.var.: Hours Worked per Month
HH Best 2 Earners All HH Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
Ln(Minimum Wage) 3.308 -2.890 -12.349 -4.622 2.804 -0.476 -12.500 -5.854
(3.851) (4.495) (8.605) (7.967) (3.837) (3.899) (7.414) (6.643)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 112979 23840 7653 6936 116979 25177 8198 7459
N clusters 293 284 248 247 293 284 248 247
N individuals 54028 11598 3820 3477 55389 12040 3999 3648
Adjusted R2 0.459 0.446 0.568 0.570 0.498 0.508 0.610 0.616
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TABLE 1.11: Minimum Wages and Employment
We report individual person level regressions using equation 1.7 where the depen-
dent variable is the dummy of employment status and the log of the minimum wage
level is used as the independent variable. Regressions in Columns (1)-(4) include the
sample of the best two earners in the household and those in Columns (5)-(8) the
sub-set of migrant workers. Standard errors clustered at county-level are shown in
parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects, province-year fixed ef-
fects, and a linear county time trend. We include time varying worker characteristics
for family size, outright house ownership, age, age squared, a gender dummy, years
of education, years of education squared, years of work experience, work experience
squared, years since migrating to urban area, years since migrating to urban are squared,
categorical dummies for industry, occupation and marital status. city-level controls
are city population, city real GDP, city real average wage and city unemployment rate.
Dep.var.: Employed (1/0)
HH Best 2 Earners Urban Migrants sub-sample
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Minimum Wage) 0.027 -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 0.028 -0.031 0.002 -0.023
(0.016)* (0.020) (0.037) (0.037) (0.025) (0.034) (0.102) (0.115)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 137225 27550 8810 8021 58366 9183 2756 2558
N clusters 671 551 405 398 629 428 277 268
N individuals 64543 13238 4340 3962 28308 4570 1390 1290
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.112 0.204 0.204 0.084 0.233 0.371 0.407
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TABLE 1.12: Minimum Wages and Occupation Change
We report individual level regression using equation 1.7 where the dependent variable
is a dummy for occupation switching from the previous year (=1 if switch). The ex-
ogenous variable is the log of the minimum wage level. Regressions in Columns (1)-(4)
include the sample of the best two earners in the household and those in Columns (5)-(8)
the sub-set of migrant workers. Standard errors clustered at county-level are shown
in parentheses. All regressions include individual fixed effects, province-year fixed
effects and a linear county time trend. We include time varying worker characteristics
for family size, outright house ownership, age, age squared, a gender dummy, years
of education, years of education squared, years of work experience, work experience
squared, years since migrating to urban area, years since migrating to urban are squared,
categorical dummies for industry, occupation and marital status. city-level controls
are city population, city real GDP, city real average wage and city unemployment rate.
Dep.var.: Employer Switch (1/0)
HH Best 2 Earners Urban Migrants sub-sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
S=0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S=0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
Ln(Minimum Wage) 0.096 0.062 0.247 0.407 0.109 -0.242 1.299 1.928
(0.100) (0.191) (0.292) (0.262) (0.099) (0.299) (0.899) (0.749)**
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 86228 17514 5396 4919 36820 5887 1699 1582
N clusters 642 524 384 380 598 406 258 253
N individuals 61103 12350 3996 3647 26127 4128 1239 1149
Adjusted R2 0.333 0.361 0.477 0.507 0.411 0.522 0.760 0.768
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1.A Predicting the Minimum Wage
For the correct interpretation of econometric estimates, it is important that mini-
mum wage changes in China are non-predictable and can be considered as a ran-
dom income shocks from the perspective of households. In this section we show
that wage changes are indeed non predictable even when using rich information
sets with socio-economic and political data typically beyond the reach of individual
households.
First, we use county-level socio-economic data to explore the predictability of
minimum wage changes. Second, we aggregate the Urban Household Survey (UHS)
data and examine whether these alternative county-level aggregates show any pre-
dictability for the minimum wage change. Third, we use biographical data on the
two most important political decision makers in Chinese counties, namely the mayor
and party secretary, to predict minimum wage changes. Throughout this exercise,
we code any nominal minimum wage change in a county as a binary (0/1) decision.
Nevertheless, all the results are robust if the (level) change of the minimum wage
becomes the dependent variable or if we use the natural logarithm of the new to the
old minimum wage. 33
1.A.1 Predictability Based on County-Level Data
Table 1-I presents OLS regression based on country-level socio-economic data to ex-
amine the predictability of minimum wage changes codes as binary outcomes (0/1).
The socio-economic data are sourced from the Prefecture Statistical Annual Year-
books, the Fiscal Statistics for Prefectures, Municipalities and Counties and the Na-
tional Demographic Yearbook. We note that these county-level data have an imper-
fect overlap with the sample of counties in our main data and so we do not use them
in the analysis on household consumption. Yet they are still a useful data source for
a test of predictability of the minimum wage change.
Columns (1)-(3) include the listed covariates as contemporaneous changes and
Columns (4)-(6) as lagged changes. All variables are expressed in real terms using
a province-level consumer price deflator. We find that none of the county variables
robustly predicts (either as contemporaneous or lagged changes) minimum wage
across specifications. In Column (3) only the average salary in the county shows
weak negative relation with the decision to change the minimum wage. But this
marginal significance disappears when we use two-way clustering at the county
and province-year levels (not shown). Overall, we conclude that the results indi-
cate no systematic relationship between county-level socio-economic variables and
minimum wage changes.
1.A.2 Predictability Based on Aggregates of Household Survey Data
Table 1-II explores the predictability of minimum wage changes based on county-
level aggregates of the Urban Household Survey (UHS) used throughout the paper.
The set of counties covered differs from Table 1-I and the time span is restricted to the
period 2002-2009. The county-level aggregates of the UHS data are complimented by
33These results are available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE 1-I: County-Level Determinants of Minimum Wage Changes,
1997-2010
The minimum wage change as the dependent variable is coded as a binary decision
outcome (1/0) with 1 representing a change and regressed on various county-level
socio-economic variables. Columns (1)-(3) use covariates in first differences con-
temporaneous with the minimum wage change; Columns (4)-(6) use covariates in
first differences lagged by one year relative to the minimum wage change.
Dep. variable: Minimum wage change dummy (1/0)
Covariates in ∆t Covariates in ∆t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(County Real GDP) -0.042 -0.191 -0.005 -0.076 -0.097 -0.012
(0.035) (0.045) (0.010) (0.028) (0.049) (0.009)
Ln(County Population) -0.077 -0.240 0.005 0.165 0.176 0.012
(0.103) (0.128) (0.009) (0.101) (0.153) (0.010)
Ln(County Total Employment) -0.014 -0.011 -0.001 0.004 0.007 -0.000
(0.014) (0.016) (0.001) (0.016) (0.023) (0.001)
County Government Balance/GDP -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Ln(County Salary per capita) 0.016 0.002 -0.020 0.021 0.006 0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001)
Ln(County Employment in Agriculture) -0.021 -0.016 0.000 0.026 0.030 0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.009) (0.012) (0.001)
Ln(Real County Savings) -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 0.014 0.005 0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.002) (0.013) (0.019) (0.001)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes
Observations 8716 8716 8714 7139 7139 7137
N clusters 1651 1651 1651 1647 1647 1647
Adjusted R2 0.591 0.697 0.990 0.625 0.686 0.992
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city-level variables drawn from the China City Statistical Yearbooks in the Chinese
Statistical Yearbook Database (CNKI). Again, no statistically significant relationship
appears between the various covariates and the minimum wage change. The results
also holds if we consider level change in minimum wages as an alternative depen-
dent variable.
1.A.3 Predictability Based on Biographical Data of Local Political Leaders
In democratic societies, important political decisions like minimum wage changes
are subject to open political debate and depend on the parliamentary strength of
competing political parties. Chinese politics represents an entirely different political
setting, important policy issues can be contingent on the preferences of the key local
decision makers, Yao and Zhang (2015). Minimum wage changes in China origi-
nate in an administrative and political process that is not subject to an open debate
that involves the public at large. This implies that little public information is gener-
ated that would allow households to anticipate minimum wage changes. Moreover,
the law only stipulates the requirement of regular review, not a mandatory change.
While individual policy preferences are hard to observe, such preferences and pol-
icy outcomes could nevertheless be related to personal political career paths and
curricula or to demographic characteristics of local leaders.
The two main political actors in Chinese local politics are the mayor, appointed
by the local communist party assembly, and the local party secretary, appointed by
personal office of the central party administration. Their biographical data are avail-
able in the Chinese Bureaucracies and Leaders Database, which is constructed and
maintained by the National Chengchi University.34 We use biographical information
about their respective tenure, their first year in office, the their year of promotion and
retirement, as well as their age and experience. Table 1-III presents the regression re-
sults with seven biographical variables for the local party secretary and an equal
number for the local mayor. Yet none of these biographical variables has any predic-
tive value for minimum wage change. Similar results are obtained if we define the
dependent variable as first difference in minimum wage levels.
Overall, we conclude from Tables 1-I, 1-II and 1-III that minimum wage changes
in China are not predictable based on county-level socio-economic data or even bio-
graphical data on the two most powerful local politicians.
34See http://ics.nccu.edu.tw/chinaleaders/. The data are documented in Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010),
Yao and Zhang (2015) and Zhou (2016).
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TABLE 1-II: Constructed County-Level Determinants of Minimum
Wage Changes, 2002-2009
The minimum wage change as the dependent variable is coded as a binary decision
outcome (1/0). We construct county-level aggregates from the UHS data and add
city-level variables. Columns (1)-(2) present estimates with standard errors clustered
at the county-level; Columns (3)-(4) report standard errors clustered two ways at the
county and province-year level.
Dep. variable: Minimum wage change dummy (0/1)
Standard error clustering: County Two-way
(1) (2) (3) (4)
County-level variables
∆t Ln(County HH real consumption) -0.008 0.047 -0.008 0.047
(0.108) (0.055) (0.111) (0.059)
∆t Ln(County HH tot. expend.) 0.001 -0.028 0.001 -0.028
(0.092) (0.039) (0.105) (0.451)
∆t Ln(County HH savings) -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006
(0.019) (0.008) (0.018) (1.265)
Share of county SOE workers -0.183 0.089 -0.183 0.089
(0.148) (0.069) (0.177) (2.248)
City-level variables
∆t Ln(City real GDP) 0.484 0.070 0.484 0.070
(0.211) (0.111) (0.450) (0.753)
∆t Ln(City population) -0.130 0.090 -0.130 0.090
(0.084) (0.068) (0.144) (1.214)
∆t City unemployment rate 0.208 -0.065 0.208 -0.065
(0.273) (0.148) (0.335) (1.511)
∆t Ln(Total city employment) 0.167 -0.130 0.167 -0.130
(0.199) (0.133) (0.330) (0.507)
∆t City employment/population -0.624 0.357 -0.624 0.357
(1.121) (1.166) (1.578) (1.486)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes
Observations 1602 1602 1602 1602
N clusters 591 591 99 99
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.973 0.676 0.973
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TABLE 1-III: Political Characteristics and Minimum Wage Changes,
1997-2010
The minimum wage change as the dependent variable is coded as a binary decision
outcome (1/0) with 1 representing a change and regressed on the characteristics
of the local party secretary and the mayor. Columns (1)-(2) present estimates with
standard errors clustered at the county-level; Columns (3)-(4) report standard errors
clustered two ways at the county and province-year level.
Dep. variable: Minimum wage change dummy (1/0)
Standard error clustering County Two–way
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party secretary characteristics:
First year in office dummy 0.018 0.004 0.018 0.004
(0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Promotion year dummy 0.049 -0.005 0.049 -0.005
(0.026) (0.007) (0.026) (0.010)
Retirement year dummy 0.079 0.028 0.079 0.028
(0.034) (0.013) (0.034) (0.017)
Age 0.047 0.018 0.047 0.018
(0.057) (0.016) (0.055) (0.028)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Province experience dummy -0.016 0.005 -0.016 0.005
(0.030) (0.009) (0.030) (0.009)
City tenure length (years) 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.004
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
Mayor characteristics:
First year in office dummy 0.090 -0.008 0.090 -0.008
(0.091) (0.026) (0.085) (0.026)
Promotion year dummy 0.030 -0.001 0.030 -0.001
(0.023) (0.005) (0.025) (0.007)
Retirement year dummy -0.016 -0.001 -0.016 -0.001
(0.043) (0.013) (0.043) (0.018)
Age -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.006
(0.052) (0.017) (0.063) (0.018)
Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Province experience dummy 0.024 0.003 0.024 0.003
(0.023) (0.006) (0.026) (0.008)
City tenure length (years) 0.090 -0.007 0.090 -0.007
(0.091) (0.025) (0.084) (0.025)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes
Observations 14548 14544 14548 14544
N clusters 258 257 232 228
Adjusted R2 0.383 0.964 0.383 0.964
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1.A.4 Persistence of the Minimum Wage Hike
Another issue concerns the intertemporal persistence of real minimum wage changes.
Even if nominal minimum wage change are not likely to be reversed, price inflation
can induce the mean reversion of the real minimum wage. If, on the other hand,
real minimum wages feature a high degree of persistence, then the increase can be
perceived as a non transitory income shock by the households. To explore the in-
tertemporal persistence of real minimum wage increases, we run the regression
∆MWc,t = α0 + ρMWc,t−1 + a1t + δp,t + γc + εc,t, (1.9)
where a coefficient ρ < 0 captures mean reversion to a time trend t of the real mini-
mum wage MW; δpt denotes a province-year fixed effect and γc a county fixed effect.
Table 1-IV reports the regression results for the period 1992-2012 and for the
shorter sample period 2002-2009 corresponding to the time frame of our analysis. We
progressively augment the specification with county fixed effects and county trends
to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional dependence. The coefficient of interest ρ
is negative in most specifications and statistically significant. Yet, the magnitude of
the mean reversion is economically weak. For instance, the coefficient in Column (4)
implies a half-life of 5.47 years for the real minimum wage.35
We also use a unit root test (adapted to panel data) to test for real minimum wage
persistence in a narrow statistical sense, Harris and Tzavalis, 1999. Under the null
hypothesis of a unit root (i.e. the real minimum wage increase is persistent) such
tests provide a critical value for ρ below which the unit root cannot be rejected. The
H-T test confirms the persistence of the minimum wage when we do not demean the
real minimum wage to take into account cross-county dependence. However, when
we compute in each time period the mean of the minimum wage across counties and
subtract this mean from the series, the test rejects the null.36
35Half-life is computed adjusting the standard formula to take into account that we are using the
first difference of the minimum wage as dependent variable: ln(0.5)/ln(−0.119 + 1) = 5.471. Using
the coefficient in Column (8) implies a half-life of 2.31 years.
36To corroborate these findings, we also undertake the Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003 test, which relaxes
the assumption about the common autoregressive coefficient and runs the test for each cross-section
under the null that all panels have unit roots, against the alternative that some panels are stationary.
This test fails to reject the null hypothesis except when we include a time trend and demean the series
to reduce the influence of cross-section dependence.
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TABLE 1-IV: Persistence of Real Minimum Wage Shock
We regress changes in the real minimum wage (∆MWct) on the lagged real minimum
wages (MWct−1) controlling for trend growth. The regressions add county or province-year
fixed effects as specified in Equation (1) to limit the influence of cross-county spatial
dependence. A significant negative coefficient implies reversion of the minimum wage
shocks to trend growth. Standard errors clustered at county-level are shown in parentheses.
Dep. var.: Real minimum wage change, ∆MWc,t
1992-2012 2002-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MWc,t−1 -0.005 0.022 -0.118 -0.119 -0.031 0.023 -0.259 -0.260
(0.003) (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)***
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes
Observations 37320 37320 37320 37320 17464 17464 17464 17464
N clusters 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183
R2 0.310 0.862 0.871 0.876 0.011 0.810 0.842 0.852
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1.B Sample Construction
1.B.1 Household Data Selection
China’s Urban Household Survey (UHS) has two components. At the household
level, we dispose of data on various consumption items and household income. At
the level of household members, additional data captures household member in-
come, income type, employment status, years of education, years of work experi-
ence, etc. We merge the household survey data with the minimum wage data at
county and city-level from the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and add addi-
tional macroeconomic variables at the county and city-level. All monetary variables
are converted in real terms using the province-level urban CPI index with the base
year 2002. The raw data constitutes a panel of 201,795 household-year observations
and 773,330 household-member-year cells for the period 2002-2009. The following
data filters are applied to the household data:
1. We only retain households that are observed at least twice in the panel (i.e. we
drop 68,779 household-year observations).
2. We retain only households reporting in their first year of sampling at least two
wage earning household members (i.e. we drop 59,624 household-year ob-
servations). Wage-earning household members are those who are potentially
affected by minimum wage changes.
3. We eliminate households that provide contradictory information about the
household head and for which we cannot compute the share S (228 household-
year observations).
The final data set comprises 73,164 household-year observations. Descriptive statis-
tics of the main variables and household demographics are shown in Tables 1-V and
1-VI respectively.
1.B.2 Identifying the Two Highest Wage Earners within the Household
For minimum wages changes to matter for household income, a household needs to
earn a positive share of its total household income from labor income near or at the
minimum wage. Within each household, we identify the two highest wage earners
conditioning on the first year the individual is observed in the panel. The selection
of wage earners within each household follows these principles:
1. We ignore self-employed individuals (30,971 member-year observations); re-
tired household members (124,901); retired and then re-employed household
members (11,396), incapacitated persons (8,396), homeworkers (61,343), sol-
diers, social volunteers or part-time employed workers (17,879), students (56,737)
and other household members undergoing training (251).
2. We ignore household members outside the labor force: below 16 years of age
(75,317) and above 59 for males (2,566) and above 54 for females (2,363).
3. We ignore household members with inconsistent records where they are re-
ported as unemployed and nevertheless receive a positive labor income (6363).
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4. We ignore members with incomplete reporting on labor income (6,694) and
workers with an annual real wage lower than 50% of the annual real minimum
wage (12,293).
5. We ignore workers with abnormally high increases in their real wage (above
1000%) between the first and last year of observation in the panel (187).
6. We ignore household members with inconsistent age records that increase by
more than one from one year to another or decrease (6,553) and household
members who are not relatives (210).
The two highest wage earners within the household are in most cases (80.5%) the
head of the household and the spouse. We retain for the household-level regressions
their wage income, age, gender, level of education and years of work experience,
years since migration to the city, marital status, industry and occupation.
1.B.3 Minimum Wage Dependency of a Household
Finally, we define the share S of household income coming from the wage income
(of the two highest wage earners) at or near the minimum wage. We consider a
wage earner to earn a minimum wage if her salary ranges between 50% and 150% of
the real minimum wage of their county of residence in the first year the individual
is observed in the panel. Conditioning on the first year of household observation
assures that the treated household group remains unchanged over time.
Among the two highest wage earners of all retained households, we identify
32,580 (18.72%) treated (minimum wage) and 141,442 (81.28 percent) non-treated
worker-year observations. We also undertake extensive robustness checks with re-
spect to a narrower salary range from 50% to 120% of the local minimum wage,
which results in 18,721 (10.76%) and 155,301 (89.24%) non-treated worker-year ob-
servations, respectively.
Table 1-V reports summary statistics on the households income and expenditure
components for household groups sorted by their minimum wage income share S.
Column (1) includes all households, Column (2) with S = 0 all households without
wage income at or near the minimum wage, whereas Columns (3)-(5) show house-
hold groups of increasing minimum wage dependency.
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TABLE 1-V: Incomes and Expenditures Share of Disposable Income
The table summarize the household income and expenditure components as a share
of disposable income by different household types sorted by their share S of mini-
mum wage income in total household disposable income. Data are from the Urban
Household Survey (UHS) and cover the period from 2002 to 2009. Reported are
average values for the entire period and standard errors are in parentheses below.
MW dependency: All S=0 S>0 S>0.5 S>0.75
Households
INCOME COMPONENTS:
Labor income 0.902 0.917 0.862 0.779 0.792
(0.158) (0.140) (0.192) (0.243) (0.242)
Transfer income 0.083 0.069 0.120 0.195 0.185
(0.146) (0.128) (0.181) (0.234) (0.233)
Transfer income net of pension 0.041 0.035 0.055 0.082 0.068
(0.081) (0.071) (0.100) (0.124) (0.106)
EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS:
Consumption 0.724 0.705 0.773 0.820 0.817
(0.311) (0.310) (0.308) (0.359) (0.364)
Education expenditure 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.100 0.098
(0.122) (0.116) (0.137) (0.152) (0.153)
Health expenditure 0.043 0.041 0.048 0.054 0.053
(0.084) (0.075) (0.105) (0.116) (0.117)
Non-durables expenditure 0.383 0.367 0.427 0.465 0.464
(0.144) (0.138) (0.150) (0.164) (0.161)
Durables expenditure 0.105 0.109 0.0947 0.0871 0.0874
(0.144) (0.151) (0.123) (0.179)
Housing expenditure 0.055 0.060 0.040 0.035 0.031
(0.491) (0.502) (0.458) (0.441) (0.420)
Savings 0.240 0.264 0.179 0.143 0.146
(0.309) (0.324) (0.254) (0.228) (0.232)
Observations 73164 53054 20110 4365 3990
Share of observations in sample 0.72 0.27 0.06 0.05
Share of total labor income 0.819 0.181 0.026 0.024
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TABLE 1-VI: Household Demographics
The table summarize the household demographics by household type sorted on the
share S of minimum wage earnings in total household disposable income. Data
are from the Urban Household Survey (UHS) and cover the period 2002-2009. Re-
ported are average values for the entire period and standard errors are in paren-
theses below. Household head refers to the household member with the highest
labor income; SOE stands for State Owned Enterprise; education is a categorical
variable with a total of nine categories: no schooling, basic literacy classes, primary
school, junior high school, senior middle school, secondary, college enrolment, bach-
elor completed, graduated.
MW dependency: All S=0 S>0 S>0.5 S>0.75
Households
Household size 3.145 3.118 3.215 3.345 3.355
(0.724) (0.703) (0.773) (0.862) (0.869)
House ownership 0.870 0.890 0.818 0.778 0.776
(0.336) (0.313) (0.386) (0.415) (0.417)
Years since migrating 8.047 8.429 7.040 6.047 6.149
(11.10) (11.15) (10.91) (10.63) (10.69)
SOE employee share 0.735 0.778 0.620 0.436 0.441
(0.441) (0.415) (0.485) (0.496) (0.497)
Female Head 0.270 0.292 0.211 0.318 0.316
(0.444) (0.455) (0.408) (0.466) (0.465)
Age of the household head 41.38 41.29 41.62 40.58 40.47
(7.842) (7.742) (8.095) (8.686) (8.754)
Household head education 5.914 6.127 5.351 4.929 4.941
(1.441) (1.419) (1.345) (1.172) (1.174)
Head work experience (years) 20.87 20.84 20.95 19.35 19.23
(8.703) (8.590) (8.995) (9.804) (9.859)
Observations 73164 53054 20110 4365 3990
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TABLE 1-VII: Different Definitions of Treated Worker
The table summarize the change of the composition of the sample when the house-
holds are defined as minimum wage treated using different definitions. The first
row defines treated households in the first year of observation and keeps them fixed
over the panel. The second row defines treatment status each year the household
is observed independently of her treatment status in the first year. The third row
shows household are assigned to treatment only if they are treated in all the years
they are observed in the panel, i.e. if at least for one year the earn both more than
the minimum wage then the household is not treated in this case. Standard errors
are reported in parenthesis.
MW dependency: S=0 S>0 S>0.25 S>0.5 S>0.75
MW treated HH in the first year 0.718 0.282 0.239 0.064 0.058
(0.450) (0.450) (0.426) (0.245) (0.234)
MW treated HH by year 0.730 0.270 0.229 0.071 0.066
(0.444) (0.444) (0.420) (0.257) (0.249)
MW treated HH in each year 0.836 0.164 0.138 0.037 0.031
(0.370) (0.370) (0.345) (0.188) (0.172)
TABLE 1-VIII: Unemployment at worker level
The table summarize the level of unemployment at worker level for the best two
earners within the households. The share of unemployed members for different
groups of minimum wage income in total disposable income are reported. Standard
errors ar ereported in parenthesis.
All S=0 S>0 S>0.25 S>0.5 S>0.75
Households
Unemployment 0.042 0.036 0.060 0.078 0.189 0.191
(0.120) (0.186) (0.238) (0.269) (0.392) (0.393)
Observations 208607 160635 47972 34869 12764 11861
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1.C Specification Issues: county trends and province-year fixed
effects
TABLE 1-IX: First-Stage Regressions without county trends and
province × year FE
Household annual real labor income is regressed on the annual real minimum wage for
households sorted by the share S of household minimum wage income in total disposable in-
come under two alternative specifications. Columns (1)-(4) do not include linear county time
trends and province-year fixed effects in the specification, while Columns (5)-(8) control for
linear county time trends and province-year fixed effects. All regressions include controls for
the two highest labor income earners in the household, namely age and age squared, a gen-
der dummy, years of work experience and work experience squared, years since migration
to the city and squared, household size as measured by the number of household members
and a house ownership dummy. Additional categorical control variables characterize the
level of education, marital status, industry and occupation. City-level variation is accounted
for by city population, city real GDP, city real average wage and city unemployment rate.
Dep. variable: Household Real Labor Income
Household FE and year FE County trends and province × year FE
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Minimum Wage 0.972 1.653 1.464 1.296 -0.022 0.364 1.378 1.529
(0.300)*** (0.443)*** (0.534)*** (0.562)** (0.574) (0.561) (0.632)** (0.692)**
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 44288 12066 3699 3374 44288 12066 3699 3374
N clusters 625 491 346 335 625 491 346 335
N households 20450 5684 1785 1627 20450 5684 1785 1627
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.395 0.512 0.522 0.256 0.515 0.700 0.705
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1.D Marginal Propensity of Consumption from Labor and
Transfer Income
TABLE 1-X: Estimates of the Marginal Propensity of Consumption
from Labor and Transfer Income
We report OLS regressions, Columns (1)-(4) estimate the change in household real consump-
tion after a change of household real labor income, Columns (5)-(6) use the sum of labor and
transfer incomes as the main regressor of interest. All regressions include controls for the
two highest labor income earners in the household, namely age and age squared, a gender
dummy, years of work experience and work experience squared, years since migration to
the city and squared, household size as measured by the number of household members
and a house ownership dummy. Additional categorical control variables characterize the
level of education, marital status, industry and occupation. City-level variation is accounted
for by city population, city real GDP, city real average wage and city unemployment rate.
Dep. variable: Household Consumption
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor Income 0.325 0.432 0.377 0.349
(0.030)*** (0.018)*** (0.098)*** (0.093)***
Labor and 0.329 0.433 0.343 0.305
Transfer Income (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.097)*** (0.097)***
City-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 44288 12066 3699 3374 44288 12066 3699 3374
N clusters 625 491 346 335 625 491 346 335
N households 20450 5684 1785 1627 20450 5684 1785 1627
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.508 0.607 0.631 0.262 0.514 0.622 0.649
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1.E Expenditure Components
TABLE 1-XI: Health Expenditure Components
The table reports the same 2SLS level regressions of Table 1.4 using sub-components of ex-
penditures in health’s goods and services. Estimates for expenditure on drugs is shown in
Columns (1)-(2), for health related medical treatments are reported in Columns (3)-(4), for
appliances (medical equipment) expenditure in Columns (5)-(6) and other health expendi-
ture in Columns (7)-(8). All regressions include city-level controls, household fixed effects,
interacted province-year fixed effects, and county time-trends as specified in Equation (8).
The samples consist of all households for which the labor income share S stemming from
minimum wage is more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75) of household
disposable income. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county-level. Weak in-
strument row shows the p-value of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test under the null of
weak instrument.
Drugs and Medicines Medical Treatment Appliances Other
MW dependency: S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor and Transfer Income 0.132 0.139 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.002 -0.010 -0.004
(0.085) (0.082)* (0.059) (0.062) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3442 3137 3442 3137 3442 3137 3442 3137
N clusters 323 314 323 314 323 314 323 314
N households 1528 1390 1528 1390 1528 1390 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009
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TABLE 1-XII: Education Expenditure Components
The table reports the same 2SLS level regressions of Table 1.4 using sub-components of ex-
penditures in health’s goods and services. Estimates for expenditure on CPU and software
is shown in Columns (1)-(2), for educational goods (textbooks, books, stationery, magazines,
dictionaries) are reported in Columns (3)-(4), for educational courses (tuition fees, tutorials,
school accommodation) expenditure in Columns (5)-(6) and educational services (cultural
and recreational services) in Columns (7)-(8). All regressions include city-level controls,
household fixed effects, interacted province-year fixed effects, and county time-trends as
specified in Equation (8). The samples consist of all households for which the labor income
share S stemming from minimum wage is more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75%
(S > 0.75) of household disposable income. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
county-level. Weak instrument row shows the p-value of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006)
test under the null of weak instrument.
CPU and Software Educ. Goods Courses Educ. Services
MW dependency: S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor and Transfer Income 0.048 0.051 0.031 0.028 0.073 0.099 -0.004 0.001
(0.040) (0.034) (0.016)* (0.014)** (0.085) (0.080) (0.035) (0.033)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3442 3137 3442 3137 3442 3137 3442 3137
N clusters 323 314 323 314 323 314 323 314
N households 1528 1390 1528 1390 1528 1390 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009
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TABLE 1-XIII: Non-durables Expenditure Components
The table reports the same 2SLS level regressions of Table 1.4 using sub-components of
expenditures in health’s goods and services. Estimates for food expenditure is shown in
Columns (1)-(2), for household services (vehicle fuel and maintenance, transportation, hair-
dresser etc.) are reported in Columns (3)-(4), for clothing expenditure in Columns (5)-(6)
and for sundry goods (jewels, watch, cosmetics, beauty appliances etc.) in Columns (7)-(8).
All regressions include city-level controls, household fixed effects, interacted province-year
fixed effects, and county time-trends as specified in Equation (8). The samples consist of
all households for which the labor income share S stemming from minimum wage is more
than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75) of household disposable income. Standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered at county-level. Weak instrument row shows the p-value
of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test under the null of weak instrument.
Food Services Clothing Sundry Goods
MW dependency: S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor and Transfer Income 0.322 0.257 0.088 0.090 0.032 0.026 0.002 -0.002
(0.148)** (0.138)* (0.050)* (0.047)* (0.059) (0.043) (0.021) (0.019)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3442 3137 3442 3137 3442 3137 3442 3137
N clusters 323 314 323 314 323 314 323 314
N households 1528 1390 1528 1390 1528 1390 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009
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TABLE 1-XIV: Durables Expenditure Components
The table reports the same 2SLS level regressions of Table 1.4 using sub-components of
expenditures in health’s goods and services. Estimates for TV expenditure is shown in
Columns (1)-(2), for other electronics (cameras and video cameras, DVD players, smart-
phones, stereo, voice recorder etc.) are reported in Columns (3)-(4), for durable transporta-
tion expenditure (cars, motorcycles, electric bicycles, bicycles and other) in Columns (5)-(6),
for household equipment (furniture and home appliances, washing machine, refrigerator
etc.) in Columns (7)-(8) and for housing expenditure (purchasing or building a house) in
Columns (9)-(10). All regressions include city-level controls, household fixed effects, inter-
acted province-year fixed effects, and county time-trends as specified in Equation (8). The
samples consist of all households for which the labor income share S stemming from mini-
mum wage is more than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75) of household disposable
income. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at county-level. Weak instrument row
shows the p-value of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test under the null of weak instrument.
Television Other Electronics Transportation HH Equipment Housing
S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Labor and
Transfer Income 0.109 0.102 0.020 0.016 -0.049 -0.005 0.047 0.046 -0.160 -0.171
(0.066)* (0.062)* (0.022) (0.020) (0.180) (0.183) (0.071) (0.066) (0.463) (0.426)
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3442 3137 3055 2779 3442 3137 3442 3137 3442 3137
N clusters 323 314 228 224 323 314 323 314 323 314
N households 1528 1390 1361 1236 1528 1390 1528 1390 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.019 0.009 0.044 0.022 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019 0.009
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1.F Wage Regression
TABLE 1-XV: Wage Regression at Individual Level
Dep.var.: Worker Wage
HH Best 2 Earners All HH Members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
Minimum Wage -0.070 0.340 0.541 0.580 -0.057 0.387 0.608 0.645
(0.235) (0.243) (0.300)* (0.327)* (0.229) (0.232)* (0.295)** (0.318)**
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 137227 27550 8810 8021 141647 28985 9392 8581
N clusters 671 551 405 398 671 551 405 398
N individuals 64543 13238 4340 3962 65946 13682 4516 4130
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.377 0.560 0.565 0.172 0.375 0.557 0.564
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1.G Categorizing S
TABLE 1-XVI: Categorizing the Share S: Minimum Wage and House-
hold Consumption
Dep.var.: Household Consumption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Minimum Wage -0.661 -0.661 -0.651 -0.749 -0.904 -0.910
(0.475) (0.476) (0.476) (0.544) (0.602) (0.605)
× 0<S<0.25 0.796
(0.613)
× 0.25<S<0.75 0.765
(0.475)
× S>0.75 1.732
(0.801)**
× 0<S<0.5 0.824
(0.349)**
× S>0.5 1.451
(0.724)**
× S>0 0.945
(0.378)**
× S>0.25 1.032
(0.526)*
× S>0.5 1.489
(0.744)**
× S>0.75 1.758
(0.818)**
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 61257 61527 61257 56354 47987 47662
N clusters 648 648 648 642 635 633
N households 28422 28422 28422 26134 22235 22077
Adjusted R2 0.233 0.233 0.233 0.236 0.232 0.233
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1.H Two-way clustering
TABLE 1-XVII: Two-way clustering: Household Consumption under
Labor Income Shocks
We report 2SLS level regressions as in Table 1.4 in which real annual household con-
sumption is alternatively regressed on the household’s fitted annual real labor income
level in Columns (1)-(4), or the fitted annual real labor income plus transfers level in
Columns (5)-(8). To allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals due to city/province-
wide shocks standard errors are now clustered at county and province-year [in squared
brackets], and county and city-year levels {in curly brackets}. The samples consist of
all households for which the labor income share S from wages is zero (S = 0), more
than 50% (S > 0.5), or more than 75% (S > 0.75) of household labor income. All
regressions include city-level controls, household fixed effects, interacted province-
year fixed effects, and county time-trends as specified in Equation (8). Standard
errors clustered at county-level in parentheses. The p-values in the last line refer to
a test under the null hypothesis of weak instruments (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006).
Dep.var.: Household Consumption
MW dependency: S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75 S = 0 S > 0.25 S > 0.5 S > 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labor Income 61.461 3.314 1.217 1.301
[1938.376] [4.368] [0.518]** [0.585]**
{1900.739} {4.242} {0.568}** {0.643}**
Labor and 9.258 2.271 1.053 1.065
Transfer Income [44.008] [1.979] [0.356]*** [0.356]***
{43.206} {1.986} {0.398}*** {0.404}***
City-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41709 11309 3442 3137 41709 11309 3442 3137
N clusters 597 469 323 314 597 469 323 314
N households 17871 4927 1528 1390 17871 4927 1528 1390
H0 : Weak instruments
(p-value) 0.975 0.529 0.031 0.026 0.845 0.396 0.019 0.009
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Chapter 2
Can Government Intervention
Make Firms More
Investment-Ready?
2.1 Introduction
Innovative start-ups and SMEs in developing and transition countries often have
good ideas, but may not have these ideas fine-tuned to the stage where they can
attract outside funding. This is the case in the Western Balkans, where there is a
perceived lack of investment readiness of innovative start-ups to be in a position
where they can compete for, and take on, outside equity (Karajkov, 2009). The
most common reasons for a lack of investment readiness include a reluctance of
entrepreneurs to surrender partial ownership and control of their business, lack of
knowledge about the availability of external sources of finance, low investability of
business development propositions, a lack of understanding about the key factors
investors look for in making investment decisions, and presentational failings such
as deficiencies in business pitches (Mason and Kwok, 2010).
Investment Readiness Programs which provide individualized training, mentor-
ing and coaching are designed to overcome these constraints, but the programs can
be expensive to provide, and to date there is no rigorous evidence as to their effec-
tiveness. We conduct a five-country randomized experiment in the Croatia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia to test the effectiveness of such a program. A
sample of 346 innovative SMEs were randomly divided into two groups: a treat-
ment group that received a high-cost and intensive program that involved help de-
veloping their financial plans, product pitch, market strategy, and willingness to
take equity financing, along with master classes, mentoring, and other assistance;
and a control group which received access to an inexpensive online-only basic in-
vestment readiness course. After this program, both groups of firms competed in a
pitch event, where they were scored by independent judges (blinded to treatment
status) on their investment readiness, with the top 50 firms then going onto a finals
stage where they pitched to investors.
The independent judges scored the pitches on six aspects of investment readi-
ness: team, technology, traction, market, progress, and presentation, with each firm
0This paper is co-authored with Ana Paula Cusolito and David McKenzie. Funding for this project
was received from the European Commission. Funding to support the impact evaluation from the
World Bank i2i Trust Fund is gratefully acknowledged. We gratefully acknowledge comments from
seminars at Duke, the IGL/Nesta conference, the IPA SME conference, University of Lausanne, Uni-
veristy of Toronto, the European Econometric Society Meeting in Cologne and from: Marius Starke,
Janko Milunovic and Peter Trapp. This experiment and a pre-analysis plan were registered in the AEA
RCT registry on October 2, 2015: https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/895.
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scored by five judges. We find that firms that went through the investment readiness
program receive an average of 0.3 standard deviations higher investment readiness
scores at this event, and are more likely to get selected to proceed to pitch in front of
investors. We then track firm outcomes over the next two years via a six-month and
two-year follow-up survey, and through measuring their subsequent media men-
tions and social media attention. We find that treated firms do get significantly more
media mentions and social media buzz over the next two years (our measure ex-
cludes any mention related to the competition itself). The judges’ scores are found
to be statistically significant predictors of investment readiness and investment out-
comes over the next two years in the control group, suggesting that improvements
in these scores should result in improved firm investment outcomes. Our point es-
timates show positive, but statistically insignificant, impacts on firm survival, three
categories of investment readiness, and on steps towards receiving external financ-
ing, with treated firms being 5 percentage points more likely to receive external fi-
nancing (95% confidence interval of -4.7p.p., +14.7p.p.).
We reconcile the significant impact on judges scores and significant predictive
effect of judge scores on firm outcomes with these results through discussion of a
funnel of attribution, through which large changes in investment readiness are pre-
dicted to result in smaller changes in investment outcomes. The results highlight the
difficulty in designing experiments to measure the impacts of such programs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses what
investment readiness programs are, their use around the world, and contrasts them
to other types of programs studied in the literature; Section 2.3 outlines the exper-
imental design and provides details of the intervention; Section 2.4 provides the
impacts on investment readiness; Section 2.5 examines how investment readiness
translates into firm performance; and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 What are Investment Readiness Programs and what is the
Evidence on Their Effectiveness?
While much policy attention around the world has been given to efforts to expand
the supply of equity finance for innovative start-ups and SMEs (through seed and
venture capital co-investment funds and other activities to attract capital), the effec-
tiveness of these programs can be hampered by a lack of readiness of these firms
to receive equity investment. Mason and Kwok, 2010 highlight three main aspects
of this lack of readiness: first, many entrepreneurs are believed to be equity-averse,
unwilling to surrender any ownership stake in or even partial control of their firms;
second, many businesses that seek external finance are not considered “investible”
by external investors due to deficiencies in their team structure, marketing strategy,
financial accounts, intellectual property protection, and other business areas; thirdly,
even if entrepreneurs are willing to consider equity and have investible projects, pre-
sentational failings mean that many firms are unable to pitch their ideas successfully
to investors.
2.2.1 What are Investment Readiness Programs?
Investment readiness programs are intended to increase the effective demand for
equity financing by helping firms overcome the factors that result in a lack of invest-
ment readiness, thereby enlarging the size and quality of the pipeline of potential
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funding opportunities for investors and increasing the likelihood of new equity in-
vestments being made.
These programs are a relatively new form of intervention, but there are now a
number of examples in the U.S. and Western Europe. Appendix 2.A provides details
on a number of these programs, and we summarize some of these examples here.
In the United States, the Larta Institute uses a combination of personalized mentor-
ing, webinars and learning modules, and market connections to help National Sci-
ence Foundation grantees in the Small Business Innovation Research program to de-
velop Commercialization Plans. Several universities offer online investment readi-
ness platforms, including the program we offer to our control group. In addition,
there are a number of accelerators and incubators that offer investment readiness
training as part of their broader array of specialized services. Examples in Europe
include investment readiness support services provided by Enterprise Ireland, the
Invest Academy Programme of the European Business Angel Network, the Euro-
pean program InvestHorizon and several demonstration programs provided by the
UK Government’s Small Business Service.
Such programs are rarer in less developed countries, but pilot programs have
been introduced in a number of recently developed or higher middle income coun-
tries. For example, the Romanian Innovation Commercialization Assistance Pro-
gram (RICAP) worked with 30 firms to help technology innovators address com-
mercialization needs1, and the Malaysia Bioeconomy Accelerator Programme pro-
vides mentoring services to assist the commercialization of innovations developed
in Malaysia.2 The Getting Ready for Capital (GReaC) project funded by the EU
aimed to help entrepreneurs in Bulgaria, Poland (and Belgium) understand the pri-
vate equity market and effectively present their business propositions to investors.3
The World Bank is preparing an investment readiness component to a program in
Morocco.
While there is substantial heterogeneity in the content of these programs, the
most comprehensive programs usually cover four dimensions, based on the core
reasons that many investment deals do not materialize (Mason and Harrison, 2001;
Mason and Kwok, 2010). The first dimension aims at reducing equity aversion, by
explaining to entrepreneurs the potential advantages that equity can bring to the
firm, both as a source of funding, and also because of the knowledge outside in-
vestors can bring to the firm. The second dimension addresses the investability of
the business by helping to train the entrepreneur to demonstrate that they have a
viable revenue model, can measure market traction, have dealt appropriately with
property right issues, have a competitive strategy, etc. The third dimension works
on the presentational skills, teaching the entrepreneur how to effectively pitch their
business ideas and provide the key information investors are looking for. Finally,
some programs also offer a networking dimension, aiming to facilitate the match-
ing process between entrepreneurs and investors through events such as venture
forums.
These programs are offered in two modalities: “hard” and “soft” programs.
Hard programs usually involve a package of support that combines online tools
and training, customized and face-to-face mentoring, group training through mas-
terclasses, and investor demonstration days or pitch events. Soft programs are self-
learning online tools structured in modules that entrepreneurs can work through at
their own pace.
1 http://portal.larta.org/ricap# what
2 https://portal.larta.org/malaysia
3 http://greac.eu/
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Both types of programs tend to be subsidized by governments, even in devel-
oped economies like the U.S. and U.K. There are several possible reasons to justify
subsidies. The first is that the targeted firms are frequently liquidity constrained,
and therefore unable to pay. Some incubator programs like Y-Combinator overcome
this constraint by investing seed capital in the firms in exchange for an equity stake
in the business. But since equity-aversion is one of the key constraints investment
readiness programs are trying to overcome, investment readiness programs have
typically not required equity stakes in exchange for participation. Secondly, since
many of these programs are new in nature, potential entrepreneurs may find it hard
to assess in advance the overall quality of the program, and their payoffs from par-
ticipation are highly uncertain, making them unwilling to pay the costs of participat-
ing. Finally, governments may justify the subsidies in terms of the public benefits
(more innovation, higher tax revenues, greater employment) that can come from
successful ventures.
2.2.2 Existing Evidence about Their Effectiveness
Currently there is no causal evidence as to the effectiveness of these investment
readiness programs. The existing literature consists of several case studies and de-
scriptive evidence. Several studies attempt to argue that a lack of investment readi-
ness hampers equity investment, focusing in particular on presentation skills. Ma-
son and Harrison, 2002 use a case study to argue that poor presentational issues
dominate the reactions of potential investors to a business proposal and constrain
the likelihood of a deal taking place. Clark, 2008 uses questionnaires submitted to
business investors after an investor forum, and shows that presentation skills are
significantly correlated with investment decisions.
Mason and Kwok, 2010 provide a descriptive evaluation of the U.K. Govern-
ment’s Small Business Service’s Investment Readiness program. Consultants judged
the program to have had success in awareness raising, business development, and
funding, but acknowledge that they don’t have a counterfactual, and that it was dif-
ficult for businesses to reflect on what their behavior would have been without the
program. They also report that tracking participants in the Finance and Business
program of the North East Regional Development authority in England found busi-
nesses reported increases in funding, sales, and jobs two years after the program, but
do not have a control group against which to compare the before-after comparisons.
More rigorous non-experimental evidence comes from work on related programs.4
One set of related programs are business accelerators and incubators. These differ
from investment readiness programs in typically being more intensive and expen-
sive, often offer some seed capital and workspace in addition to training and men-
toring, and work with a much smaller number of firms at any one time. For example,
accelerators like Y-combinator take an entry cohort of 10 to 20 firms, who then re-
ceive seed capital, move to Silicon Valley for 3 months, and culminate with a demo
day in which they present their ideas to selected investors. Several studies have used
matching approaches to compare firms going through accelerators to similar firms
which did not. Hallen, Bingham, and Cohen, 2014 compare accelerator-backed new
ventures to a matched set of non-accelerator ventures and find the former are faster
at raising venture capital and gaining customer traction. Smith and Hannigan, 2015
4 Somewhat, but less closely, related is regression-discontinuity work that shows the impact of
financing to innovative firms on subsequent firm outcomes (Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar, 2011; Howell,
2017b); and experimental work on business training and consulting services to firms (reviewed in
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013).
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match firms going through Y-Combinator and Tech-Stars to start-ups that instead
received financial assistance from angel groups, and find participation in a top ac-
celerator program increases the speed of receiving follow-on funding and the speed
of exit. In contrast, Yu, 2016 matches accelerator and non-accelerator companies
and find the former raise less funding, and close down earlier. Gonzalez-Uribe and
Leatherbee, 2017 use a regression-discontinuity approach to compare start-ups en-
rolled in the Start-up Chile accelerator program to those just below the qualification
threshold, finding a positive relationship between the mentorship and the scale of
the start-up and access to seed and venture financing.
Finally, two recent experiments examine effects of short, cheap interventions to
potential business ventures.5 Wagner, 2016 conducts an experiment with 88 Start-
up Chile grantees, and finds giving written feedback on their business plans makes
firms more likely to survive, as measured by web presence, but is not able to measure
other outcomes. Clingingsmith and Shane, 2017 provide 30 minute pitch training to
undergraduate students in Ohio, who then deliver 90 second pitches to judges. They
find training actually lowers the judges scores on average, by helping judges better
distinguish bad from good ideas, and having a more negative impact on low quality
ideas than the positive impact on better quality ideas.6
Our work differs from this work on accelerators in at least four key aspects. The
first is in the type of program being analyzed: investment readiness programs of the
type we study here are designed to be able to be scaled up and operate with size-
able numbers of firms at a time, compared to the more intensive focus on a small
number of firms at a time in incubator and accelerator programs. Second, ours uses
a randomized experiment, overcoming concerns about how well non-experimental
methods are able to overcome biases induced by the explicit selection mechanism
that aims to choose better firms for the program than the non-participants. Thirdly,
the existing literature has largely relied on a small number of outcome measures
that can be collected without the use of firm surveys – survival, whether or not they
received venture funding, and web traffic measures. We have much more detailed
data, including the use of judge scores and intermediate outcome indicators that
allow us to focus on investment readiness, and not just investment outcomes. Fi-
nally, the majority of studies focus on the U.S. which has a well-developed venture
capital market, whereas we focus on an area of the world where firms are only just
starting to engage with outside investors, making investment readiness programs
potentially more important.
2.2.3 Why an investment readiness program in the Balkans?
Increasing innovation is a key regional priority in the Balkans region as a means to
boost firm productivity and sustain economic growth. While it is generally accepted
that debt finance is not the optimal source of funding for early-stage SMEs and start-
ups, equity finance is only marginally used in the region. A regional report noted
that there is a debate as to how much this lack of use of risk capital reflects a lack
of supply of equity finance, versus a lack of readiness of entrepreneurs to attract
and accept this financing Karajkov, 2009. Based on the viewpoint that action was
5 Another example of an experiment with early-stage ventures is Bernstein et al. (2017), who ran-
domize the information potential investors on AngelList receive about start-ups, and find that infor-
mation about the founding team matters for their decision to find out more about the company.
6 Using a difference-in-differences approach, Howell, 2017a also finds that negative feedback leads
to more abandonment of business ventures.
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needed on both the supply and demand sides, the Enterprise Development and In-
novation Facility (EDIF) initiative financed by the European Commission includes
efforts to increase the supply of private equity to the region, improve the legislative
frameworks to better encourage venture capital activity, and undertake efforts to in-
crease investment readiness. This paper provides an evaluation of the investment
readiness component of this initiative.
2.3 Experimental Design
To implement this intervention, we ran a competitive procurement process where
companies specializing in investment readiness programs provided bids. We short-
listed five companies, and together with evaluations of these proposals from Josh
Lerner from Harvard University and his team at Bella Research Group, and with
advice from experts in the national innovation agencies of the participating coun-
tries, chose as the winning firm the company Pioneers JFDI GmbH (Pioneers hence-
forth). Founded in 2009 and based out of Vienna, they are one of Europe’s leading
platforms for entrepreneurship, organizing an annual “Pioneers Festival” (with 3000
attendees), as well as providing mentoring, pitch training, and opportunities for pre-
sentation and networking with European and international founders and investors.
They launched a specific investment readiness program called Pioneers of the Balkans
for this project.
2.3.1 Generating the Sample
Eligibility criteria for the program were developed by the World Bank and Pioneers
team, conditional on the rules of the European Commission. To participate in the
program, a firm had to be legally registered in at least one of the five countries:
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro or Serbia. The firm had to be a micro,
small, or medium-enterprise, defined as having fewer than 250 employees, and an
annual turnover below 50 million euros. It had to be innovative, meaning that “it
will in the foreseeable future develop products, services, or processes which are new
or substantially improved compared to the state of the art in its industry, and which
carry a risk of technological or industrial failure” , and could not be on a sanctions
list or operating in a set of negative activities (e.g. gambling or alcohol production).
To launch the program, the brand Pioneers of the Balkans was created, and a ded-
icated website set up.7 The program was marketed as a competitive program de-
signed especially for innovative entrepreneurs seeking or considering venture fi-
nancing. The main communications therefore promoted a major pan-regional start-
up competition due to take place in two stages, with a Semi-finals in Belgrade and
subsequent Finals event in Zagreb. It included a preliminary list of investors who
had already confirmed their attendance at the Finals, and noted that selected firms
would receive a training and preparation package.
We had set a target of 300 to 350 participating firms. In designing the program,
both providers of investment readiness services and experts in the innovation agen-
cies agreed that there was a limit on how many firms potential investors would be
willing to listen to pitches from. They also noted a concern that randomly choosing
a firm to pitch in front of investors that was not of high quality could have reputa-
tional risks to the region, with potential investors observing such firms as a signal
7 http://www.pioneersofthebalkans.io [accessed May 5, 2018]
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more generally that firms in the region aren’t of high enough quality to merit invest-
ments. A two-stage process was designed to overcome these issues: the Semi-finals
would be the main phase of our study, with all firms in the study having a chance to
present their ideas in the semi-finals and get scored by independent judges on their
investment readiness. Then only the top-50 would progress to the finals, with these
firms selected on merit.
Pioneers aimed to create broad awareness of the program among entrepreneurial
firms in the region, launching the program at the start of August 2015 (see timeline in
Appendix 2.B) and marketing the program rapidly. It used five major instruments
to achieve this goal: public sources of information for applicants, direct electronic
and physical mailings, social media marketing, a roadshow spanning all five tar-
get countries, incentives for early applications (a raffle for a dinner with two leading
entrepreneurs from the region), and media relations. A list of more than 1,200 poten-
tial contacts was directly emailed using firm names provided by the local innovation
funds and government counterparts, and other contacts in the region. LinkedIn and
Facebook advertising was used, and “multipliers” were asked to spread the word to
their contacts in the region.
Applicants had to apply online, with the data from this application form provid-
ing the baseline data for this study. More than 1,200 applications were started online,
and a total of 584 full applications were received. These were screened for eligibility,
resulting in 346 firms being selected as eligible for the program.
This process succeeded in generating a sample of young firms involved in a wide
range of innovative activities. At the time of application, firms had an average of 6
employees, with a 10-90 percentile range of (1, 12). They had been in business for
2.5 years on average, and are involved in high-tech innovative industries such as
cloud computing and big data, app development for a wide range of business and
personal services, pharmaceutical products, etc. Half of the founders have post-
graduate education, and 60 percent have a global rather than regional focus as their
key market. To make clear the types of firms involved, it is worth giving some more
specific examples of the types of innovation these firms are doing. Some examples
are as follows:
• A firm that is developing virtual reality software that can be used in outdoor
interactive missions, with the aim of deploying this in military training ex-
ercises and theme park adventures (e.g. a team-based maze/obstacle course
where dragons and other objects are flying around)
• A firm developing an app that geo-locates users on ski fields in Europe, and
provides a way for them to see where all their family members are at any point
in time, and to direct them to common meeting places.
• A bio-tech firm that has developed a new coating for common medicines that
allows the body to better regulate the dose-intensity, to reduce under- and
over-dosages of medicines
• An architecture firm that has developed an innovative luxury “boatel” that
runs on an electric motor and can be used on lakes
• A firm that has developed solar-powered benches for public spaces that can
charge phones and also monitor air and noise quality.
A number of the firms were developing apps for the Balkan and global markets,
covering a wide range of activities such as making it easier to use public transport, a
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local version of Uber, an app to connect consumers with producers of organic prod-
ucts, online sports coaching, and an app to manage freight logistics. But there are
also firms involved in physical manufacturing of products, such high-end electri-
cal bicycles, smart vending machines, indoor pet houses, and a USB charger that
charges while bicycling.
2.3.2 Random Assignment
Applications closed on September 6, 2015 and were then screened to ensure they met
the eligibility requirements. All applicants which met the formal eligibility criteria
were accepted into the study. Eligible applications were then scored on four criteria
to measure their initial level of investment readiness: market attractiveness, product
technology, traction, and team. Appendix 2.C describes the scoring methodology.
The top 10 proposals overall in terms of score were then randomly assigned to 5 in
treatment and 5 in control, in order to ensure that some of the very top proposals
were in both groups. Then the remainder of firms were divided into strata based
on country (Serbia, Croatia, or the rest), and on whether or not they already have
a private investor. Within these six stratum firms were ranked into groups of four
on the basis of their investment readiness score. Within these quartets two firms
were randomly allocated by computer to treatment and two to control. This was
done for an initial batch of 333 firms, allocating 167 to treatment and 166 to control.
An additional batch took longer to verify their eligibility requirements and were
received after this assignment, these were then also randomly allocated and form a
separate strata. This resulted in 346 firms, with 174 treatment and 172 control. A
pre-analysis plan was registered with the AEA trial registry on October 2, 2015 to
pre-specify the initial outcomes of interest.8
This process resulted in treatment and control groups that are evenly balanced
and comparable in terms of their initial characteristics. This is seen in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.1 shows that the two groups are also similar across the entire distribution
in terms of initial investment readiness. As a result, any difference in investment
readiness at the conclusion of the program can be reliability assessed as the impact
of the program and not due to any pre-existing differences across groups.
2.3.3 Details of the Treatment and Control Offerings
The treatment and control groups were blinded to treatment status, and both were
offered a form of investment readiness training – the difference being in the inten-
sity, cost, and medium of the offerings. We summarize both treatment and control
programs here. A key issue with understanding the impact of different training pro-
grams is that much of the literature does not provide sufficient detail on what was
offered, leaving the program as a black box for others seeking to learn or compare.
Therefore, in Appendices 4 and 5 we provide much more detailed information on
each program.
The treatment group received an investment readiness program provided by Pi-
oneers, but branded under the name Startup Live Mini-Accelerator. This was an inten-
sive two-month program that aims to prepare companies to be in a position where
they are ready to talk with potential investors. The first phase (“qualification” ) was
structured around an online training platform called WhatAVenture. Using this tool,
8 https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/895
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individuals are asked to outline and self-critically assess their businesses by describ-
ing the problem or need addressed by their product or service, the commercializa-
tion concept and expected revenue streams, conduct a market sizing exercise, and
describe their competitive positioning. Each business was assigned a lead mentor
who supports them through this process and provides feedback and help.
After completing this first phase, firms were then brought into an “acceleration
phase” . In this phase they had individualized mentoring from both their lead men-
tor, and from a pool of more than one hundred specialized mentors who could
help out on specific concrete and sector-specific needs. Mentoring took place both
on-site and via video calls. During this phase, there were four masterclass week-
ends, which took place every week in October from Friday evening through Sun-
day afternoon. These masterclasses rotated around the different countries, and were
recorded so that those who couldn’t attend in person could access the contents on-
line. Each workshop followed a similar format, but with the topics varying. On Fri-
day evenings the attending entrepreneurs would have a chance to introduce them-
selves and their businesses in just 90 seconds with no presentation materials, and
also see examples of the same from the mentors, followed by informal discussions.
Saturdays would involve five to eight lectures and/or workshops, with themes such
as sales and marketing, team building and human resources, and investment and
finance. On Sundays, all participants and mentors focused on presentational skills
as well as pitch deck structure and design. The final phase was a “pitch preparation
phase” and took place in the last two weeks, in the run-up to the semi-finals. This in-
cluded working on their pitch decks with their mentors, delivering practice pitches,
and then on-site training in Belgrade the day before the semi-finals performance as
a final practice run.
Both phases of the treatment were geared toward developing a comprehensive
set of skills for a successful investment ready start-up. Each of the outcome vari-
ables that we are measuring had a specific part of the training dedicated to it. Each
start-up was free to choose on which needs and classes to focus on depending also
on their current skill set. Our treatment variable being a dummy summarises the
impact of all of the different training opportunities in one average estimate on a set
of outcomes. With such a set-up it is not clearly possible to identify which particular
training was conducive to raising equity funding, or improving sales and revenues,
or allowing the firm to survive. All of these outcomes would depend on several com-
ponents of a start-up, as for instance the team skill set, the quality of the proposed
idea, their presentation skills, their networking opportunities, their market traction
or their readiness in meeting specific demands from the investors etc. As such the
aim of the paper is not to be so granular in identifying which particular component
of the training may have brought the positive result since these components may
vary across firms depending on their initial competences. The goal is to understand
whether a government intervention aimed at reducing the shortcomings of the gen-
eral investment readiness of a firm, can bridge the gap between supply and demand
fro equity in the region.
The total cost of the treatment is estimated to be $ 614,000, or approximately
$ 4,000 per active participant.9 The main component of the cost is the individual
9The exact cost per firm differs in terms of services contracted vs services actually delivered, since
not all firms used all the mentoring hours they were allocated. Pioneers retrospectively estimates that
the actual services delivered to the firms were approximately $ 3,000 based on actual hours mentoring
used. Note further that this calculation does not include the costs of advertising the program through
roadshows, or of putting on the semi-final and final events which were important in attracting firms
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mentoring, which averaged $ 3,072 per beneficiary, with the masterclasses costing $
793 per beneficiary and pitch training $ 230.
The control group companies were offered an e-learning course developed and
distributed by the Global Commercialization Group (GCG) of the University of Texas
at Austin. This course is distributed under the label Innovation Readiness SeriesTM
and was launched in 2011. It is targeted to a broad audience of entrepreneurs, sci-
entists, engineers, and students, with the goal in helping transform their innovative
and technology-based concepts into a viable commercialization plan and a convinc-
ing pitch. The content is delivered online through 10 modules of 45-60 minutes
each, with a multiple choice quiz at the end of each module. Appendix 2.E provides
descriptions of the content of each module. They cover key issues such as how to
articulate the benefits of an innovation to customers and investors, intellectual prop-
erty protection, market validation, comparing to competition, and how to pitch and
present. The cost of the course was a one-time $ 5,000 set-up charge to customize to
our program, and then $ 153 per firm.
There were several reasons for offering the control group an online investment
readiness program rather than not providing any service at all. The first was that,
from a public policy point of view, a key question was whether an expensive and
intensive program was needed, or whether identical results could be obtained by
cheap and accessible online alternatives. This was considered the more interest-
ing policy counterfactual than offering nothing at all. Second, from an evaluation
standpoint, offering both groups an investment readiness program lowers the risk
of Hawthorne and John Henry effects, since both groups were told they were being
provided with an investment readiness program. Finally, we also believed that of-
fering the control group something would minimize the risk of differential attrition
compared to the treatment group.
2.3.4 Take-up
Of the 174 firms randomized into treatment, 157 (90.1% ) completed the WhatAVen-
ture online training platform, and 79.3% received individual mentoring. Conditional
on receiving individual mentoring, entrepreneurs received a median of 8 and mean
of 11 hours of individual mentoring from the lead mentor and pool of specialist
mentors.10 76 out of the 174 (43.7% ) attended at least one masterclass in person
(videos of the masterclasses were also available online, with typically 10-20 firms
watching each). There were approximately 1,150 mentoring hours provided during
the masterclasses, of which around 390 hours were individual mentoring, and 760
hours were in the form of lectures and presentations. This represents an average of
15 hours per attendee. In addition, before the semi-finals, 76 firms (43.7% ) attended
a 3-hour final pitch presentation training.
Table 2.2 examines the correlates of take-up of the WhatAVenture tool and of mas-
terclass participation amongst those in the treatment group. We run a probit of take-
up on all the baseline characteristics in Table 2.1, and then run a stepwise proce-
dure to progressively drop the largest coefficient with a p-value above 0.2 to end
up with the sparser specifications in columns 2 and 4. For the initial stage of using
the WhatAVenture tool, the only variable that is consistent in the sparse model is the
initial investment readiness score: firms with higher initial readiness are more likely
to the program. These overhead costs are estimated at approximately $ 1,500 per firm (in both the
treatment and control groups).
10 Note firms were eligible to receive up to 30 hours of individual mentoring time, so the majority of
teams used considerably less hours than allocated to them.
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to complete this first phase. However, we then see in columns 3 and 4 that higher
initial investment readiness is associated with a lower probability of attending a
masterclass. This might reflect that firms who already are more ready feel they have
less need to learn from such workshops. We see attendance is lower for firms from
Croatia. This perhaps reflects the masterclass weekend in that country being held in
Split, rather than the larger city of Zagreb: a one-day workshop was held addition-
ally in Zagreb, and including this reduces the gap slightly. Attendance is higher for
firms whose owners have post-graduate education, and for those who have partici-
pated in a mentoring or acceleration program before, potentially reflecting a taste or
revealed preference for training, or complementarities with existing skills. Finally,
companies which use cloud technology were more likely to attend. When asked
in our follow-up survey why they didn’t attend, the most important reasons given
were that they didn’t want to take the time away from their businesses (and in some
cases second jobs as employees), and that the locations were too far away.
Out of the 172 participants assigned to the control group, 120 (70% ) accessed at
least once the online Innovation Readiness SeriesTM platform. However, even con-
ditional on accessing the platform, overall usage was relatively low. Conditional on
accessing the online platform, 118 participants viewed at least once the modules’
section and 55 viewed it at least 10 times; the mean number of views of the modules
section was 21 and the median 9. Each module last approximately half an hour, so
we can approximate that the mean time spent on the modules was 10 hours while the
median 4.5 hours. Only 63 (37% of the control group) participated in one of the seven
quizzes at the end of a module. A total of 51 control group entrepreneurs passed at
least 4 quizzes with 45 attaining the threshold of 70% correct answers in all quizzes,
necessary to receive a certificate of completion from the IC2 Institute at the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin. The main two correlates of taking and passing the quizzes
among the control group are having postgraduate education (positively correlated),
and having previously participated in a mentoring or accelerator (negatively cor-
related). The online courses are thus done by those who have more schooling and
have not previously had exposure to such content.
2.4 Impacts on Investment Readiness as Scored by Judges
2.4.1 The Semi-finals and Judging Procedure
The semi-finals were held in parallel to, and in cooperation with, the Belgrade Ven-
ture Forum, an annual venture capital conference that took place from November
12 to 14, 2015. Participants were invited to present in a pitch event that follows the
standard format of such events, with firms giving a 5-minute pitch of their business
case, followed by 5 minutes of questions from a jury of judges.
Participation required the founder of the firm or a representative to be physically
present in Belgrade. To encourage participation, firms received multiple reminders
and calls, were sent an invitation letter with a ticket voucher that allowed them one
day of free access to the adjoining Belgrade Venture Forum, and were provided with
a transport subsidy that was sufficient to cover the cost of bus travel to the event. The
travel time was approximately 4 hours from Croatia, 5 hours from Macedonia, and 6
to 7 hours from Kosovo and Montenegro. In total 211 of the 346 invited firms (61% )
attended the semi-finals: 110 firms from the treatment group (63.8% ) and 101 firms
from the control group (58.1). The attendance rate was similar for Serbia (64% ) and
Croatia (67% ), and lower for the other three countries (51% ). Attendance rates were
higher amongst those who had participated more in the intervention. Amongst the
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treatment group, 81.6% of those who had attended at least one masterclass attended
the semi-finals, versus 49.0% of those who had not. Amongst the control group,
88.9% of those who had taken any of the quizzes attended, versus 41.3% of those
who had not. We discuss robustness to this attrition in the next section.
A group of 66 independent judges was used to do the scoring. Panels of five
judges were assigned to judge a session of six firms at a time, with judges then be-
ing rotated so that they are on panels with different judges for their next sessions.
Each batch of six firms consisted of three treatment and three control firms, selected
to have a similar range of initial investment readiness scores, and grouped accord-
ing to industry and country of operation. Judges were assigned to batches based
on their availability (some were giving talks at the venture forum), industry, and
technology used. Appendix 2.F provides details of characteristics of these judges.
They were a mix of investors, successful business owners, and experts in mentoring
and coaching start-ups. 37 percent lived in one of the five countries taking part in
the competition, while two-thirds were based in other countries. Eighty-percent of
them regularly mentor start-ups, 64 percent were part of companies that make ven-
ture investments, and three-quarters had founded their own companies. They were
therefore experienced in what outside investors are looking for in terms of invest-
ment readiness.
Judges were blinded to treatment status, and were not provided with any infor-
mation about the company in advance of scoring. They were briefed and asked to
score each firm on six factors:
1. Team: the skills and capabilities of the entrepreneur and his or her team
2. Technology: the degree of innovativeness and technological advancement
3. Traction: indications of measureable market success
4. Market: the commercial market attractiveness and size of the potential market
5. Recent business progress: the amount of progress firms had made during the
last three months (the time since initial application)
6. Presentation performance
An aggregate investment readiness score was then formed using the following
weights: (team) 28% , (technology) 21% , (traction) 14% , (market) 7% , and (progress)
30% . These weights were not revealed to the judges, but were based on what seed-
and early-stage investors would commonly focus on (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004).
They tend to emphasize the quality of the team and their technology (Gompers et
al., 2016), and the extent to which the business is continually improving. The presen-
tation score was added to allow judges to independently assess how well the firm
presented its ideas, and as “hygiene” factor that could be used if necessary to avoid
placing someone unable to present in front of investors at the final. The correlation
between this weighted score and an equally-weighted score is 0.995, and we show
in Appendix 2.F that our results are robust to this choice of weighting.
There were two ways for firms to be selected for the finals. The main path was
through an overall ranking based on the aggregate investment readiness score. Sec-
ondly, judges scored each firm after watching its pitch, and then at the end of the
batch of six presentations, discussed the set of six. They then were asked to collec-
tively rank the three best they had seen out of the six, and could choose to directly
nominate the top-ranked firm to directly be sent to the finals. They were asked to use
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this direct nomination selectively, reserving it only for firms they believed should
certainly be granted the opportunity to present in the finals. The idea behind direct
nomination was to allow for the possibility that through collective discussion, the
strength of a firm may be more apparent.
Sixteen firms were directly nominated to the finals, of which only four were not
in the top-50 overall based on the individual ranks.11 Then firms ranked in the top
46 based on the overall score were also chosen to give a total of 50 finalists. We then
examined how sensitive these rankings were to allowing for differences in scoring
amongst judges, and re-ranked firms on their residual scores after subtracting judge
fixed effects. Four additional firms were chosen as finalists based on having judge-
fixed-effect-adjusted scores in the top-50 even though their raw scores were not in
the top 50. This gave a set of 54 firms that were invited to the finals.
2.4.2 Estimating the Impact on Investment Readiness as Scored by Judges
To estimate the impact of the program on investment readiness as scored by the
judges, we use the following (pre-specified) base specification for firm iin stratum s:
Outcomei = α+ βTreati +
S
∑
s=1
cs1 (ies) + ε i (2.1)
Where 1 (ies) are strata dummy variables. Note that stratification implicitly con-
trols for baseline investment readiness, country, and whether or not the firm has an
outside private investor at baseline. Robust (Eicker-White) standard errors are used.
As a robustness check, we also re-estimate equation 2.1 after controlling for judge
fixed effects.
It is important to note that the treatment may affect different firms in a differ-
ent way depending on the personal abilities of each individual member of the team.
Recent evidence has shown that the same type of training, for instance online self-
learning course may have an heterogeneous benefit on the participants depending
on the cognitive skills of the single individual. For instance an individual with above
average investment readiness with possibly a previous experience in similar train-
ing programs benefits marginally from attending an online course with respect to an
individual that is just now beginning to familiarize with the innovation eco-system,
for this type of relative gains in technology-aided education see for instance Mu-
ralidharan, Singh, and Ganimian, 2019. We test also for such hypothesis in the next
Section.
The parameter β is then the intention-to-treat effect (ITT). This measures the im-
pact of being assigned to the treatment group, and being offered the expensive and
intensive investment readiness program rather than the online course offered to the
control group. We could also attempt to measure the local average treatment effect
(LATE) of actually receiving treatment. Recall that 90.1% of the treatment group
completed the WhatAVenture tool. However, all but one of the treatment group firms
that attended the semi-finals (99.1%) had completed this tool, so the non-compliers
to treatment status are firms for which we do not have investment readiness scores.
As such, the ITT and LATE are almost identical for the firms attending the semi-
finals. We therefore just report the ITT results.
The first column of Table 2.3 presents the impact of treatment in our overall mea-
sure of investment readiness, as scored by the judges. This is our main outcome
in this table, and so our main approach to multiple hypothesis testing for this set
11They ranked between 58 and 74.
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of outcomes is to rely on this aggregate. The control group has a mean investment
readiness score of 2.9 (s.d. 0.9). We find that treatment increases this score by 0.284,
which is significant at the 5 percent level. The magnitude is thus equivalent to 0.31
standard deviations. The second row of estimates show that this impact continues to
hold after controlling for judge fixed effects, with a larger magnitude of 0.41. Figure
2.3 compares the distributions of investment readiness scores for the treatment and
control groups, and shows there is a rightward shift in the distribution, so that these
gains appear to be occurring everywhere except at the very top.
The next five rows of Table 2.3 examine which components of the overall score
have improved with treatment. We find positive impacts on all five components
(team, technology, traction, market, and progress), with the impacts statistically sig-
nificant for three out of five measures, and significant for all five measures after
controlling for judge fixed effects. The seventh row then examines the impact on
the team’s presentation score. Recall this is not included as part of the overall score,
but was scored separately. We find that treatment resulted in a 0.37 unit (0.32 s.d.)
increase in the team’s presentational score, which is statistically significant at the 5
percent level. Treated firms are therefore more investment ready in terms of both
being able to present their idea, and in terms of the quality of the idea presented.
We had hypothesized that the treatment might also reduce the variability among
judges in their assessment of how investment-ready firms are. To examine this,
in column 8 we consider as an outcome the standard deviation of the individual
judge scores for a firm, with a higher standard deviation indicating more divergence
amongst judges in their assessment of the firm. However, we see a small and not
statistically significant impact of treatment on this measure.
Finally, the last column examines whether treated firms were more likely to be
selected as one of the top 54 firms that were invited to pitch to investors in the finals.
Only 12 percent of the control group firms were selected for the finals, and treatment
has an 11.5 percentage point increase in this likelihood. This is a large effect, dou-
bling the likelihood of making the finals, but it is only significant at the 10 percent
level.
The investment readiness scores are only available for firms which participated
in the semi-finals. This raises the concern of bias arising from differential partici-
pation patterns among treatment and control firms. The last columns of Table 2.1
examines balance on baseline characteristics by treatment status for the firms which
participated in the semi-finals. We see that, overall, the sample still looks balanced
on most observable characteristics, although the overall joint orthogonality test has
a p-value of 0.086. Most importantly, the mean of the baseline overall investment
readiness differs only by 0.02 between the two groups, and Appendix Figure 2-II
compares the full distribution of the baseline investment readiness score by treat-
ment group and participation status, and shows the distributions also look similar.
Our pre-analysis plan specified two approaches to examining the robustness of our
results to this attrition: imputing scores for those who did not attend, and using Lee,
2009 bounds. Appendix 2.F shows the results are robust to both approaches, and are
also robust to using alternative weighting schemes to aggregate the different compo-
nents of the overall score. The program therefore succeeded in making firms more
investment-ready, as judged by independent experts.
2.4.3 Heterogeneity in Impact by Initial Investment Readiness
In our pre-analysis plan, we hypothesized that the impact of the program is likely to
be greater for firms that were less investment-ready to begin with, since firms that
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already had very high scores on all components would have had little room to im-
prove. Conversely, this impact could be negative, if training causes less investment-
ready firms to present their ideas more clearly to judges, allowing judges to more
easily recognize them as low quality as in Clingingsmith and Shane, 2017. To test
this hypothesis, we interact treatment with an indicator of whether or not the firm
had a baseline investment readiness score below the median of 3 (45.1 percent of
firms), and include this interaction, along with the level effect of having a below
median readiness score in an expanded version of equation 2.1.
Table 2.4 reports the results of examining this heterogeneity for the same out-
comes as were tested in Table 2.3. The point estimate in column 1 is consistent with
this hypothesis, with the estimated effect of treatment on investment readiness being
twice as large for below median firms as above median firms. However, our power
to detect this heterogeneity is low, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
there is no difference in treatment effects by initial readiness. The next six columns
show positive point estimates on four out of five of the interaction effect for the dif-
ferent subcomponents of the overall score, along with a positive point estimate on
the interaction with the presentation score. However, the only significant effect is
when looking at the technology sub-component as an outcome. Moreover, after cor-
recting for multiple hypothesis testing using Holm, 1979 method this impact is no
longer significant. Finally, in the last column we see that the interaction is negative
for being selected for the finals. This is consistent with the idea that firms that were
far from investment-ready to begin with would not be able to improve enough to
get into the top group, although this interaction is not statistically significant and
so we cannot reject that the treatment effect on progression to the finals is the same
regardless of initial score.
2.5 Longer-term impacts on investment readiness and firm
performance
The immediate impacts on investment readiness are seen in the performance in the
semi-finals. We then track the firms over time in a variety of ways to see whether this
short-term improvement in investment readiness translates into longer-term invest-
ment readiness, into the chance of receiving investments, and into firm performance.
2.5.1 Performance in the Finals Event
The Finals event was held in cooperation with the Balkan Venture Forum on De-
cember 3 and 4, 2015 in Zagreb. This was the largest venture capital conference in
the five target countries to date, with more than 400 attendees. The pitching slots
were spread over two days and grouped into batches based on industry segments
(business and productivity, lifestyle and entertainment, life science and energy, en-
vironment, and mobility and transportation). Jury members consisting of partners
at venture capital firms and managers of accelerators/incubators choose a category
winner for each batch. Out of eight category winners, 6 came from the treatment
group and 2 from the control. These category winners were publicly awarded with
a large-format printed award and a bottle of sparkling wine following the slogan
“honor, fame, and champagne” . The three lead investors of the conference had
each publicly committed to choose at least one firm each to give an “invitation to
negotiate” for investment by the end of the conference. They extended these invita-
tions to four finalists in total, of which 3 were from the treatment group and 1 from
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the control. The treatment group therefore did better, but because the absolute num-
ber of firms winning is so low, these impacts are still small in absolute magnitude (1
to 2 percentage points), and are not statistically significant (the smallest p-value is
0.157 for being a category winner).
Following the finals, a short survey was sent to investors who had attended the
finals. Responses were received from 32 investors. Out of these investors, 66 percent
said they had talked about a potential investment with at least one firm, 28 percent
planned to negotiate with a firm, and 50 percent said they might invest and had
added new firms to their watchlists. Only 40 percent had previously invested in
the region, and when asked what the main barrier to investing in the region was,
the modal answer was in generating deal flow and identifying good investment
prospects. Investors were asked whether they planned to increase their investment
in the region as a result of attending. 25 percent said they would, 31 percent said
they would reallocate their investment from other investments they might make to-
wards firms in the event, and the rest would not change their investment strategies.
This provides suggestive evidence that the project may have increased the overall
amount of investment towards these types of firms in the region.
2.5.2 Impact on Media Buzz
We examine whether the firm is gaining attention and traction through several mea-
sures of media attention and social media buzz. One advantage of these measures
is that they are available for the full sample, with no attrition. The media intelli-
gence specialist firm Meltwater was contracted to collect online media mentions of
the firms in our sample over the six month period March 1 to August 31, 2015 (pre-
intervention), and then one year and two years later (March 1 to August 31, 2016;
and March 1 to August 31, 2017). Note that these time periods exclude the period of
the intervention, semi-finals, and finals, so are independent of any media coverage
of the program or pitch events, and correspond to an average of 6 and 18 months
post-intervention. Meltwater tracks more than 250,000 global news sources in 190
countries in 25 languages (including Serbo-Croatian and Albanian). Thirteen per-
cent of the firms in our sample had at least one media article about the firm during
the six months prior to application, with a median of three articles conditional on
having any media.
Column 1 of Table 2.5 show that 9.9 percent of the control sample was mentioned
at least once in the media during the six-month intervals in 2016 and 2017, and treat-
ment results in a 4.7 percentage point (2016) and 3.9 percentage point (2017) increase.
These increases are large relative to the sample mean, but not statistically significant.
Column 2 of Table 2.5 shows that we do see a statistically significant increase in the
total number of media mentions in 2017, which are three times as high for the treat-
ment group as the control.
Two-thirds of the firms had some form of social media presence at baseline, with
Facebook (which 58% use) and twitter (42% use) being the most common. Column
3 shows a small and statistically insignificant impact of treatment on the number
of Facebook followers a firm has, and Column 4 shows that treated firms have 20%
more twitter followers after two years, but this is also not statistically significant. We
pre-specified an overall index of media buzz by taking standardized z-scores of these
first four columns.12 The last column of Table 2.5 shows that treated firms have more
12Our pre-analysis plan also noted we would look at the impact on web-traffic, and being included
on AngelList, a web platform for fundraising, but that these would not be included in our overall index
of media buzz. We find no significant impact on these other outcomes (Appendix 2.G).
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media buzz, with this significant at the 5 percent level in 2017.
Tracking Firm Performance Through Follow-up Surveys
We conducted two rounds of follow-up surveys of these firms. The first, intended
to measure short-term effects, was taken between April and August 2016, corre-
sponding to a period of approximately six months after the end of the investment
readiness program and judging, and enables us to measure short-term effects. The
overall survey response rate was 79.2 percent, and does not differ significantly be-
tween treatment (79.9% ) and control (78.5% ). In addition, we collected information
on operating status, number of employees, and whether negotiations for an outside
investment had occurred for a further 12 percent of firms, resulting in basic data
being available for 92.2 percent of firms. The second follow-up survey took place
between August 2017 and March 2018, corresponding to an average of two years
since the intervention. Catalini, Guzman, and Stern, 2017 show that 75 percent of
firms that receive venture capital financing in the U.S. receive their first financing
within the first two years after incorporation, so this timing covers a window where
we should expect many firms to receive external financing if they will ever do so.
The overall survey response rate for this second follow-up was 85.0 percent, and
again does not differ significantly between treatment (86.2% ) and control (83.7% ),
with data on firm operating status and receipt of equity available for 94.5% of firms.
Appendix 2.H shows no significant difference in response rates by treatment status,
and that treatment and control firms remain balanced on baseline observable data
for those responding to the survey.
The follow-up surveys focused on measuring changes in the firm in three do-
mains. The first is whether or not the firm is still operating (regardless of whether or
not it has been sold to another owner). The second is investment readiness, where
we focus on three aspects identified by Mason and Kwok, 2010: (1) willingness
and interest in taking on equity investment; (2) general investability, as measured
whether there is a viable business of interest to investors in terms of employment,
sales, and profits; and (3) whether the firm has put in place specific measures in-
vestors want to see before making investments, such as separation of outcomes,
revenue projections, knowledge of customer acquisition costs, tracking key metrics
of traction, and covering intellectual property. The third and final domain looks
at steps towards receiving external funding and then external financing received.
Steps towards financing include contacting outside investors, making pitches, work-
ing with mentors or experts to help obtain financing, and entering into negotiations.
Receipt of external financing considers new debt and equity investments, as well as
receipt of incubator and accelerator grants.
We ask several questions under each domain and sub-domain. Our pre-analysis
plan then specifies aggregating these measures to form standardized indices. This
reduces concerns about multiple hypothesis testing by focusing on one aggregate
outcome in each family of questions. Appendix 2.C provides the exact questions
used in forming each question, and Appendix 2.I provides treatment impacts on
each specific question used in these aggregate measures.
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2.5.3 Do Higher Investment Readiness Scores Predict Better Firm Invest-
ment Readiness and Investment Outcomes?
The investment readiness program resulted in higher investment readiness scores
from judges. To investigate whether these judges’ scores are informative about fu-
ture outcomes for the firm, we use the control group sample to run the regression:
Outcomei = µ+ θ InvestmentReadinessi + γ′i Xi + ε i (2.2)
We carry out this estimation first with no additional controls, and then with con-
trols X for country (dummies for Serbia and for Croatia), whether or not the firm
had received funding from an outside investor at baseline, and the business sector
(dummies for business and productivity, and lifestyle and entertainment sectors).
We estimate this separately by survey, to examine results at different time horizons.
Table 2.6 presents the results. Column 1 shows that 10% of control firms had died
by the first follow-up, and 25% by the second follow-up, two years post-intervention.
These high death rates are higher than the average rates in developing countries, and
likely reflect the firms being young and in relatively developed countries (McKen-
zie and Paffhausen, 2017). We then see no significant association between higher
investment readiness scores and subsequent survival. Columns 2 through 6 then
examine the associations between higher investment readiness scores and our dif-
ferent measures of subsequent investment readiness actions and investment steps
and outcomes. We see that the judges’ scores of investment readiness are statisti-
cally significant predictors of the subsequent willingness and interest of the owner
in taking on equity investment, whether the firm is meeting specific needs of in-
vestors before investment can take place, whether the firm has taken steps towards
external financing, and whether they have received external financing. This is true
both in the short-run (six-month) survey, and in the two-year survey. The magni-
tudes range from 0.14 to 0.33, suggesting that a one unit change in the judge scores
(which had a mean of 2.9 and standard deviation of 0.9) would predict a 0.14 to 0.33
increase in these indices (corresponding to 0.2 to 0.5 standard deviations). The only
measure where we do not find a significant association is in general investability,
which is an index of measures of firm employment, profits, and sales.
Finally, in the last column we examine whether the firm had made at least one
deal with an outside investor since the start of the program (August 2015). 24.4
percent of the control group have made such a deal after two years. A one-mark
higher investment readiness score from the judges significantly predicts a 17 to 18
percentage point increase in the likelihood of making such a deal, which is large
relative to this baseline rate.
We therefore have that treatment has a causal impact ( β = 0.28 ) on the invest-
ment readiness score received from judges, and that this investment readiness score
in turn is a significant predictor (with coefficient θ ) of firm outcomes in the control
group sample. Combining these two estimates allows us to obtain an estimate of
the predicted treatment effect βθ . This predicted effect is shown for each outcome in
Table 2.6. It assumes that the only impact of the investment readiness program on
firm outcomes is captured through the investment readiness score, that the associa-
tion between score and outcomes observed in the control group is causal, and that
the sequential ignorability assumption of Imai et al., 2011 holds.13 Although these
assumptions can be questioned, we believe such an exercise is useful in providing
13The sequential ignorability assumption requires that if there are heterogeneous treatment effects,
it is not the case that the firms for whom treatment increases investment readiness scores are different
from the firms for which an increase in investment readiness scores would increase future outcomes.
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a sense of the magnitudes we might expect to see for treatment effects, given how
much our program affected investment readiness scores, and how much a change
in scores in turn predicts future outcomes. We see that the predicted treatment ef-
fects are small in absolute terms: each of our index measures is predicted to increase
by only 0.04 to 0.09 over two years, and the predicted increase in the likelihood of
receiving outside funding is 4.6 percentage points. We compare our estimated treat-
ment effects to these benchmarks in the next section.
2.5.4 Treatment Effects on Investment Readiness and Investment Out-
comes
Table 2.7 presents the treatment effects of the investment readiness program on these
survey outcomes after estimating equation (1). Panel A shows the short-run im-
pacts six months after the intervention, and panel B the impacts two years post-
intervention. Treatment results in a 7.2 percentage point increase in firm survival
over two years, but this is not statistically significant, with a 95 percent confidence
interval of (-1.7p.p., +16.1p.p.). We see a reduction in external investment in the
very short-run, which comes through less debt financing, but no significant impact
on any of our investment readiness or investment outcomes over two years. Af-
ter two years, the treatment group is 5 percentage points more likely to have made
a deal with an outside investor, with a 95 percent confidence interval of (-4.7p.p.,
+14.7p.p.). The estimated point estimates on all our index measures at two years are
all positive, but small, ranging from 0.003 for our external investment index, to 0.089
for general investability. These magnitudes are similar to those of our predicted
treatment effects, and in all cases the predicted treatment effect βθ lies within the 95
percent confidence interval for our estimated treatment effects.
Appendix 2.I shows impacts on the individual measures that make up these ag-
gregate indices. The intervention has a large and significant (p=0.013) impact on
employment after two years of 4.5 workers, which almost doubles the employment
level in the control mean. Employment is often a key policy outcome by itself, and
so this program would compare favorably to a number of other programs when
judged on employment alone. However, if we correct for testing 25 different out-
comes that make up the aggregate indices, this impact is no longer statistically sig-
nificant (p=0.425).
2.5.5 How should we interpret the lack of treatment effect?
Our results show that the investment readiness program increased investment readi-
ness scores from the judges, that these scores are predictive of future investment
readiness and investment outcomes, but that we do not find any significant im-
pacts of the program on these future outcomes. To reconcile these findings, we note
that our estimated treatment effects are in line with the predicted treatment effects
βθ – while we increased investment readiness scores, we did not increase them by
enough to register large enough changes in investment outcomes to be detectable.
Our confidence intervals enable us to rule out the program having large absolute
impacts on these outcomes, but are wide enough to allow for the program to have
moderate sized impacts that are not possible to detect with the sample size we have.
One difficulty in detecting end outcomes comes from the issue of statistical power
weakening the more steps one takes along a “funnel of attribution” (McKenzie and
Woodruff, 2013). Our experiment starts with a group of firms who apply to a pro-
gram. To get from this stage to receiving equity investment requires satisfying a
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number of steps – they must be interested in receiving investment and become in-
vestment ready, take steps towards receiving investment, and then actually receive
investment. The effective number of firms drops as we pass from one step to the
next, making it harder to detect impacts for end outcomes than initial outcomes. This
program is the first randomized experiment of its kind, but like a number of other
experiments involving larger firms, the sample size is set by external constraints in
terms of the number of firms that the program attracts and caters to, rather than
being a choice parameter.
Given the sample size, our funding proposal calculated that we would have 80%
power to detect a 0.23 increase in the investment readiness score, based on the mean
and standard deviation of the baseline score measure and not accounting for the
power gains from stratification. Our estimated treatment effect of 0.28 exceeds this
level. In contrast, our funding proposal assumed that it would be very rare for con-
trol group firms to receive outside funding, assuming a mean of 3 percent, and then
estimated a minimum detectable effect size of 8 percentage points at 80% power,
not accounting for the power gains from stratified randomization (since we did not
know how strongly our strata would be correlated with the end outcome). Ex post,
our randomization strata have an R2 of 0.29 in a regression of making a deal with an
outside investor on strata dummies. Given this, our anticipated power would have
been 91 percent to detect an 8 percentage point increase.
In practice, our estimated impact on receiving outside funding is 5 percentage
points (similar in magnitude to the predicted impact β θ= 0.046, which is less than
this minimal detectable effect. But the larger reduction in power comes from the
control mean being much higher than anticipated. While we expected very few
control firms to receive external financing, in practice 24.4 percent of control firms
had made a deal within two years. It is much harder to detect an 8 percentage point
increase from a control mean of 24.4% than from a control mean of 3% : under our
baseline assumptions, power would drop to 33.3% at this mean level. So a key reason
for not being able to detect a treatment effect on external investment is that control
firms found it easier to get investment than we had anticipated.
We explore the types of investment received in Table 2.8.14 Firms in the two-year
long follow-up survey were asked about whether they had made deals with different
types of outside investors, and if so, what type of deal. We see that the most common
deals occurred with other business owners (17%), angel investors (10%), and venture
capital funds (10%).15 Most of these deals were for a share of equity in the firm, with
royalty deals, convertible notes, and licensing deals not very common. Both the type
of investor and type of deal are similar across the treatment and control groups. We
have only partial data on the amount of these deals, but know that 16.8% of firms
(69% of those receiving an outside investment) received an amount of at least 25,000
euros, with this again not differing significantly by treatment status (Appendix Table
2-XIII).16
Finally, firms in the long survey were asked what is the main challenge their
business faces in their ability to grow over the next two years. Getting financing
is seen as the main challenge by 41% of the control firms and 24% of the treatment
14Note that this table was not pre-specified, and is intended to explore the higher than anticipated
rate of outside funding received by firms.
15Our measure of receiving external financing excludes financing received from family and friends.
10.8% of firms in the long survey received financing from family and friends, but in less than half of
cases this was for an equity stake- terms tend to be less formal in such cases.
16 Using the long follow-up survey only, 43% (42% treatment, 44% control) of those receiving outside
funding received at least 100,000 euros in investment. This information is not available for firms doing
the short survey.
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firms, with this difference statistically significant (p=0.002). In addition to the pos-
itive point estimate on getting access to external financing, it is possible that the
investment readiness program led some treatment firms to realize that they need to
improve other areas in their business first.
2.6 Conclusions
Investment readiness programs have been offered in a range of developing and
emerging markets, based on the idea of a gap between the quality of ideas en-
trepreneurs have, and their readiness to attract and receive outside investment in
those ideas. Despite their growing use, there has not been any rigorous study of
their effectiveness. Our five-country randomized trial enables measurement of the
effect of such a program. We do find that investment readiness increases, as mea-
sured by scores in a pitch competition, and that these scores are in turn predictive
of future investment readiness and outcomes amongst firms. Nevertheless, despite
finding positive point estimates, our estimates of the treatment effects of the invest-
ment readiness program on these firm investment outcomes over the next two years
are not statistically significant. Our analysis suggests that this in part reflects that
the change in investment readiness score is not large enough to generate sizeable
impacts on subsequent firm outcomes, and also that more of these firms are able to
obtain financing without the program than was originally anticipated.
We believe these results offer lessons for governments deciding whether and
how to use such policies. Starting with firms that express interest in outside fund-
ing, but that require many steps to take place before being in a position to receive
funding may end up including many firms for which investment readiness is not the
main constraint to receiving outside funding and to firm growth. As a result, invest-
ment readiness programs that start from the demand side of outside financing may
have stronger impacts on getting firms to take steps towards investment readiness,
than on investment outcomes, where other constraints also play a role. A possible
alternative to test would be to start from the supply side, starting with investors and
asking them for a list of firms that are at the margin of being investible, but for which
assistance on specific aspects of investment readiness are needed.
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FIGURE 2.1: Baseline Distributions of Investment Readiness for Treat-
ment and Control Groups
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Note: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions has p-value of 0.988
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FIGURE 2.2: Baseline Distributions of Investment Readiness for
Those Attending Semi-Finals
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Note: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of distributions has p-value of 0.959
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FIGURE 2.3: Distribution of Investment Readiness Scores after Pro-
gram as Scored by Judges
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TABLE 2.1: Balance Test on Application Data
Treatment  Control P-value Treatment  Control P-value
Variables stra�ﬁed on
Incorporated/Registered in Croa�a 0.25 0.24 0.612 0.25 0.30 0.920
Incorporated/Registered in Serbia 0.46 0.46 0.626 0.48 0.48 0.513
Baseline Readiness Score 2.95 2.92 0.150 2.99 2.97 0.476
Has an outside private investor 0.10 0.09 0.178 0.14 0.06 0.170
Other variables
Market a�rac�veness score 3.08 3.05 0.851 3.13 3.18 0.579
Product technology score 2.47 2.43 0.835 2.56 2.71 0.085
Trac�on score 3.34 3.27 0.507 3.28 3.06 0.382
Team score 3.04 3.05 0.878 3.08 3.02 0.207
Sector is business and produc�vity 0.48 0.39 0.107 0.45 0.36 0.436
Sector is lifestyle and entertainment 0.18 0.23 0.295 0.20 0.27 0.215
Uses Cloud Technology 0.20 0.26 0.231 0.20 0.21 0.984
Uses Big Data 0.18 0.21 0.642 0.17 0.20 0.915
Place in value chain is developer 0.61 0.55 0.171 0.60 0.57 0.677
Place in value chain is service provider 0.59 0.54 0.372 0.60 0.54 0.108
Age of ﬁrm (years) 2.61 2.66 0.887 2.24 2.29 0.346
Early stage ﬁrm 0.30 0.33 0.475 0.35 0.37 0.554
Revenues in 2014 178073 184760 0.959 37642 144012 0.303
Number of employees 6.47 5.88 0.539 4.65 5.32 0.800
Age of main founder 38.22 36.81 0.204 38.02 36.67 0.362
Main founder has post-graduate educa�on 0.49 0.48 0.816 0.54 0.55 0.740
At least one founder is female 0.16 0.22 0.128 0.16 0.30 0.071
Company has a global focus 0.60 0.58 0.576 0.59 0.63 0.569
Have accepted outside ﬁnancing 0.34 0.37 0.656 0.42 0.40 0.836
Previouslyin mentoring/accelerator program 0.15 0.16 0.704 0.18 0.22 0.202
Sample Size 174 172 110 101
Joint test of orthogonality of treatment p-value 0.621 0.086
Full Sample Semi-Final Par�cipants
Notes: Full sample denotes the full experimental sample. Semi-final participants
are the sample that were scored by judges during the semi-final pitch event. Vari-
ables stratified on were the variables used in randomized assignment.
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TABLE 2.2: Correlates on the Take-Up Decision among the Treatment
Group
Full Model Stepwise Model Full Model Stepwise Model
Baseline Investment Readiness Score 0.494** 0.573*** -0.217 -0.238*
(0.194) (0.169) (0.144) (0.132)
Incorporated/Registered in Croa�a 0.424 -0.757** -0.771***
(0.397) (0.296) (0.286)
Incorporated/Registered in Serbia 0.409 -0.331 -0.393
(0.354) (0.261) (0.245)
Sector is business and produc�vity 0.128 0.040
(0.254) (0.262)
Sector is lifestyle and entertainment 0.191 0.010
(0.366) (0.327)
Uses Cloud Technology 0.137 0.577** 0.610**
(0.372) (0.275) (0.259)
Uses Big Data 0.740 0.278
(0.521) (0.266)
Place in value chain is developer -0.181 -0.360* -0.309
(0.292) (0.215) (0.207)
Place in value chain is service provider -0.211 -0.108
(0.294) (0.235)
Age of ﬁrm (years) -0.005 -0.026
(0.056) (0.044)
Early stage ﬁrm -0.147 0.024
(0.335) (0.238)
Number of employees 0.008 -0.005
(0.013) (0.010)
Age of main founder -0.020 -0.018 -0.008
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Main founder has post-graduate educa�on -0.141 0.487** 0.485**
(0.278) (0.221) (0.212)
At least one founder is female -0.674** -0.455 -0.001
(0.302) (0.337) (0.270)
Company has a global focus 0.280 0.073
(0.305) (0.225)
Have accepted outside ﬁnancing 0.211 0.210
(0.324) (0.252)
Has an outside private investor -0.123 -0.121
(0.581) (0.373)
Have par�cipated in mentoring/accelerator program before 0.558 0.399 0.488*
(0.579) (0.308) (0.276)
Sample Size 174 174 174 174
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects from probit es�ma�on.
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respec�vely
90.1% of ﬁrms took up WhatAVenture, and 43.7% a�ended at least one masterclass.
Take-up WhatAventure A�end Masterclasses
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TABLE 2.3: Impact of Program on Investment readiness as Scored by
Judges
Overall Std Dev Selected
Readiness Team Technology Trac�on Market Progress Presenta�on of Judge to go to
Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Scores Finals
Base Speciﬁca�on
Assigned to Treatment 0.284** 0.167 0.372** 0.206 0.268* 0.373*** 0.372** 0.006 0.115*
(0.126) (0.150) (0.152) (0.130) (0.137) (0.137) (0.164) (0.049) (0.068)
Including Judge Fixed Eﬀects
Assigned to Treatment 0.409*** 0.369** 0.476*** 0.295** 0.463*** 0.440*** 0.514*** -0.017 0.090
(0.135) (0.158) (0.174) (0.142) (0.139) (0.143) (0.191) (0.051) (0.076)
Sample Size 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211
Control Mean 2.908 3.042 2.970 2.541 3.406 2.794 3.042 0.723 0.122
Control Std. Dev. 0.903 1.068 1.031 0.947 0.940 0.937 1.145 0.317 0.328
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions control for randomiza�on strata. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 percent levels respec�vely. Judge ﬁxed eﬀects controls for which ﬁve of the sixty-ﬁve judges judged a par�cular
ﬁrm.
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TABLE 2.4: Heterogeneity in Impacts on Investment Readiness
Overall Std Dev Selected
Readiness Team Technology Trac�on Market Progress Presenta�on of Judge to go to
Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Scores Finals
Assigned to Treatment 0.203 0.014 0.405** 0.138 0.009 0.314 0.249 0.020 0.177*
(0.178) (0.208) (0.193) (0.192) (0.180) (0.197) (0.230) (0.062) (0.101)
Assigned to Treatment*Baseline Readiness below Median 0.210 0.378 -0.083 0.183 0.646** 0.169 0.310 -0.019 -0.179
(0.254) (0.305) (0.317) (0.251) (0.275) (0.270) (0.335) (0.105) (0.127)
Sample Size 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211 211
Control Mean 2.908 3.042 2.970 2.541 3.406 2.794 3.042 0.723 0.122
Control Std. Dev 0.903 1.068 1.031 0.947 0.940 0.937 1.145 0.317 0.328
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions control for randomiza�on strata. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 percent levels respec�vely. Regressions also control for level eﬀect of having a baseline investment readiness score below the median of 3.
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TABLE 2.5: Impacts on Media mentions and Social Media Buzz
Any media Number of # Facebook # Twi�er Media Buzz  
men�on Media men�ons likes Followers Index
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment 0.047 0.786 -38.0 15.110 0.085
(0.031) (0.483) (145) (18.495) (0.053)
Sample Size 346 346 346 346 346
Control Mean 0.099 0.663 1119 112.471 -0.060
stddev 0.299 3.410 2388 260.201 0.546
Panel B: Impact at Eighteen months
Assigned to Treatment 0.039 0.736** 0.889 22.106 0.112**
(0.030) (0.291) (218) (18.974) (0.047)
Sample Size 346 346 346 346 346
Control Mean 0.099 0.320 1430 106.866 -0.073
Control S.D. 0.299 1.566 3106 249.504 0.528
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
All regressions control for randomiza�on strata ﬁxed eﬀects and for baseline values of outcome of interest.
Any media men�on denotes ﬁrm was men�oned in news media in 6 month window,  number of media men�ons 
is the number of �mes the ﬁrm was men�oned, winsorized at the 99th percen�le.   # Facebook likes and # Twi�er 
Followers are the number of Facebook likes for the ﬁrm's Facebook page, and number of Twi�er followers for the 
ﬁrm, both winsorized at the 95th percen�le. Media Buzz Index is an index of standardized z-scores of these ﬁrst 
four columns.
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TABLE 2.6: Judges Scores Predict Firm Outcomes 6 months and 2 year
after the program
v
Firm Interested General Speciﬁc needs Investment External Made a deal
survival in equity Investability of investors Steps investment with investor
Panel A: Associa�on at Six Months
without controls 0.024 0.201** 0.076 0.336*** 0.222*** 0.213** 0.093**
Score assessed by Judges (0.037) (0.076) (0.072) (0.065) (0.082) (0.098) (0.038)
with controls for country, prior funding, and sector
Score assessed by Judges 0.017 0.168* 0.052 0.300*** 0.179** 0.187* 0.085**
(0.037) (0.087) (0.074) (0.069) (0.087) (0.110) (0.039)
Sample Size 92 83 83 81 73 82 82
Control Mean 0.898 -0.015 -0.039 -0.059 0.008 0.084 0.083
Control S.D. 0.303 0.764 0.634 0.682 0.720 0.741 0.276
Predicted Treatment Eﬀect 0.007 0.056 0.021 0.094 0.062 0.060 0.026
Panel B: Associa�on at Two Years
without controls 0.061 0.153* 0.040 0.136* 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.166***
Score assessed by Judges (0.041) (0.088) (0.073) (0.082) (0.100) (0.072) (0.048)
with controls for country, prior funding, and sector
Score assessed by Judges 0.053 0.128 0.027 0.140* 0.324*** 0.339*** 0.175***
(0.044) (0.094) (0.078) (0.077) (0.099) (0.077) (0.049)
Sample Size 100 92 86 88 80 99 99
Control Mean 0.753 -0.005 -0.058 -0.059 -0.032 0.018 0.244
Control S.D. 0.433 0.783 0.650 0.692 0.760 0.698 0.431
Predicted Treatment Eﬀect 0.017 0.044 0.011 0.038 0.090 0.090 0.046
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respec�vely.
Firm survival is a binary variable that takes value one if the ﬁrm is opera�ng, and zero otherwise.   Interested in equity is a
standardized index of whether the ﬁrm is interested in equity ﬁnancing, the maximum equity share they are willing to have
owned by outside investors, whether they have speciﬁc deal terms for investors, and whether they would consider a royalty-
based investment. General investability is a standardized index of number of employees, whether the founders work full-
�me in the business, whether the ﬁrm had posi�ve sales in the ﬁrst quarter of the year, whether total sales exceed 10,000 
euros in that quarter, whether the ﬁrm made a posi�ve proﬁt in the past year, and whether the ﬁrm made sales to Western 
Europe or the United States. Speciﬁc needs of investors is a standardized index of whether business and personal accounts are 
separated, whether the ﬁrm has made a revenue projec�on for the next year, whether it knows customer acquisi�on costs, 
the number of key metrics tracked, whether it has found out if the product or service can be covered by intellectual property 
protec�on, and whether it has at least one form of intellectual property protec�on received or pending.   Investment steps is a 
standardized index of having contacted at outside investor, made a pitch to an outside investor, have a mentor or external 
expert suppor�ng them to obtain ﬁnancing, and entered into nego�a�ons with an outside investor. External investment is a 
standardized index of having taken on new debt, having made a deal with an outside investor, have received at least 25,000 
euros in outside ﬁnancing, and have received an incubator or accelerator grant (all since August 2015). Made a deal with an 
investor indicates having made a deal with an outside investor since August 2015 (program start).
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TABLE 2.7: Impacts on Survey Outcomes 6 months and 2 years after
the program
Firm Interested General Speciﬁc needs Investment External Made a deal
survival in equity Investability of investors Steps investment with investor
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment 0.049 0.051 0.026 0.082 -0.017 -0.152* -0.024
(0.030) (0.094) (0.085) (0.080) (0.098) (0.087) (0.033)
Sample Size 319 278 277 269 240 279 279
Control Mean 0.898 -0.015 -0.039 -0.059 0.008 0.084 0.083
Control S.D. 0.303 0.764 0.634 0.682 0.720 0.741 0.276
Predicted Treatment eﬀect 0.007 0.056 0.021 0.094 0.062 0.060 0.026
Panel B: Impact at Two Years
Assigned to Treatment 0.072 0.032 0.089 0.084 0.044 0.003 0.050
(0.045) (0.084) (0.082) (0.079) (0.092) (0.080) (0.049)
Sample Size 340 309 291 298 282 330 330
Control Mean 0.753 -0.005 -0.058 -0.059 -0.032 0.018 0.244
Control S.D. 0.433 0.783 0.650 0.692 0.760 0.698 0.431
Predicted Treatment eﬀect 0.017 0.044 0.011 0.038 0.090 0.090 0.046
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respec�vely.
All regressions control for randomiza�on strata ﬁxed eﬀects.
Firm survival is a binary variable that takes value one if the ﬁrm is opera�ng, and zero otherwise.   Interested in equity is a
standardized index of whether the ﬁrm is interested in equity ﬁnancing, the maximum equity share they are willing to have
owned by outside investors, whether they have speciﬁc deal terms for investors, and whether they would consider a royalty-
based investment. General investability is a standardized index of number of employees, whether the founders work full-
�me in the business, whether the ﬁrm had posi�ve sales in the ﬁrst quarter of the year, whether total sales exceed 10,000 
euros in that quarter, whether the ﬁrm made a posi�ve proﬁt in the past year, and whether the ﬁrm made sales to Western 
Europe or the United States. Speciﬁc needs of investors is a standardized index of whether business and personal accounts are 
separated, whether the ﬁrm has made a revenue projec�on for the next year, whether it knows customer acquisi�on costs, 
the number of key metrics tracked, whether it has found out if the product or service can be covered by intellectual property 
protec�on, and whether it has at least one form of intellectual property protec�on received or pending.   Investment steps is a 
standardized index of having contacted at outside investor, made a pitch to an outside investor, have a mentor or external 
expert suppor�ng them to obtain ﬁnancing, and entered into nego�a�ons with an outside investor. External investment is a 
standardized index of having taken on new debt, having made a deal with an outside investor, have received at least 25,000 
euros in outside ﬁnancing, and have received an incubator or accelerator grant (all since August 2015). Made a deal with an 
investor indicates having made a deal with an outside investor since August 2015 (program start).
Predicted Treatment eﬀect is the treatment eﬀect predicted from associa�on in the control group between the judges score 
and the outcome, mul�plied by the treatment eﬀect of the program on the judges score.
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TABLE 2.8: Details on Types of External Funding Deals Made
Sample Treatment Control
Size Group Group P-value
Who was deal made with?
Sold Firm 221 0.017 0.038 0.547
Deal with Other Business Owner 221 0.165 0.179 0.385
Deal with Angel Investor 221 0.096 0.104 0.804
Deal with Crowdfunding 221 0.043 0.019 0.164
Deal with Accelerator 221 0.087 0.038 0.096
Deal with VC Fund 221 0.096 0.113 0.967
Deal with Government Fund 221 0.070 0.075 0.706
What type of deal was made?
Equity-Share 221 0.209 0.236 0.765
Licensing Deal 221 0.043 0.009 0.113
Royalty Deal 221 0.035 0.057 0.737
Conver�ble Note Deal 221 0.026 0.019 0.868
Other Deal 221 0.043 0.057 0.826
Says ﬁnancing is main challenge 204 0.239 0.411 0.002
Notes: Data are for ﬁrms that answered the full survey in the second follow-up,
approximately two years post-interven�on. Some ﬁrms made mul�ple
deals, and so numbers given are propor�on of ﬁrms which made at least one of this
deal type. Says ﬁnancing is main challenge is an indicator of whether ﬁnancing is
viewed as the main challenge the business faces in its ability to grow.
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2.A Appendix: Examples of Investment Readiness Programs
Around the World
The text provides some examples of investment readiness programs offered in other
countries. We provide more discussion of these examples here, with Mason and Har-
rison, 2001 and Mason and Kwok, 2010 also providing reviews of some programs.
2.A.1 Australia
The “Impact Investment Readiness Fund” offers grants of up to $ 100,000 for en-
terprises to purchase specialized capacity building support from providers such as
advisory, financial, intermediary or legal services. The program aims to bridge the
gap in the Australian market that exists between mission-driven organizations in
need of funding and investors actively seeking impact investment opportunities.17
2.A.2 United Kingdom
In the UK, there are different types of investment readiness programs. Some of them
discriminate in favor of entrepreneurs that have a social mission, while others focus
on all types of firms. Within the first group, the “Investment and Contract Readiness
Fund” 18, supported by the Office for Civil Society, assists social ventures to build
their capacity to be able to raise capital. The “Impact HUB Westminster” also offers
an investment readiness program, the “Impact Investment Readiness” , which aims
to accelerate investment into social and environmental businesses based in London.
It helps entrepreneurs to learn which type of investment is right for them, discover
how to write investable business plans, and articulate their business mission as an
attractive impact investment. They usually offer two days of free in-depth content
on relevant topics, led by experts and supported by peer-to-peer learning.19
Within the second group, the “Growth Accelerator” 20 provides investment readi-
ness services that help the entrepreneur understand which type of finance is right for
her/him, build strong business plan and investment pitch, ensure the financial in-
formation provided to potential investors is credible and robust, pitch to the right
type of investor for the entrepreneur’s business, connect with a wide range of fi-
nance institutions and investors across the country and secure finance. Another
example in the UK is the investment readiness program provided by the “Angel
Capital Group” , which focuses specifically around three key dimensions: (i) posi-
tioning in the market, (ii) developing attractiveness to the investor, and (iii) pitching
the message and opportunity correctly. From its headquarters in central London, the
Angel Capital Group works both nationally and internationally, providing access to
leading-edge services designed to improve investment readiness, facilitate access to
early stage investment, and create opportunities for the development of new early
stage co-investment funds, with a key focus on the angel investment market.21 The
“Greater London Enterprise” 22 is also another provider of investment readiness ser-
vices, usually through a combination of an e-learning model and legal and financial
17 http://impactinvestingaustralia.com/iirf/.
18 http://www.sibgroup.org.uk/investment-readiness/.
19 https://westminster.impacthub.net/impact-investment-ready/
20 http://www.ga.businessgrowthservice.greatbusiness.gov.uk/what-we-offer/
access-to-finance/
21 http://www.angelcapital.co.uk/.
22 https://www.gle.co.uk/gle-business-support.html
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advisors, who are also investors. Mason and Kwok, 2010 also provide details on sev-
eral other programs in the U.K. These include the different variants of investment
readiness programs tried by the U.K. Small Business Service’s Investment Readi-
ness Demonstration Project, the University of Warwick’s Science Park’s Investment
Readiness program; and the Finance and Business program delivered in the North
East of England by the North East Regional Development Agency.
2.A.3 Europe
In Ireland, “Enterprise Ireland” offers investment readiness support to entrepreneurs
by giving them access to the network “Enterprise Ireland Advisers” , and allow-
ing them to get specialist support in a range of key strategic business development
functions, including equity raising, technology development, market research, and
export sales. The “Invest Academy Programme” , is an investment readiness pro-
gram sponsored by the European Business Angel Network (EBAN), Sun& Sup, and
Eurada geared to train entrepreneurs to understand sources of financing for their
company by building their knowledge of financial sources, and helping them to
refine their business propositions and business plans to make them attractive to
potential investors and/or lenders. “InvestHorizon” is a program designed to in-
crease investments made in Innovative European SMEs through Investment Readi-
ness development and investor sensitization. The program assists companies getting
started, raising awareness amongst SMEs about investment sources, options and re-
quirements, providing coaching services to get funded, and matching entrepreneurs
with specialized and active investors through investment forum events.
A European Union financed project led to the Ready for Equity23 program which
now offers training programs for fund-seeking entrepreneurs throughout Europe,
with an 8-module course that includes an introduction to equity, discussion of the
investment process, team building, how to do the perfect presentation, and how to
value the enterprise and manage exit.
2.A.4 United States
In the U.S, there are also several initiatives to foster investment readiness. For
example, the “Lean Startup” methodology developed by Steve Blank24 offers en-
trepreneurs a framework to focus on what’s important to be ready. Teams use the
Lean Startup toolkit: the Business Model Canvas + Customer Development process
+ Agile Engineering to prepare themselves and be ready to present their business
propositions to potential investors. These three tools allow start-ups to focus on
the parts of an early-stage venture that matter the most for investors: the product,
market fit, customer acquisition/base, revenue and cost models, channels and part-
ners. The “Larta Institute” also offers investment readiness services.25 By working
side-by-side with entrepreneurs to identify and address their unique challenges and
opportunities, they help them to be ready to raise equity finance. The Larta Insti-
tute gives entrepreneurs access to top-notch specialists in financial planning and
mentors that support the entrepreneur in building a credible and attractive business
plan. They have also worked with NSF grantees to help them commercialize their
ideas.
23 http://www.readyforequity.eu/article/2010/start_page/
24 http://steveblank.com/about/.
25 http://www.larta.org/services/entrepreneurs
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2.B Appendix: Timeline
• Aug 14, 2015: applications launched
• August 2015: roadshows, advertising
• Sept 6, 2015: Applications closed
• Sept 10, 2015: Random assignment done by computer
• Oct 2, 2015: Registration in AEA RCT registry
• Sept 10-Nov 13, 2015: Investment Readiness program implemented, master
classes, mentoring, etc.
• November 12-14, 2015: Semi-finals and pitch event in Belgrade
• December 2-4, 2015: Finals with the top 54 firms from the semi-finals pitching
in front of the investors VC fund managers and Business Angels.
• April-August 2016: First follow-up survey (approximately 6 months post-program)
• August 2017-March 2018: Second follow-up survey (approximately 2 years
post-program).
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2.C Appendix: Scoring Methodology and Variable Defini-
tions
The key variables are measured and defined as follows:
2.C.1 Baseline Investment Readiness
The applications were scored by a team from Pioneers Ventures, a seed-stage venture
capital investment unit. Two professional investment managers reviewed each eli-
gible application independently and assigned a score, based on for sub-scores using
an agreed scoring metric as detailed below in Appendix Table 2-I. Where the inde-
pendent scores differed by more than one unit, they discussed the cases to arrive at
a consensus score, otherwise the scores were averaged. Each business was scored on
four sub-components as follows:
TABLE 2-I: Description of the Investment Readiness Scoring Scale
Category Weight Points Threshold description
Market attrac-
tiveness
10% 1 Market does not exist/ no market
need
2 Small market well served by com-
petitors or equally good substitutes
3 Large market well served by com-
petitors or equally good substitutes
4 Attractive niche in small market with
unique solution/ positioning
5 Attractive niche in large market with
unique solution/ positioning
6 Very large and mostly untapped/
underserved market with right offer-
ing
Co-founder(s)
and team
20% 1 Single founder, no team
2 Team of 2+ people
3 Complimentary team with little ex-
perience
4 Complimentary team with signifi-
cant experience
5 Serial entrepreneur(s)
6 Serial entrepreneur(s) with exit
Product/ technol-
ogy
30% 1 No/ low innovation - Imitation of ex-
isting products or services
2 Low innovation - Localization of
proven business models from abroad
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
3 Some innovation - Incremental im-
provements of existing products or
services
4 Innovative new solutions or business
models that address customer needs
5 Competitive technological innova-
tion/ advantage
6 Patented/ patent-pending techno-
logical innovation or otherwise pro-
tected IP
Traction 40% 1 No traction
2 Soft traction (press coverage, face-
book likes etc.)
3 Test users/ prototype testing
4 Non-financial KPIs (e.g. downloads,
pre-orders)
5 Generating revenues
6 Sustainable business (generated rev-
enues in 2014 > GPD/capita for each
founder)
The baseline investment readiness score was then calculated as a weighted average
of these four sub-components, using the weights detailed above.
2.C.2 Semi-finals scores provided by Judges
Judges scored each of the following on a six-point scale, with the score being the
simple average of the scores of each of the five judges scoring the pitch:
1. Team: a score for the skills and capabilities of the entrepreneur and team
2. Technology: a score for the degree of innovativeness and technological advance-
ment
3. Traction: a score for indications of measureable market success
4. Market: a score for commercial market attractiveness
5. Progress: a score for recent business development progress (in the last 3 months)
6. Presentation: a score for the presentation performance.
The following two variables were then calculated:
1. Overall readiness score: this is calculated as a weighted average of the team (28%
weight), technology (21% weight), traction (14% weight), market (7% weight),
and progress (30% weight) scores.
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2. Std dev of judge scores: the overall readiness score is calculated for each judge.
We then calculate the standard deviation of the five judge scores for a firm to
get this measure of how much disagreement amongst judges there was in the
scoring.
Finally, we also construct a dummy variable Selected to go to Finals to denote
whether or not the firm was selected by virtue of having a top overall score or by
direct nomination to go through to the Finals event.
2.C.3 Media mentions and social media buzz
1. Any media mention is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm is men-
tioned in any of the over 250,000 global news sources covered by Meltwater
during the six month period March 1 to August 31. This is measured for 2016
in panel A of Table 2.5, and for 2017 in panel B.
2. Number of media mentions: the number of times the firm is mentioned in any
of the global news sources covered by Meltwater during the six month period
March 1 to August 31. This is winsorized at the 99th percentile to reduce the
influence of outliers.
3. # Facebook likes: the number of likes for the firm’s Facebook page, measured
approximately 6 months and 18 months post intervention. This is recorded
as zero for firms without Facebook pages (including firms that have closed
down), and is winsorized at the 99th percentile.
4. # Twitter followers: the number of followers the firm’s twitter account has,
measured approximately 6 months and 18 months post intervention. This is
recorded as zero for firms without twitter profiles (including firms that have
closed down), and is winsorized at the 99th percentile.
5. Media buzz index: Standardized z-scores of each of the above four variables are
obtained by subtracting their mean and dividing by their standard deviation
(separately by time period). The media buzz index is then the mean of the
standardized z-scores for any media mention, number of media mentions, #
facebook likes, and # twitter followers.
2.C.4 Survey outcomes
1. Firm survival: this is a dummy variable coded as one if the firm is still operating
(regardless of whether or not it has the original owners), and 0 otherwise.
2. Interested in equity: this is an average of standardized z-scores from the follow-
ing variables:
• Interested in equity financing for the business: a dummy variable which takes
value one if the owners says they are interested in receiving new equity
financing for the business.
• Maximum equity share willing to have held by outside investors: this variable
ranges from 0 to 100, and is the percent of equity the firm owner reports
being willing to have held by an outside investor. It is coded as 100 for
individuals who have sold their whole firm, and as the share of equity
currently held by investors for those who are not interested in receiving
new equity.
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• Have specific deal terms of offer outside investors: this is a dummy variable,
coded as one if the firm owner reports having specific deal terms (e.g. a
draft term sheet) to offer outside investors, and zero otherwise. It is coded
as zero for firms that have closed.
• Would consider a royalty-based investment: a dummy variable, coded as one
if the firm owner reports willingness to consider a royalty-based invest-
ment, and zero otherwise. It is coded as zero for firms that have closed.
3. General investability: this is an average of standardized z-scores of the follow-
ing variables:
• Number of employees in the company: the number of employees in the com-
pany, coded as zero for firms that are closed, and winsorized at the 99th
percentile.
• Founder/co-founders work full-time in the company: a dummy variable that
takes value one if at least one of the founders works full-time in the com-
pany, and zero otherwise.
• Positive total sales for first quarter: this is a dummy variable which takes
value one if the firm made positive sales in the first quarter of 2016 (first
follow-up survey), or in the first quarter of 2017 (second follow-up sur-
vey), and zero otherwise. It is coded as zero for firms that have closed.
• Total sales for first quarter of at least 10,000 euros: a dummy variable which
takes value one if the firm made sales of at least 10,000 euros in the first
quarter of 2016 (first follow-up survey), or in the first quarter of 2017 (sec-
ond follow-up survey), and zero otherwise. It is coded as zero for firms
that have closed.
• Business made positive profit in last year: a dummy variable which takes
value one if the firm made a positive profit in 2015 (first follow-up survey)
or in 2016 (second follow-up survey), and zero otherwise. It is coded as
zero for firms that are closed.
• Sales made in Western Europe or U.S.: a dummy variable which takes value
one if the firm makes sales in European Union countries (excluding Croa-
tia and Slovenia) or in the United States, and zero otherwise. It is coded
as zero for firms that are closed.
4. Meeting the specific needs of investors: this is an average of standardized z-scores
of the following variables:
• Accounts of the business are separated from those of the owners: a dummy
variable that takes value one if the business accounts are kept separately
from those of the owner, and zero otherwise. It is coded as zero for closed
firms.
• Revenue projection made for the next 12 months: a dummy variable that
takes value one if the firm has in place a revenue projection for the next
12 months, and zero otherwise. It is coded as zero for closed firms.
• Business knows customer acquisition costs: a dummy variable that takes
value one if the firm knows the cost of acquiring a customer, and zero
otherwise. It is coded as zero for closed firms.
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• Number of key metrics (out of 11) being tracked: the number of key metrics be-
ing tracked such as newsletter sign-ups, pre-orders, free user downloads,
requests for samples or free trials, free pilot projects with customers, cur-
rent active users, new sales leads per month, sales meetings per month,
paid pilot projects with customers, paid customer sign-ups or paid down-
loads, and customer life-time value. This is coded as zero for closed firms.
• Found out whether product or service can be covered by intellectual property pro-
tection: a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has found out
whether their product or service can be covered by some form of intel-
lectual property protection, and zero otherwise. This is coded as zero for
closed firms.
• Has at least one form of intellectual property protection or application pending:
A dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has, or has pending, a
copyright, trademark, industrial design right, patent, or other form of IP
protection, and zero otherwise. This is coded as zero for closed firms.
5. Investment Steps: this is an average of standardized z-scores of the following
variables:
• Has contacted an outside investor to see if they are interested in making an in-
vestment: A dummy variable taking the value one if, in the last year, the
firm has contacted an outside investor to see if they are interested in mak-
ing an investment, and zero otherwise. Firms that say they are not inter-
ested in investment and that do not answer this question are assumed to
have not contacted an investor. Coded as zero for closed firms.
• Has made a pitch to outside investors outside of our program: A dummy vari-
able taking the value one if, in the past year, the firm made a pitch to out-
side investors at an event. Firms were explicitly asked to exclude pitches
made during the semi-finals and finals of the Pioneers program. Firms
that say they are not interested in outside investment are assumed not to
have made a pitch. It is coded as zero otherwise, including if the firm is
closed.
• Have a mentor or external export supporting them to obtain external financing: a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm has a mentor or exter-
nal expert helping them to raise funding, and is zero otherwise, including
if the firm is closed.
• Entered into negotiations with outside investor since August 2015: a dummy
variable which takes the value one if the firm has entered into negotia-
tions with any outside investor since August 2015, and zero otherwise. It
is coded as zero if the firm is closed. Firms which have been sold, or which
have received outside equity investments, and which did not answer this
question, are assumed to have entered into negotiations.
6. External investment: this is an average of standardized z-scores of the following
variables26:
26 Our pre-analysis plan also originally added a fifth variable to this index: total amount of outside
investment received. However, after our first follow-up survey found firms were very reluctant to
specify the exact amount of funding received, this question was dropped from the second follow-up
survey, and so is not included in the overall index.
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• Taken on new debt since August 2015: a dummy variable which takes value
one if the firm has taken on new debt since August 2015, and zero other-
wise. It is assumed to be zero for firms closed.
• Have made a deal with an outside investor since August 2015: a dummy vari-
able which takes value one if the firm has made a deal with an outside
investor (who is not family or friends) since August 2015, and zero other-
wise. This takes value one if the firm has been sold, and zero if the firm
has closed before being sold.
• Received at least 25,000 euros in new outside investment since August 2015:
a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm has received at least
25,000 euros in outside investment since August 2015, and zero otherwise.
It is set at zero for firms that have closed and not been sold for more than
25,000 euros.
• Received incubator/accelerator grant since August 2015: a dummy variable
that takes the value one if the firm has received a grant from an incubator
or accelerator since August 2015, and zero otherwise.
7. Have made a deal with an outside investor since August 2015: a dummy variable
which takes value one if the firm has made a deal with an outside investor
(who is not family or friends) since August 2015, and zero otherwise. This
takes value one if the firm has been sold, and zero if the firm has closed before
being sold. Note that this is also considered as part of the external investment
index, but given its role as a summary statistic of whether investment readiness
leads to new investment, is also considered as an outcome by itself.
2.D Appendix: Additional Details on Treatment Interven-
tion
2.D.1 Selection of Content
The treatment group intervention was designed to reflect best international stan-
dards for investment readiness programs and guarantee quality of training and men-
toring. One of the main concerns for us was to find an implementer having the
capacity to train more than one hundred firms across five countries in the Western
Balkans in a limited amount of time. This required the availability of a consider-
able quantity of mentors, both local and international, willing to travel to the region
and with a wide-ranging background of skills in business development. We also
needed to find a partner with demonstrated capacity on organizing internationally
renowned pitch events, where small and nascent enterprises have the opportunity
to pitch in front of international investors and opportunity to network their product
and ideas, witness successful stories from established young entrepreneurs and the
investors’ community.
The selection procedure consisted in three phases: a call for an Expression of In-
terest (EOI), followed by submissions of Technical Proposals (TP) and a final phase
where we made a comprehensive assessment of the technical proposals and their
compatibility with the Terms of Reference (TOR). The first phase saw eight compa-
nies submitting their EOI. We selected five out of the nine companies that expressed
their interest for the second phase: all of them shared a few characteristics like an
international focus, and a team with experiences in the region and familiarity with
the SMEs and VC eco-systems of the Western Balkans.
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The World Bank team reviewed these technical proposals, and also sought an
outside evaluation from Professor Josh Lerner and his team at the Bella Research
Group. They have worldwide experience in assessing venture capital eco-systems
and business accelerator programs. In addition, we referred to the expert opinion
of country officials in the Western Balkan region, experts in the local national in-
novation agencies, familiar with the regional eco-systems and hence able to detect
incongruences of the technical proposals with local conditions. The final overall as-
sessments merged the feedbacks of these three main sources: it listed the positives
and negatives of each proposal and identified specific questions to be submitted to
the applicants in case there were aspects to investigate further. The final ranking
that emerged from the series of consultations and assessments identified the Aus-
trian company Pioneers JFDI GmbH as the best suitable candidate for the planned
intervention.
Pioneers JFDI GmbH was the best candidate because of the experience of their
team in the region and in providing small businesses personalized training and ad-
vice, the competences and logistical as well as human capital capacity to deliver a
widespread training program across five countries. Prior to 2011, the Pioneers team
was involved with STARTeurope, which offered the Startup Live events, a series of
training workshops and pitch events. Pioneers’ mentors have deep experience as
venture-funded startups entrepreneurs and represent the countries of interest in the
Western Balkan region and in addition Austria, Germany, Greece, Israel, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. Many of their
mentors come through the Pioneers JFDI GmbH program already, so they already
know the curriculum and thus do not need to be trained.
2.D.2 Treatment website
The treatment was operated under a separate brand to ensure separation and clearly
communicate the difference between the “Pioneers of the Balkans” competition and
the investment readiness program for the treated group. The “Startup Live Mini-
Accelerator” provided a dedicated website that also provides a central point of ac-
cess to all of the treatment resources. It was password-protected to ensure that
only invitees (i.e., Treatment Group participants, mentors, the program management
team and World Bank Group team members) could access it.
At the beginning of the program each beneficiary of the treated group was pro-
vided with a starter kit including a detailed booklet with instructions and descrip-
tion of all the four parts of the investment readiness program: qualification phase,
mentoring phase, masterclasses, and pitch training; and details of the Pioneers team
and their contact details.
2.D.3 WhatAVenture
WhatAVenture asks a simple set of question about the business in order to i) match
the entrepreneur with the appropriate mentor ii) understand the phase of devel-
opment and the preparation of the entrepreneur in order to tailor to each firm the
subsequent individual mentoring phase, iii) bring the treatment group firms to a
similar level of qualification before proceeding with individual mentoring in the
second stage of the training period.
The application WhatAVenture and the methodology therein was developed and
tested in the context of post-graduate studies at the University of Economics and
Business in Vienna, in close collaboration with leading academics and practitioners
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from the innovation and entrepreneurship field. It is an online interactive course for
start-ups to put in words the details of their business idea, from the development
of the business plan to marketing strategy and their financing needs.27 The appli-
cation is designed for self-paced progress along its steps. Once registered, startups
assigned to the treatment group were granted access to the tool until 31 December
2015 independent of their progress or advancement. After completing each step,
they had the opportunity to discuss their progress, findings and potential questions
or difficulties in short online mentoring sessions (typically 30-45 minutes). The main
questions addressed with the WhatAVenture application are:
1. Customer Exploration: the first step requires the team to answer questions
on the targeted customers, to identify the customer segment and to customer
needs related to their product
2. Solution: develop a solution to the problem and match it to the customers’
needs
3. Business model – frame a sound business model around the value proposition
of the company
4. Competitor analysis – Elaborate on the competitive advantage of the firm, or-
ganize an idea of marketing, sizing and competitive positioning
5. Market size: define the target size of the customer segment
6. Financials: quantify the costs and revenue structures, expected profitability
and financing needs until break-even
In the first meetings of the WhatAVenture the mentor takes some time to ask
questions and understand in detail the product the company plans to market and
the possible value generation. This is important for providing a better mentorship
in the successive acceleration phase.
2.D.4 Assignment to Mentors
In the qualification phase each company was assigned a lead mentor from the begin-
ning who takes the role of a direct contact person for getting started in the mentoring
program. The lead mentors support their mentees not only as their personal spar-
ring partner during the qualification phase but also as primary contact person and
advisor during the acceleration and pitch preparation phases. Match-making is con-
ducted based either on relevant professional experience (e.g., an entrepreneur in the
dairy industry might be assigned a lead mentor with an academic background in
dairy product management), personal interests (e.g., a participating business active
in the area of design might be assigned a lead mentor with a passion for sailing),
technical expertise (e.g., a team that lacks even a basic online presence might be as-
signed a web-/graphics designer as a lead mentor) or proximity.
27 Since the beginning of its external commercialization in 2014, the WhatAVenture has already
been rolled out at several academic institutions as well as leading European corporates like Deutsche
Telekom that use it for standardizing and professionalizing their intrapreneurship processes. Fur-
thermore, several (corporate) accelerator programs like Bayer’s Grants4Apps and two Austrian gov-
ernmental equity financing and R& funding institutions (Austrian Federal Promotional Bank; Vienna
Business Agency) have chosen the tool as their central application for tracking startups progress and
coordinating mentoring sessions throughout their programs.
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In addition, a “Mentors Catalogue” was distributed to each firm. It contains rel-
evant biographical and professional information of the 100+ mentors forming the
pool of regional and international experts from where the participants can draw in
addition to the assigned lead mentors. The catalogue was sent to the treated group
beneficiaries in the welcoming package just before the beginning of the program and
they were provided with an internet interface where they have access to the network
of dedicated mentors, and where they have the possibility to screen the qualifica-
tions and the field of expertise of the mentors through a short CV and contact them
directly to book a mentoring session.
In total the treatment group could benefit from 141 mentors, who came from 26
different countries. Most of them live in Austria (43.3%) followed by Serbia (10.6%)
and Germany (9.2%). They can be divided in four main groups: standard teachers
and mentors (i.e. business consultants, university and business school professors),
successful entrepreneurs (i.e. CEOs of their companies), successful young enter-
prise investors (e.g. business angel investors, venture capitalists etc), leading public
speakers and pitch trainers. All of them cover a wide range of expertise and have
at least three years of mentoring experience, while more about half of mentors have,
individually, more than 10 years of experience in business mentoring. The major-
ity having experience in business development and management in the IC& T in-
dustry; there are more technical mentors with a science background as software or
hardware experts, payment systems and financial industry experts. Other industries
were also covered, as for instance health care and pharmaceuticals, automotive and
transportation, shipping and apparel sectors. All mentors have a good knowledge of
business development, but a dedicated group of mentors was highly specialized in
sales, marketing and e-commerce as well as intellectual property, competitive strat-
egy and marketing. A smaller subset has experience in human resources, relation-
ships and team building.
2.D.5 Acceleration phase
Upon successfully completing the qualification phase all beneficiaries are inducted
into the acceleration phase. The individual mentoring sessions were scheduled on
the online dedicated website to the program and were carried out either remotely via
phone, video call28 or on-site mentoring depending on the availability of mentors
in the cities where the entrepreneur is located. It is important to note that among
the pool of 100+ mentors many of them are internationals living and residing in
the Western Balkan region, hence there was still the possibility to get international
mentoring in English within the city of residence of the entrepreneurs. We ensured
that every startup in the program gets some on-site mentoring exposure, partly also
as an instrument to ensure their continued personal commitment to the program
and to allow for the development of personal relationships beyond voice and video
calls.
Average mentoring sessions typically lasted approximately 90 minutes and re-
quired additional work between sessions from the entrepreneur to improve the busi-
ness proposal before the next session. In total we had more than 1800 hours of in-
dividual mentoring. Once a mentor submits his feedback to the central database,
the information entered into the first part of the form is be forwarded via e-mail to
28 Remote session were arranged between both parties to take place either via Skype or, especially
for remote group mentoring hosted on our software solutions to provide video calls (e.g. WebEx).
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the mentored entrepreneur, along with the request to likewise provide feedback to
the mentor in question. This bidirectional feedback process not only serves the pur-
pose of assessing mentees’ satisfaction with the mentor and the benefit gained from
a particular session, but also to validate the mentor’s feedback and data entered by
means of a counterparty review process.
Examples of the discussion in the acceleration phase were:
• Some companies were developing more products so needed advice on what
would be best to focus on or whether to spin-off part of their business.
• Explore value proposition for different customer segments and how to struc-
ture it (i.e. B2B or B2C), how to implement it and what channels of communi-
cation to use. When necessary narrow down customer segment.
• Some firms needed a market validation - to take a prototype or mockup to
target customers and test the outcomes.
• Formulating and analyzing the competitor’s matrix, set up a market research
plan to investigate competition in target markets.
• Identifying local partners for collaboration and regional expansion.
• Defining a clear pricing strategy for different markets (e.g Western Balkans,
Europe, U.S. etc)
• For companies in a more advanced stage discussions on possible financing
options for current expansions plans, the amount to be asked and the form of
partnership.
• Discuss legal ways to achieve monetization: early-stage selling, licensing to
interested parties worldwide for franchising etc.
• Making sure the startup product abides to and will operate according to ex-
isting regulations and the differences in regulations between the EU and the
Western Balkans for limited liability partnerships and equity financing.
• Practice to present the company in 5 minutes and in an elevator pitch of 90 sec-
onds; preparation for the questions time to understand what investors want,
and working on telling a clear story.
2.D.6 Masterclass weekends
Additional training during the acceleration phase is delivered in from of classes and
lectures, these take place during 2.5 days “masterclass weekends” organized in the
participating countries. At the masterclass weekends general business education is
taught, courses such as marketing, finances, team building, sales, competition as
well as rhetoric, body language and design.
A dedicated website for masterclasses and the material was set up, the portal
also offers information about and access to a dedicated community communication
channel “ChatGrape” . This is an instant communication tool available as a browser-
based application as well as native application for most mobile devices and allows
for private as well as group communication in a structured way by allowing all
users to set up and join subject-specific groups and to tag information and questions
posted with key word expressions.
Masterclasses took place in the following four locations and dates:
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• 9 to 11 October - Split, Croatia
• 16 to 18 October - Novi Sad, Serbia
• 23 to 25 October - Pristina, Kosovo
• 30 October to 1 November - Skopje, Macedonia
Each weekend had a main theme but were not exclusively dedicated to it with
lectures, panels and presentations covering other topics as well. For example, the
weekend in Split dealt with the business model, while the masterclass in Novi Sad
with sales and marketing. The Pristina masterclass had the main lectures on team
building and human resources while the Skopje weekend dealt with investment and
finance. The final program of each masterclass weekend was set up at the end of
September and published on the information portal so that beneficiaries can gather
information and decide which masterclass weekends they want to attend. Before
each masterclass the mentors and the beneficiaries are provided with a guide that
helps them to understand the organizational structure of the weekend and the ben-
efits of participating in the weekend. Some examples of the content of the master-
classes are described below.
The lecture on “Research and networking” introduced the importance of research
and networking for the best business model. It explained the difference between a
business model and a business plan, how to prepare an action plan and structure a
business model canvas step by step. It urged entrepreneurs to think about the weak-
est points of their plans and possible solutions. It then touched upon the importance
of customers, competition, sales, marketing, traction, business development and fi-
nances.
The class “Rapid Prototyping” described how to move from an idea to a market
validated product. It explained the concept of rapid prototyping, the importance
and the methods of prototyping and using examples from the cinema, cars and
smartphone applications sectors. It then covered the concept of minimum viable
product (MVP) and the need to frame business hypotheses on the market reaction
to their product, the customers and financial hypotheses too. All of them should be
tested in the market to get feedback and fine tune product development.
The team building panel addressed questions on how to create a team and what
are the most important features a new company must develop in order to have the
investors’ attention. Two main things emerged: the first is that a successful enter-
prise has to form an eclectic and competent team encompassing all possible func-
tions that a nascent company must have. The spectrum of functions proposed ranges
from not only having a developer and an idea but also in having a good lawyer, a
technician, a person familiar with the financing. But the most important of all seem
to be having a very good member acting as a sales person. This figure should end
up being most of the time the CTO of the company if not a co-founder because dedi-
cated persons are really difficult to find, in those cases is the founder itself that must
acquire sales skills and complement them with partners acting as supporters in this
role. The importance of having a team with a wide-ranging expertise that comple-
ment each other turned out to be one of the best ways sending a positive message of
confidence and investment readiness to the investors, a message saying that if you
put the money in my company you are minimize the risk of wasting your money.
The traction presentation emphasized the importance of the three Ts: team, tech-
nology and traction. Traction because it is strictly linked with the term growth, with
the importance of scaling up and having sustainable growth and having a “product-
market fit” which is another way of saying that the product should be in line with the
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demand coming from the market. However it was stated that one size does not fit all
and there are no general rules, what works for one company is not always good for
others, as well as a channel to gain traction today is not guaranteed that will work
for the same company some time down the road. The focus shifted then to the need
to update the targets, reset the objectives forward every time a target is reached. The
channels to increase traction were also covered, 19 of those channels were mentioned
and briefly explained (social and display ads, offline ads, email marketing, targeting
blogs, direct sales, trade shows etc).
The presentation “The quantified startup” delved into trying to use data driven
decision frameworks into strategic decision making of a startup. The presentation is
directed mostly, but not exclusively, to web service providers, that is companies that
can track their users online. What kind of metric are important to identify which
stage your startup belongs at the moment, what metrics are important to scale up
or increase traction? The presentation provided references of papers and books the
presenter recommends to identify the metrics needed for every stage in the startup
development. Measures such as churn, acceptance rate, viral coefficient, cost per
user and similar were overviewed.
The presentation “How to sell to corporations” covered the topic of how to get
access to established corporates for nascent startups. How to ally with them and
exploit the market potential and value they have. One of the main point is that cor-
porations, despite investing money in in-house accelerators and alliance partnership
programs for startups, they do not really understand fully the value the startups that
approach them have. So it is up to the startups to get ready for this kind of partner-
ship, it is they that have to explain and convince the corporations of the value of
their idea. The presenter described a process toward strategically thinking about
approaching a corporation. How to convince corporations? Set the targets, find the
best match, do your research, be well prepared, set our sales steps. An important as-
pect touched upon was that, once arranged a meeting you need to frame the meeting
in order to get the idea convened, speak about concrete and clear things.
The lecture on B2B marketing saw a short introduction on the history of mar-
keting. Some general information was given and the difference between the B2B
and B2C marketing was explained. Introductions to new paradigms like the C2B
and C2C was also described. The speaker explained processes of customer decision
making and affiliation with a brand, with few examples from the most established
companies and their marketing strategies. The importance of tradeshows for mar-
keting was emphasized despite being an expensive option. But is one of the best
way to get in touch with professional buyers informally.
The lecture on “EU funding” delved into the landscape of funding opportunities
for startups and SMEs at the institutional EU level through EU structural funds for
development. Information on different type of funding, the application process and
the best way to approach these funding minimizing the load of work for the appli-
cation. The need of a consultant for the application was also pushed forward as a
good idea to develop these proposals and how much consultancy is needed.
The presentation “How to craft a pitch” as delivered in all four masterclasses and
described how to structure the pitch and what to emphasize in it. The second part
of the talk dealt with the 90 second elevator pitch. The emphasis for the 5 minute
pitch was on seven main points to take into account: i) product/service what it is
and explained it in detail to make the audience understand it, ii) market opportunity,
what are the prospects, the vision and the demand for the product, iii) team, who are
the main components of the team, what’s their expertise and role, iv) competition,
v) finances and cost structure, vi) development stage: where you are, at what stage,
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what you need, vii) future, where you will be, or expect to be, in 6 months to a year.
2.D.7 Pitch preparation
The mentoring program transitions into the Pitch Preparation Phase after the last
masterclass weekend. This phase is intended to ensure that all beneficiaries focus
their attention entirely on their pitch performance in the remaining two weeks before
their appearance on stage in front of jury members in the semi-finals pitch event.
In the course of this phase, a standard pitch training approach was implemented,
this was developed and tested in the context of the annual Pioneers Festivals and
consists of the following steps:
1. The entrepreneurs were asked to upload the pitch decks (tailored to a 5-minute
on-stage presentation followed by another 5 minutes of questions and answers with
the jury). This pitch deck is then made available to the lead mentor for initial review.
2. The entrepreneurs schedule a video call with their lead mentor to begin prac-
ticing the pitch together.
3. During the sessions, the entrepreneur delivers his/her pitch and receive feed-
back on both the oral pitch performance as well as the pitch deck.
4. Lead mentor and entrepreneur may schedule additional sessions bilaterally to
review progress as the entrepreneur implements recommendations.
5. In parallel, the program management team assigns each entrepreneur two
additional mentors, one it has worked with already and one new mentor.
6. Also these mentors are asked to schedule pitch training sessions with the
entrepreneur and request the latest version of the pitch deck.
7. The program management team collects and reviews feedback protocols to
assess the entrepreneurs’ preparedness for their Semi-finals appearance.
The entrepreneurs were encouraged to use the time between sessions to work on
their pitch decks and practice their oral delivery of the pitch further. Additionally,
to this standard pitch training cycle and the live "dress rehearsal" on the day prior
to their pitch in the Semi-finals, entrepreneurs can request further support from spe-
cialists on rhetoric, body language or slide deck design by approaching relevant
mentors from the mentors’ catalogue if needed, or upon recommendation by one of
their pitch preparation mentors.
2.D.8 Detailed cost breakdown
The cost of offering the program is provided in Appendix Table 2-II
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TABLE 2-II: Detailed Program Cost Breakdown
Investment readiness programs - Calculatory program cost
A. Individual mentoring Unit Quantity Rate [USD]
1. Direct cost of individual mentoring hours per beneficiary 30 1'917 
2. Overhead cost per mentor per beneficiary 1 326 
3. Overhead cost of mentoring program per beneficiary 1 492 
4. Online mentoring tool per beneficiary 1 338 
Subtotal per beneficiary 3'072 
B. Masterclasses
1. Organization per beneficiary 1 321 
2. Venue & catering per beneficiary 1 107 
3. Lectures per beneficiary 4 175 
4. Travel and accomodation cost per beneficiary 1 191 
Subtotal per beneficiary 793 
C. Pitch training
1. Organization per finalist 1 170 
2. Venue & catering per finalist 1 73 
3. Pitch training per finalist 1 279 
4. Travel and accomodation cost per finalist 1 168 
Subtotal per finalist 690 
Grand total per beneficiary
A. Individual mentoring per beneficiary 1 3'072 
B. Masterclasses per beneficiary 1 793 
C. Pitch training per beneficiary 0.33 230 
4'095 
Grand total per investment readiness program
A. Individual mentoring Number of beneficiaries 150 460'865 
B. Masterclasses Number of masterclasses 4 118'932 
C. Pitch training Number of finalists 50 34'513 
614'310 
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2.E Additional Details on Control Intervention
2.E.1 Selection of Content
We organized the control group intervention design around a few simple guidelines:
i) an online course, ii) relatively cheap or free to use, iii) offering general knowl-
edge of simple investment readiness concepts and iv) providing e-guidance toward
a start-up pitching competition. The World Bank team conducted market research
together with Innovative Ventures Incorporated, a specialized investment advisor
to international financial institutions and governments in private equity and ven-
ture capital funds. After this initial screening of available alternatives the decision
was made to use a paid online course since the alternatives without fee did not offer
the necessary quality standards. For the paid alternatives we carefully evaluated the
contents and undertook the full demo versions to understand the specific differences
among the candidate courses.
The program chosen is an e-learning course developed and distributed by the
Global Commercialization Group (GCG) of the IC2 Institute at the University of
Texas at Austin. The group is an internationally active facilitator for growth of in-
novative and technology based businesses and it offers a wider range of technology
commercialization training programs for managers around the world. The Innova-
tion Readiness SeriesTM was created to bring the work of the Global Commercializa-
tion Group to a global customer base at a cheaper price vis-à-vis delivering training
and international business development programs in-country. Since its launch in
2011, the Innovation Readiness SeriesTM has trained more than two thousand en-
trepreneurs and students from 20 countries worldwide. The content can be offered
in three different languages: English, Spanish or Russian. For the Pioneers of the
Balkans cohort we opted for the English based course.
2.E.2 Course details and content
The program introduces students to common terminology used in the start-up eco-
system, and the requirements to commercialize innovations, including protecting
intellectual property, describing an innovation and the benefits it provides (vs. fea-
tures), navigating development, understanding competition (substitutes and direct
competitive products), market validation, creating a ‘pitch’ and presenting to in-
vestors, customers and others.
This content is delivered online through 10 modules of 45-60 minutes each. The
modules have a set of slides that are read and explained via a recorded voice. Each
module has detailed steps to work through for creating a business proposition and
includes assignments in two formats: quizzes with multiple-choice answers benefi-
ciaries can take to test their understanding of the material, and in the case of some
of the ten modules (i.e. technology brief and description, benefits, competition and
presentation skills) written exercises to be voluntarily handed in. Finally, in the last
module there is the possibility to record and upload a video sample of the planned
pitch. Nevertheless, for the Pioneers of the Balkans cohort the program was cus-
tomized to allow feedback only after the multiple choice quizzes in form of number
of correct answers. Written exercise and the video of the pitch were voluntarily up-
loaded on the platform but were not commented or discussed with the participant.
While this program is not a substitute to one-on-one mentoring, it gives a basic
introduction to business planning and pitching, is well-structured and cheap alter-
native to a mentorship based investment readiness program, it is comprehensive and
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allows beneficiaries to create a sketch of business model which can be presented to
investors, customers and other interested parties. Moreover, it is a self-learning tool,
beneficiaries can work at their own pace, the ten module series introduces the key
concepts of innovation, and explores each of the primary issues that impact bringing
a technology to the market allowing for a self-paced learning environment.
In terms of curricular incentives, at the completion of all the modules, beneficia-
ries who answer correctly at least 70% of quiz questions and take active part in all of
them, receive a certification of Investment Readiness from IC2 Institute at the Texas
University through the World Bank Group program “Pioneers of the Balkans” .
The list of the ten modules and short description of the content is provided.
Module 1 – Introduction: the introduction module explains how the Innovation
Readiness Series works, and the objectives for the course. It explains what commer-
cialization is, and helps distinguish between innovation and invention.
• Module 1 – Introduction: the introduction module explains how the Innova-
tion Readiness Series works, and the objectives for the course. It explains what
commercialization is, and helps distinguish between innovation and inven-
tion.
• Module 2 - Technical Description: the technology description module helps
participants describe their innovation using technical jargon and key words.
• Module 3 – Benefits: the benefits module teaches how to articulate the benefits
of an innovation in a way that conveys value to customers and users.
• Module 4 - Development Status: the development status module delivers an
overview of the product development cycle with an eye to the market.
• Module 5 - Intellectual Property, Part 1: explains what IP is, the different types
of ownership, and what can be protected. It also explains Trademarks and
Copyrights.
• Module 6 - Intellectual Property, Part 2: the focus is on Patents and Trade Se-
crets, and provides a foundation to designing an individual IP strategy.
• Module 7 – Competition: the competition module will help the participant
discover and compare key benefits to those of the competition.
• Module 8 - Market Validation: the market validation module explains the val-
idation process and how to discover exactly what the market expects from an
innovation.
• Module 9 - Pitching Your Innovation: the planning and pitching module helps
prepare a technology brief of the innovation and can be used in the next steps
to commercialization.
• Module 10 - Presentation Skills: the presentation module is taught by an inter-
nationally established and experienced public speaker, demonstrates how to
deliver presentations in an effective and captivating way.
Depending on the previous experience of the participant and their commitment
to hand in a written set of answers, a minimum of four weeks is recommended to
deliver a basic course and the total envisioned time to complete the course lectures,
answer the quizzes and compile the written exercises is 15-30 hours. However, recall
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that among the set of assignments only the quizzes after each session were graded
and participants receive feedback on the number of correct answers. In case of writ-
ten exercises and uploaded pitch video no feedback was offered so that the only
incentive in that case was self-motivation. Moreover only quizzes counted toward
the receipt of the final completion certificate, given this incentive structure we expect
a lower usage of the written exercises and video pitch uploads than multiple-choice
quizzes.
2.E.3 Communication and Reminders
During the deployment of the intervention our team sent weekly motivational an-
nouncements to the students on the platform and on their email address, the aim
of the announcements was to promote learning and active participation. They were
structured as progress reports where we showed the top ten performing firms in
the last week in terms of correct answers in submitted quizzes, and explained the
reasons why it is important to take part in the course. Firms were told that going
through the modules would both help provide matching of their businesses with
judges who had sectoral expertise in their business, and that going through the con-
tents of the modules would likely increase their chances of getting a higher score in
the semi-finals and getting selected for the finals.
2.E.4 Usage
Appendix Figure 2-I summarizes the proportion of students that submitted assign-
ments (either quizzes or written exercises), each bar corresponds to an assignment.
Out of the 120 participants that connected at least once to the online platform, 63
(36.6% of the total) actively participated in one of the quizzes, with 45 of them com-
pleting the threshold of 70% correct answers. For the non-graded written exercises,
the technology description was completed by 40 participants, the technology brief
by 20, benefits exercise by 29 and the competition exercise by 22 participants. Lastly,
only 8 students uploaded a video of their pitch.
114Chapter 2. Can Government Intervention Make Firms More Investment-Ready?
FIGURE 2-I: Participation of the Control Group in Online Course Con-
tent
2.E.5 Satisfaction
A short survey was administered after the semi-finals to assess their satisfaction with
different elements of the program. Respondents are therefore only the entrepreneurs
that participated in the semi-finals. The survey was answered by 102 treated group
firms (92.7% of the treated semifinalists) and 87 control group (86.1% of control semi-
finalists). Appendix Table 2-III compares the overall satisfaction of the treated and
control group semifinalists over few dimensions on a scale from 1 to 6. The treated
group values more the communication, the structure and design and the training
materials provided, the difference is statistically significant. However, the mean
grade given by the control group to those dimension is well above 4. Recall that
firms were blind to treatment assignment. Where there is no significant satisfaction
difference between the treated and control group is in the feedback received from
the jury at the semifinals and the organization of the semifinals. These features were
common to both groups. As such, the satisfaction survey indicates the value added
of the treatment also in the subjective assessment of the program by participants.
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TABLE 2-III: Treated vs. Control Satisfaction survey – How satisfied
are you with each of the following?
Treatment Control
Dimension Obs. Mean Std.
dev.
Obs. Mean Std.
dev.
p-
value
Communication
overall
102 5.17 .95 87 4.55 1.44 0.014
Structure and Design
of PotB
101 5.00 1.14 86 4.43 1.26 0.005
Training Resources 102 5.31 1.02 84 4.36 1.25 0.000
Jury Feedback 101 4.45 1.43 86 4.11 1.68 0.486
Semi-Finals (Bel-
grade Venture
Forum)
101 4.45 1.42 83 4.34 1.36 0.861
Note: PotB denotes Pioneers of the Balkans program
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2.F Appendix: Additional Details on Semi-Finals and Finals
Appendix Table 2-IV summarizes the characteristics of judges used for the scoring
TABLE 2-IV: Semi-Final Judges Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev.
Lives in the Western Balkans 0.37 0.49
Lives in European Union (except Croa�a) 0.48 0.50
Male 0.88 0.33
Age 39.1 10.4
Has Founded a Company 0.75 0.43
Years of Experience in their industry 11.5 8.5
Company makes venture investments 0.64 0.48
Is an Angel Investor 0.37 0.49
Regularly Mentors Start-ups 0.80 0.40
Sample Size 65
Note: data unavailable for one judge.
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FIGURE 2-II: Baseline Investment Readiness Scores by Participation
in the Semi-finals and Treatment Status
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Baseline scores by participation in semi-finals
Appendix Figure 2-II shows that the baseline distribution of investment readi-
ness scores is similar for those that participated in the semi-finals (and therefore
received judges’ scores) and those that did not.
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2.F.1 Robustness to Non-participation
Our pre-analysis plan specified two approaches to examining the robustness of our
results to the attrition that results from not all participants attending the semi-finals,
and therefore not having judges’ scores for all firms.
The first approach is to impute investment scores for firms which did not partici-
pate in the finals. We pre-specified that we would do this by estimating the following
equation on the control group sample who participated in the semi-finals:
OverallScorei = a + bBaselineTeamScorei + cBaselineMarketScorei
+ dBaselineProductScorei + eBaselineTractionScorei
+ f Croatiai + gSerbiai + hBaselineOutsidePrivateInvestori + ε i
(2.3)
This yields a prediction of the semi-finals investment readiness score as a func-
tion of the baseline scores on the different components, the country of operation, and
whether or not they had an outside private investor at baseline. We replace missing
scores for both treatment and control with these predicted values and re-estimate
equation (1). The first column of Appendix Table 2-V repeats our estimated impact
on the overall score from Table 2.3, which assumes scores are missing-at-random.
Column 2 then shows the impact on the score after imputing missing values. The
impact is still positive and statistically significant, with an estimated effect of 0.19
points.
The second approach is to compare the participation rates of treatment and con-
trol and use Lee, 2009 bounds to adjust for differential attrition. The participation
rate in the semi-finals was 63.2 percent for the treatment group, and 58.7 percent for
the control group. The difference of 4.5 percent is not statistically significant (p=0.39,
or 0.37 after controlling for strata fixed effects). Nevertheless, we test sensitivity to
this difference in attrition rates by dropping the top or bottom eight (4.5% of 174)
scores from the treatment group. The next two columns of Appendix Table 2-V then
show the Lee upper and lower bounds respectively are 0.41 and 0.18. Since Table
2.3 and Appendix Figure 2-II shows that the differential attrition is not coming from
the tails of the baseline investment readiness score distribution, we think it highly
unlikely that it would be coming from either tail of the follow-up distribution either.
As a final robustness check, we show in the last two columns of Appendix Table
2-V that our results are not sensitive to how we aggregate the different sub-scores.
Column 5 aggregates the five sub-scores using equal weights instead of the different
weights in our main specification, while Column 6 also includes the presentation
score. We see the estimated effects of 0.277 and 0.293 are very similar in sign, signif-
icance, and magnitude to those using the unequal weights.
Taken together, these results show that the impact of treatment on the invest-
ment readiness score is unlikely to be driven by differential participation patterns
in the semi-finals between the treatment and control groups, nor by the weighting,
and so our finding that the investment readiness program has improved investment
readiness is robust.
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TABLE 2-V: Robustness of Impact on Investment Readiness to Attri-
tion and to how Scores are Weighted
Imputed  Lee Lee 
Score Score Upper Lower 5 components  6 components
Assigned to Treatment 0.284** 0.193***  0.408*** 0.176 0.277** 0.293**
(0.126) (0.065) (0.119) (0.130) (0.123) (0.124)
Sample Size 211 343 203 203 211 211
Control Mean 2.908 2.865 2.908 2.908 2.950 2.966
Control Std. Dev 0.903 0.750 0.903 0.903 0.884 0.894
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions control for randomiza�on strata. 
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10,5, and 1 percent levels respec�vely
Score is the investment readiness score in the semi-ﬁnals. Imputed score imputes missing scores based on regressing the score 
for the control group on baseline team, trac�on, market readiness, product technology, country, and having an outside investor 
and using predicted score for missing observa�ons. Lee upper and Lee lower bounds trim the bo�om 8 and top 8 scores
respec�vely from the treatment group to adjust for higher a�ri�on in the control group. Equally weighted scores weight the
ﬁve (team, technology, trac�on, market and progress) or six (also presenta�on) sub-scores equally.
Equally weighted
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2.G Appendix: Impact on Web Traffic and on being included
in AngelList
Our pre-analysis plan also noted that we would consider several measures of web
traffic and web presence that have been used by other researchers (e.g. Kerr, Lerner,
and Schoar, 2011, Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee, 2017, but which may be less ap-
propriate for firms in a less developed market: whether or not the firm is included
in AngelList, a popular web platform for fundraising, startup jobs and investing
allowing startups to raise capital from angel investors; and the global web-traffic
rankings of the company’s webpage as collected by Alexa and SimilarWeb. We see
no significant impacts on any of these measures.
TABLE 2-VI: Impacts on Web Traffic and AngelList
Appears Has Alexa  Has Similar  
on Alexa Global Similar Web
Angel List Rank Ranking Rank Ranking
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment -0.022 -0.042 -304.7 0.013 447.5
(0.035) (0.043) (1412) (0.047) (2068)
Sample Size 346 346 188 346 160
Control Mean 0.308 0.535 11161 0.442 12364
Control S.D. 0.463 0.500 8383 0.498 9434
Panel B: Impact at Eighteen months
Assigned to Treatment -0.034 0.032 120.6 -0.008 1952.4
(0.041) (0.048) (1438) (0.048) (1945)
Sample Size 346 346 132 346 156
Control Mean 0.372 0.343 7407 0.442 12614
Control S.D. 0.485 0.476 5431 0.498 9949
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels respec�vely.
All regressions include controls for baseline level of outcome, and for strata
used in randomiza�on.
Alexa Global ranking and Similar Web ranking are expressed in 1000s, and are
condi�onal on having a ranking at all.
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2.H Appendix: Follow-up Survey Response Rates and bal-
ance on responders
Appendix Table 2-VII reports the completion rates by treatment status for three def-
initions of completion. Initially we began with a longer follow-up survey, which
in addition to asking about our key outcomes, also asked a series of process ques-
tions about the Pioneers of the Balkans program and their reasons for participating
or not participating. In order to encourage responses from more reluctant firms,
we removed these questions to shorten the questionnaire for a second interviewing
phase, with the short survey containing all the key outcomes in our pre-analysis
plan. Finally, for firms that we could not interview after multiple attempts, we at-
tempted to collect basic information in a few minutes from them, asking for their
current operating status, their number of employees, whether they had entered into
negotiations with an outside investor to make an investment in their firm since Au-
gust 2015, and how much new investment they had received since August 2015. In
the second follow-up, this basic information was restricted to whether the firm was
still operating, and whether it has received external financing, and also used web
searches and secondary contacts.
We see that the treatment group was more likely to respond to the full survey
than the control group in the first follow-up survey (p=0.066), but there is no signifi-
cant difference in response rates for having at least the short survey, or at least basic
information, and no significant treatment differences for the second follow-up.
TABLE 2-VII: Follow-up Survey Completion Rates
Appendix Table 2-VII compares baseline observables for the treatment and con-
trol groups, conditional on completing at least the short survey. We cannot reject that
these observables are orthogonal to treatment status for either definition of survey
completion. Given the lack of significant difference in response rates by treatment
status, and that the sample responding to at least the short survey is balanced on
observables, we treat attrition as missing at random in our analysis of the survey
data.
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TABLE 2-VIII: Balance test on Sample Interviewed at Folow-up
Treatment Control P-value Treatment Control P-value
Variables stra�ﬁed on
Incorporated/Registered in Croa�a 0.230 0.237 0.869 0.27 0.24 0.623
Incorporated/Registered in Serbia 0.446 0.481 0.619 0.48 0.50 0.637
Baseline Readiness Score 2.997 2.899 0.183 2.93 2.94 0.163
Has an outside private investor 0.122 0.067 0.145 0.10 0.10 0.227
Other variables
Market a�rac�veness score 3.112 3.062 0.885 3.06 3.09 0.657
Product technology score 2.485 2.419 0.649 2.44 2.48 0.872
Trac�on score 3.433 3.233 0.818 3.32 3.17 0.135
Team score 3.090 3.008 0.971 3.00 3.11 0.630
Sector is business and produc�vity 0.460 0.393 0.435 0.47 0.38 0.172
Sector is lifestyle and entertainment 0.187 0.230 0.516 0.19 0.23 0.428
Uses Cloud Technology 0.201 0.252 0.617 0.19 0.26 0.187
Uses Big Data 0.187 0.222 0.959 0.19 0.24 0.186
Place in value chain is developer 0.647 0.533 0.056 0.63 0.57 0.270
Place in value chain is service provider 0.568 0.533 0.479 0.59 0.56 0.482
Age of ﬁrm (years) 2.712 2.622 0.445 2.55 2.50 0.951
Early stage ﬁrm 0.331 0.304 0.475 0.32 0.37 0.464
Revenues in 2014 197649 157401 0.955 181796 127478 0.630
Number of employees 6.856 5.467 0.341 6.08 5.35 0.218
Age of main founder 38.216 36.563 0.222 38.02 37.19 0.433
Main founder has post-graduate educa�on 0.525 0.496 0.934 0.50 0.50 0.770
At least one founder is female 0.137 0.222 0.066 0.15 0.22 0.063
Company has a global focus 0.583 0.578 0.850 0.59 0.60 0.815
Have accepted outside ﬁnancing 0.374 0.348 0.559 0.35 0.39 0.614
Previously in mentoring/accelerator program 0.173 0.178 0.535 0.16 0.17 0.905
Sample Size 139 135 150 144
Joint test of orthogonality of treatment p-value 0.417 0.167
Note: interviewed at follow-up denote that ﬁrm completed at least the short survey
Answered First Follow-up Answered Second Follow-up
2.I. Appendix: Treatment Effects on Individual Survey Outcomes 123
2.I Appendix: Treatment Effects on Individual Survey Out-
comes
Appendix Tables 2-IX, 2-X, 2-XI, 2-XII and 2-XIII report the treatment impacts esti-
mated on each of the individual outcomes that make up the aggregate indices pre-
sented in Table 2.7. Our main approach to multiple testing is to use the standardized
indices of z-scores, which are contained in Table 2.7, and are presented again at the
end of each table. Alternatively, since there are 25 outcomes presented in these ap-
pendix tables for each time period, using Holm’s (1979) step-down method gives an
adjusted p-value for the most significant of the individual outcomes (the employ-
ment effect in round 2) of 0.425. Thus none of the coefficients shown in these tables
are individually significant after adjustments for multiple testing.
TABLE 2-IX: Treatment Impacts on Willingness and Interest in Taking
on Equity investment
Interested in  Maximum Has speciﬁc  Would consider Aggregate  
equity investment equity share deal terms Royal�es Index
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment -0.019 3.920 0.001 0.025 0.051
(0.066) (3.169) (0.061) (0.065) (0.094)
Sample Size 278 264 271 268 278
Control Mean 0.603 23.155 0.331 0.508 -0.015
Control S.D. 0.491 23.439 0.472 0.502 0.764
Panel B: Impact at Two Years
Assigned to Treatment -0.034 -2.175 0.050 0.105* 0.032
(0.055) (2.972) (0.051) (0.056) (0.084)
Sample Size 309 285 309 303 309
Control Mean 0.575 25.066 0.242 0.487 -0.005
Control S.D. 0.496 26.591 0.430 0.501 0.783
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TABLE 2-X: Impacts on General Investability
Number Founder Posi�ve Revenue Posi�ve Sales Aggregate
Employees full-�me Revenue  >10,000 eurosProﬁt US/Europe Index
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment 1.100 0.061 0.008 0.035 -0.061 -0.019 0.026
(1.215) (0.052) (0.061) (0.068) (0.059) (0.060) (0.085)
Sample Size 318 269 277 277 272 265 277
Control Mean 6.111 0.750 0.699 0.353 0.289 0.386 -0.039
Control S.D. 10.596 0.435 0.461 0.480 0.455 0.489 0.634
Panel B: Impact at Two Years
Assigned to Treatment 4.554** 0.018 0.032 -0.017 0.085 0.051 0.089
(1.814) (0.061) (0.071) (0.068) (0.061) (0.055) (0.082)
Sample Size 291 291 232 242 276 310 291
Control Mean 4.683 0.620 0.526 0.361 0.482 0.340 -0.058
Control S.D. 6.381 0.487 0.502 0.482 0.502 0.475 0.650
TABLE 2-XI: Impacts on Meeting the Specific needs of Investors
Separates Has revenue   Knows customer  Number key Found out if Has IP or Aggregate  
Accounts projec�on acquisi�on cost metrics tracked can protect IP pending Index
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment 0.060 0.066 0.009 -0.168 0.033 0.054 0.082
(0.053) (0.066) (0.064) (0.299) (0.065) (0.061) (0.080)
Sample Size 268 268 268 268 269 269 269
Control Mean 0.742 0.561 0.409 2.106 0.439 0.364 -0.059
Control S.D. 0.439 0.498 0.494 2.598 0.498 0.483 0.682
Panel B: Impact at Two Years
Assigned to Treatment 0.086 0.018 0.061 -0.092 0.059 0.049 0.084
(0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.361) (0.063) (0.057) (0.079)
Sample Size 291 291 291 269 271 275 298
Control Mean 0.577 0.486 0.352 1.667 0.444 0.244 -0.059
Control S.D. 0.496 0.502 0.479 2.854 0.499 0.431 0.692
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TABLE 2-XII: Impacts on Steps Towards Investment
Contacted  Has mentor  
outside Made  helping raise Entered into  Aggregate   
investor a pitch ﬁnance nego�a�ons Index
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment -0.082 0.016 0.078 -0.008 -0.017
(0.074) (0.068) (0.063) (0.057) (0.098)
Sample Size 239 240 232 279 240
Control Mean 0.509 0.549 0.236 0.323 0.008
Control S.D. 0.502 0.500 0.427 0.470 0.720
Panel B: Impact at Two Years
Assigned to Treatment -0.019 0.006 0.050 0.068 0.044
(0.057) (0.047) (0.040) (0.059) (0.092)
Sample Size 282 282 279 279 282
Control Mean 0.324 0.184 0.097 0.328 -0.032
Control S.D. 0.470 0.389 0.297 0.471 0.760
TABLE 2-XIII: Impact on External Investment
Taken on  Made deal  Received  Amount of Received  
new with at least new investment incubator Aggregate  
debt investor 25,000 received grant index
Panel A: Impact at Six Months
Assigned to Treatment -0.118** -0.024 -0.032 -11232* -0.036 -0.152*
(0.057) (0.033) (0.028) (6425.486) (0.037) (0.087)
Sample Size 276 279 277 277 269 279
Control Mean 0.419 0.083 0.068 13452.273 0.090 0.084
Control S.D. 0.495 0.276 0.253 62358.927 0.288 0.741
Panel B: Impact at Two Years
Assigned to Treatment -0.059 0.050 -0.024 n.m. -0.005 0.003
(0.048) (0.049) (0.041) (0.036) (0.080)
Sample Size 278 330 317 268 330
Control Mean 0.182 0.244 0.168 0.076 0.018
Control S.D. 0.388 0.431 0.375 0.267 0.698
Note: n.m. denotes not measured in this survey round.
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Chapter 3
Has Regulatory Capital Made
Banks Safer?
3.1 Introduction
One of the primary objectives of central banks is to foster the stability of the bank-
ing system. Capital requirements are in general used to increase banks’ resilience
by requiring them to hold more capital, thereby improving loss absorption capac-
ity during financial downturns. The policymakers’ rationale for demanding more
capital is to increase the skin in the game of bank equity holders, limiting risk taking
behaviour while at the same time reducing the probability of insolvency and the cost
of bank failure for taxpayers.
Theoretical contributions on the skin in the game argument postulate that for
banks with higher capital ratios, there is an incentive by bank managers to avoid ex-
cessive risk-taking. This is because more risk increases the variance of returns which
in turn can amplify the probability of significant losses on banks’ equity, (Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000; Repullo and Suarez, 2004; Repullo, 2004).
At the same time, banks might increase their asset risk in response to higher capi-
tal requirements, possibly overcompensating the positive effect of the higher capital
buffer. A strand of academic research argues that better capitalized banks are not
necessarily taking on less risks.1 For instance, the principal-agent theory shows how
the presence of imperfect information, which is endemic in complex organizations
such as banks, can manifest itself in moral hazard associated with the existence of
distorted incentives between the principal and the agent.2 Similarly, empirical bank-
ing literature shows how more regulated banks can have risk-taking incentives due
to the negative effect of higher capital requirements on bank profits, (Koehn and
0This is a single-authored chapter. I would like to thank Jonathan Bridges, Adrian Bruhin, Marco
D’Errico, Antonio Di Cesare, Frank Dierick, Michal Dvorˇák, Elena Esposito, Harald Hau, Heleen Hof-
mans, Mario Jovanovic´, Jan Hannes Lang, Frédéric Lardo, Robert Lautert, Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti,
Axel Loefler, Sergio Masciantonio, Francesco Mazzaferro, Jakob Orthacker, Tuomas Peltonen, Mara
Pirovano, Antonio Sanchez, Glenn Schepens, Tibor Szendrei and Andreas Tischbirek for valuable com-
ments. Participants of: the ESRB expert group on structural capital buffers and the members of the
ESRB Instrument Working Group, the Risk Analysis Division of the Single Supervisory Mechanism at
the European Central Bank.
1In this paper, risk-taking behaviour is intended as exposure risk of the portfolio of banks’ assets,
measured as the ratio of risk-weighted assets over total assets.
2Several strands of literature have shown the consequences of the principal-agent asymmetric infor-
mation problem. Academic contributions range from the fields of economics Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981,
finance Acharya and Naqvi, 2012, managerial Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998, corporate finance
(Ross, 1973; Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro, 2015) to law and banking regulation Alexander, 2006. This
literature illustrates how within a principal-agent relationship the presence of incomplete information
and misaligned incentives can induce managers to take on excessive risk and how regulation can help
to limit this inefficiency.
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Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Blum, 1999). This divergence of views
raises the question as to whether and how banks’ risk taking behaviour is affected
by increases in regulatory capital requirements.
This paper sheds light on this question by exploiting a policy change whereby
systemically important European banks were subject to variations in macropruden-
tial capital requirements imposed by the regulator. In spirit, the study is closely
related to the earlier empirical studies on risk-taking and risk sensitive capital re-
quirements such as Shrieves and Dahl, 1992 or Jacques and Nigro, 1997. The present
study contributes to this literature by using an exogenous policy shock as a source of
variation to bank capital requirements for the identification of the causal response.
The econometric specification relies on a panel of bank-level balance sheet data
and a regression difference-in-difference design. A cross-country bank-level panel
controls for time varying macroeconomic variation absorbed by country-time dum-
mies, and, in contrast to single country bank-level studies, can increase the external
validity of the results. At the same time, in comparison to country-level panels, it
improves on the granularity of available data fostering the study of heterogeneous
effects. More specifically, the use of the granular bank-level database allows to mea-
sure banks’ interconnectedness with the financial system through interbank lending
and OTC derivatives. This is an essential feature for delivering unbiased estimates
since the calibration of capital requirements is a function of banks’ interconnect-
edness and complexity. In addition, a bank-level panel allows to control for the
quantitative-easing channel of non-conventional monetary policy which may influ-
ence banks ability to raise capital and hence solvency by providing a more stable
source of funding. This is controlled for by including cash held at Central Banks.
Finally, this study provides a detailed account for heterogeneity in terms of size,
profitability, and funding sources.
Starting in 2014, the newly introduced macroprudential capital requirements
have been gradually phased-in across the 28 European Union (EU) countries. They
apply to parents and subsidiaries of systemically important banks.3 The focus on
systemic banks is important due to financial stability concerns. EU macroprudential
regulation empowers national authorities to set individual bank-level capital require-
ments for systemic risk, these are introduced at different times across EU countries.
The staggered policy implementation across borders and time fosters the opportu-
nity for a research design based on a quasi-experiment. Nevertheless, threats to the
identification of causal effects may arise from several sources, in particular the fol-
lowing assumptions must hold: i) banks do not anticipate the change, i.e. the com-
mon trend assumption is not violated, ii) the policy change is exogenous, ii) there
are no spillovers across borders.
The failure of the common trend assumption due to anticipating behavior by con-
trol group banks is a standard threat for the identification. Section 3.7 discusses those
threats and presents several robustness tests.4 The first test of the common trend as-
sumption controls for bank-level trends in the regression as in Wolfers (2006), the
second inspects the existence of anticipatory behaviour which would invalidate the
3As of 2017Q3, Global and Other Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs and O-SIBs) in the EU are
204 financial credit institutions. They represent 86% of total consolidated assets of EU banks in 2016
according to consolidated balance sheet statistics, see ECB source. The sample composition of SIBs
may vary from year to year due to new banks being designated as O-SIB, or old banks not satisfying
any more the requirements to be designated as O-SIBs. See European Banking Authority Guidelines
on O-SIB.
4Two standard tests of the common trend assumption and an additional test of the anticipation
behavior stemming from announcement effects.
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common trend assumption. The third test investigates the presence of announce-
ment effects of the policy and is akin to Alpert, 2016. All of them present robust
evidence on the absence of diverging pre-treatment effects across the treated and the
control group.
The exogeneity of the policy change may not be warranted because capital re-
quirements are introduced for each bank individually by its own macroprudential
authority and are not centralised at EU level. This leaves discretion to national reg-
ulators and could cause the introduction of these requirements to be endogenous
if the Member State behaves strategically and wants to protect (weaker) domestic
banks. The paper investigates this possibility in Section 3.8 without finding evi-
dence supporting endogenous behavior. In fact, several provisions enshrined in EU
banking regulation are specifically aimed at eliminating national biases with respect
to macroprudential risks.
The first provision establishes that four different EU institutions are overseeing
the implementation of macroprudential buffers across the EU, namely the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the EU Commission, the EBA and the ECB.5 Second,
the ESRB ha the mandate to identify and monitor systemic risk in the EU. To pre-
serve financial stability, the ESRB can issue public warnings and recommendations to
Member States where identified systemic risks are deemed to be significant and not
addressed. Moreover, the ESRB can issue confidential warnings to the Heads of
States in the EU Council and must monitor their follow-up.6 Third, the ECB has top-
up power for Euro Area banks, this guarantees that there is no inaction bias toward
strategically important domestic banks since the ECB can apply higher macropru-
dential capital requirement than the one established at national level.7 With a further
aim of fostering consistency, the ECB has also developed a framework to provide a
minimum common floor when calibrating systemic capital requirements applied at
the national level.8 Fourth, any measure requires the approval of the ECB Governing
Council, and acting on a proposal by the EU Commission, the EU Council of min-
istries has the power to reject the proposed national macroprudential measure. This
provision guarantees that foreign subsidiaries are treated fairly and equally without
being affected by protectionist measures.9
The validity of the research method could be further questioned if large banks
shift their assets across borders to branches or subsidiaries in order to conduct reg-
ulatory arbitrage. In this case, the existence of spillover effects may produce biased
estimates. However, also this concern is addressed within the regulatory frame-
work which envisages the possibility of reciprocation. This grants the power to a
Member State to request a countervailing capital increase to foreign branches, or
directly across borders when risks of spillover are deemed significant. Reciproca-
tion should ultimately ensure the reduction of the incentive to search for regulatory
5See fot instance, Article 131(7) of the Capital requirements Directive IV (CRDIV) which states
that before setting or resetting an O-SIB buffer, the competent authority shall notify the Commission,
the ESRB, EBA, and the competent microprudential supervisors of the Member States concerned one
month before the publication of the decision.
6For more information on ESRB’s tasks and powers see the related ESRB regulation.
7For the ECB top-up power and the scrutiny of the ECB on national macroprudential measures see
Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation.
8See ECB floor methodology for setting the capital buffer for an identified Other Systemically Im-
portant Institution (O-SII). By providing a minimum floor, the ECB reduces national discretion in cali-
bration of the capital instrument and provides the basis of a discussion between the ECB and national
authorities on the overall assessment of the appropriateness of a macroprudential stance.
9This is in accordance with Article 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU).
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arbitrage and the enforcement of a level playing field among parents, subsidiaries,
and branches within and across the borders.10 This study addresses the concerns
of spillovers by using consolidated financial accounts of EU banks which eliminate
the possibility of arbitrage. The use of consolidated data is also warranted because
macroprudential capital requirements are levied at a group consolidated level.
The reciprocation framework, in conjunction with other provisions established
in the EU banking regulation, alleviate to a great extent the concerns on the validity
of the research method due to endogeneity stemming from national considerations.
The paper finds that the EU-wide regulatory effort to increase the resilience of the
banking sector has contributed to a better capitalized European financial system. In
the baseline specification, a one percentage point increase in capital requirements
increases CET1 capital by an average of 13 percent. The impact is higher (17.7 per-
cent) for banks with a buffer lower than two percentage points from the minimum
capital requirement and for which the policy tightening is more binding. When re-
quirements are relaxed in a downturn, the increase in highest quality CET1 capital
can help the banks in supplying credit acting counter-cyclically to sustain economic
growth in bad times.
However, the significant increase in capital is accompanied with a cost: banks
react to a one percentage point hike in capital requirements by increasing the aver-
age risk weights of their portfolio by 6.1 percentage points. The impact is attenuated
for small banks (4.3 p.p.), but medium (7.3 p.p.) and large (9.6 p.p.) systemically
important banks have a significantly higher risk taking behavior after a hike in cap-
ital requirements. These linearly increasing in size findings for medium and large
banks indicate that costs such as those potentially arising from an intensification of
agency problems may lie behind our results. As shown by Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000,
a diluted ownership structure typical of large publicly traded firms is proportionally
associated with increasing agency costs.
In order to estimate the overall impact on banks’ solvency of the two opposing
effects - i.e. higher resilience achieved with a capital increase versus lower resilience
arising from more risk-taking - the study estimates the impact of the policy change
on probabilities of default extrapolated from credit ratings. Results indicate that
the positive effect of accumulating more equity capital is counterbalanced by the
negative substitution effect toward more riskier assets. The overall net effect on
solvency as measured by probabilities of default is thus null. At the same time,
results indicate that rating agencies evaluate the capital increase as the prevailing
effect on the probability of default of medium and large banks relative to the smaller
banks.
In terms of heterogenous effects of capital requirements, the study documents
that banks adopting the internal rating based (IRB) approach manage to show a
lower propensity to risk taking on their financial accounts, this evidence suggests
the existence of a competitive advantage for IRB banks since lower risk weights im-
ply a lower cost of compliance to higher capital requirements. In addition, results
indicate most of the increase in risk taking is due to less profitable institutions as
measured by net interest income, suggesting that they try to achieve higher returns
by substituting toward more riskier assets to compensate for the low profitability as
10The reciprocity framework is codified in two main documents: (i)Recommendation of the
ESRB/2015/2; (ii) Article 5 of Decision ESRB/2015/4. For a detailed account of the reciprocation
framework in the EU consult the dedicated ESRB web page on reciprocation, and Chapter 11 of the
ESRB Handbook on operationalising macroprudential policy. In this context, the ESRB has an im-
portant coordination role in assessing measures, discussing cross-border effects, and recommending
mitigating measures, including reciprocity.
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a symptom of gambling for resurrection. Further, the study documents that whole-
sale funded banks have a lower tendency to increase their risk profile with respect
to retail funded banks. This result can be interpreted as a strategic need to control
excessive risk taking to compensate for the riskier funding model inherent in whole-
sale funded banks. It may also be a consequence of competitive advantage arising
from the capacity to exploit cross-border funding in regions where monetary policy
conditions are more expansionary improving thus profitability, see Bruno and Shin,
2015.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the theoretical and empir-
ical literature, the EU macroprudential regulation is presented in Section 3.3 while
the empirical methodology is illustrated in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the ev-
idence while the robustness to common trend assumption is presented in Section
3.7, and a formal test of endogeneity is presented in Section 3.8. Finally, the overall
impact on the probabilities of default is described in Section 3.9, and conclusions are
drawn in Section 3.10.
3.2 Literature
3.2.1 Related Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature approached the question of the relationship between higher
capital and risk taking from different angles. Since the pioneering contribution of
Modigliani and Miller, 1958, the literature expanded and relied on a variety of mod-
elling techniques. Despite the richness of existing contributions a consensus has not
been reached. According to theoretical literature, the effect of capital requirements
on risk taking behavior is ambiguous and hence the relationship is still an open em-
pirical question.11
In the basic version of their model, Modigliani and Miller, 1958 assume that fi-
nancial markets are efficient and perfect, while taxes, agency and bankruptcy costs
are absent. As a result, the Modigliani and Miller, 1958 two famous propositions
state: i) the capital structure does not affect the value of the firm and, ii) more levered
firms have higher expected returns on equity than non-levered firms. The literature
has shown that failure of the M&M assumptions may lead to departures from the
theorems’ propositions. For instance, in their later correction paper, Modigliani and
Miller, 1963 show how tax advantages for debt instruments lead to non-proportional
after tax returns across firms. Keeping constant the balance sheet size, stricter cap-
ital requirements imply that banks are less able to exploit favourable tax treatment
of debt. For banks, Miller, 1995 argues that the deposit insurance can be regarded as
a net tax subsidy, enabling banks to obtain funds at less than an appropriately risk-
adjusted cost, promoting in the limit the minimization of the desired equity ratio.
One of the implications of the second M&M proposition is that a higher capital
requirement would reduce the expected return of the bank’s earning assets and thus
curb the incentive for risk taking ensuring that banks always choose socially opti-
mal risk levels. At the same time, higher capital requirement add another layer of
protection for the taxpayer, and Miller, 1995 points out that capital requirements are
11Theoretical contributions range from portfolio models maximizing a mean-variance utility func-
tion (Kahane, 1977; Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992), models
using option pricing methods to value the deposit insurance subsidy (Merton, 1977; Galai and Ma-
sulis, 1976; Furlong and Keeley, 1989), dynamic models of charter value and competition (Keeley, 1990;
Blum, 1999; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000), or the principal-agent framework, (Saunders,
Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994)
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no panacea in this regard because the banks cannot be trusted from offsetting the
added taxpayer protection resulting from higher capital requirements by increasing
the risk of their assets further. Furthermore, the presence of significant agency costs,
which are generally higher in large firms due to the diluted ownership structure,
see Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000, can also lead to the failure of the M&M propositions.
Bankruptcy costs also play a role, as pointed out by the Basel Committee in their
study on the costs and benefits of stronger capital regulation, the main benefits of
a stronger financial system reflect a lower probability of banking crises and their
associated bankruptcy costs, BCBS, 2010. As such the predictions of the M&M theo-
rem on the risk taking behavior of banks after a hike in capital requirements remain
uncertain.
Limited liability and deposit insurance models claim that depositors do not have
any incentive to monitor banks’ behaviour, it follows that managers would have
more opportunity to increase asset riskiness and exploit moral hazard arising from
the deposit insurance subsidy, Green, 1984. In these models, the moral hazard prob-
lem may be further exacerbated by the presence of informational advantage for bank
managers, Jensen and Meckling, 1976. Similarly, Kareken and Wallace, 1978 find that
in a monopoly model of banking with complete contingent claims and under an
FDIC-type deposit insurance scheme, the banking industry maintains a risky port-
folio and capital requirements do not forestall bankruptcy.12
Portfolio choice models support both views, on one side Kahane, 1977, Koehn
and Santomero, 1980, Flannery, 1989 conclude that capital requirements are inef-
ficient in constraining the risk shifting in the bank portfolio insulating them from
market discipline. Nevertheless, Furlong and Keeley, 1989 show that for a value-
maximizing bank and the presence of option-value of deposit insurance, the incen-
tives to increase asset risk decline as bank capital increases. More recently, Kim and
Santomero, 1988 show that the the use of simple capital ratios is ineffective to bound
the insolvency risk of banks, and propose theoretically corrected risk-weights as a
solution to the risk taking behaviour. Similarly, Rochet, 1992 argues that utility, as
opposed to value, maximizing banks can reduce risk taking if capital ratios take into
account their asset risk. Blum, 1999 models a dynamic decision problem of a bank
to conclude that capital adequacy rules may increase bank riskiness.
Merton, 1977 fostered the use of option-pricing models which consider deposit
insurance as an option-value, to reach the conclusion that more skin in the game, i.e.
higher capital requirements, can reduce incentives for increasing portfolio riskiness.
Galai and Masulis, 1976 use a capital asset pricing model and an option pricing
model to show how unanticipated changes in firm capital can induce investments
in portfolios with higher variance. Similarly, Gennotte and Pyle, 1991 show how
deposit guarantees in combination with higher capital requirements lead banks to
increase asset risk.
A further strand of models uses the charter value of the bank, i.e. the difference
between going concern and liquidation value, to support the skin in the game argu-
ment, Marcus, 1984. By the same token, Benston, 1986 argues that bank sharehold-
ers have more incentives to operate conservatively when the amount of their own
funds is at risk. The prospect of loosing charter value on managers’ career can re-
mind managers of the consequences of excessive risk-taking. Saunders, Strock, and
Travlos, 1990 show how managers may have incentives to reduce the default risk
below the shareholders desired level in order to protect their own human capital.
12Notice that, as convincingly showed by Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 deposit insurance is at the
same time a fundamental policy tool to avoid bank runs, hence notwithstanding the moral hazard
incentive, deposit insurance is widely used to limit bank panics and bank runs in time of distress.
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The question is if the bank-managers have the same incentives of the shareholders.
Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994 model the classic moral hazard problem with unob-
servable managers’ effort to conclude that banks with low leverage may have an
incentive to increase risk since interference from principal is lower, and viceversa.
We test for this hypothesis in section 3.6.2. More recently, the theoretical literature
using the charter value argument was augmented by including competition in the
banking industry to conclude how the presence of more competitors may reduce the
charter value and increase default risk through asset risk, Keeley, 1990, Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000.
3.2.2 Related Empirical Literature
Previous empirical research on the impact of higher capital requirements on bank
risk-taking is scant. Pioneering empirical contributions focused on the introduction
of risk-weighted regulatory standards in the late 1980s and was rather fervent in
the 1990s. It used descriptive regression analysis and simultaneous equation mod-
els relying thus on endogenous components of capital increase by bank managers,
(Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Jacques and Nigro, 1997).
One of the earliest empirical contributions is provided by Shrieves and Dahl,
1992. The authors adopt a two-stage simultaneous equation estimation to analyze
the relationship between risk and capital. They estimate discretionary changes in
asset portfolio risk induced by a variation of capital taken endogenously by the
bank. The authors find a positive relationship between increased capital levels and
risk taking as measured by average risk-weights. The positive relation holds also
for banks with capital in excess of the minimum requirements, leading the authors
to conclude that risk-taking behaviour is influenced by bank owners’ and/or man-
agers’ private incentives.
Haubrich and Wachtel, 1993 apply an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to study
whether the 1998 risk-based capital accord (Basel I) led to the risk shifting of com-
mercial banks’ portfolio toward government securities and hence a lower average
risk-weight. The authors conclude that the implementation of Basel I fostered risk
reduction, with poorly-capitalized banks shifting their portfolios away from high-
risk assets and towards low-risk assets.
Using a three-stage least squares simultaneous equation model, Jacques and Ni-
gro, 1997 examine the impact of the risk-based capital standards on bank capital and
portfolio risk in the first year the Basel risk-based standards were in effect. As in
Shrieves and Dahl, 1992, they use discretionary bank management adjustments to
capital, and measure risk as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. The pa-
per concludes that risk-based capital standards were effective in increasing capital
ratios and reducing portfolio risk for banks which already met the new risk-based
standards. Interestingly, Jacques and Nigro, 1997 define also a supervisory pressure
variable assuming that banks may respond differently depending on whether they
are in excess or in shortage of required capital. For capital-constrained banks the
responses showed little connection to the degree to which they fell short of the stan-
dards. Applying a similar simultaneous equation framework to a sample of Swiss
banks, Rime, 2001 finds that supervisory pressure induces banks to increase their
capital, but does not affect the level of risk.
After the turn of the century, academic focus on the impact of bank capital re-
quirement on risk-taking has subdued. More recently, Gropp et al., 2016 exploit
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the 2011 European Banking Authority (EBA) capital exercise13 and a difference-
indifference matching estimator to find that treated banks increase capital ratios by
reducing their credit supply. On the margin of their study, the authors show that the
EBA capital exercise did not have significant effects on risk reduction as measured
by the risk-weighted asset to total asset ratio. Similarly, Calomiris and Jaremski,
2016 exploit a staggered implementation of deposit insurance laws in the U.S. and
the fact that those laws were applied only to some depository institutions within the
states to corroborate the theoretical literature on the moral-hazard consequences of
deposit insurance.
3.3 The EU macroprudential capital based regulation
One of the criticisms of earlier Basel standards for capital requirements, is the lack
of emphasis on risks stemming from correlated exposures that may accumulate over
time and increase systemic risk, (Hellwig, 1995; Acharya, 2009; Haldane and May,
2011). Basel I and II capital standards are focused exclusively on individual port-
folios without acknowledging the importance of how much these portfolios are di-
versified, the pattern of co-variances among individual assets, systemic correlation
of risks and interconnectedness, and/or the cost of failure of big and more complex
banks.14
Basel III standards include additional capital requirements aimed at tackling
some of these issues and add three main new buffers: the Capital Conservation
Buffer (CCoB) for build-up of adequate buffers above the minimum that can be
drawn down in periods of stress, the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) aimed at
limiting the procyclicality of credit growth, and additional capital buffers for Global
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIB) aimed at addressing the liquidation cost of
too-big-to fail banks.15 These efforts notwithstanding, critics have questioned both
the lack of ambition and the design of some of the Basel III buffers Repullo and
Saurina, 2011.
In Europe, the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Require-
ments Directive (CRD IV) introduced a new macroprudential framework transpos-
ing the Basel III agreement.16 The CRDIV has been officially transposed in law on
17th July 2013 and the full reform package entered into force on the 1st January
2014. The overarching goal of the new EU regulation is to limit systemic risk in
the banking sector through the introduction of a set of Systemic macroprudential
Capital Requirements (SMCR) available to national authorities to address systemic
risks. The set of SMCR include three main capital based instruments: the Systemic
13The EBA capital exercise required 61 banks to build-up additional capital buffers to reach a level
of 9% core tier 1 ratio in 8 months, from 26 October 2011 until June 2012
14On one hand Basel I introduced risk-weighted exposures in order to force banks with more risk in
their portfolios to maintain a higher capital level, while Basel II main innovation was the introduction
of the Internal Rating Based (IRB) and the Standardized Approach (SA) models for the computation
of risk-weights. For a more detailed history of Basel capital standards and their deficiencies see for
instance Brealey, 2006 and Hellwig, 2010.
15In addition, Basel III introduces favourable risk-weights for OTC derivatives cleared through cen-
tral counterparties (CCPs), and is raising the risk-weights on exposures to financial institutions rela-
tive to the non-financial corporate sector, as financial exposures are more highly correlated than non-
financial ones.
16Detailed information on the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive can be found on the
European Commission website. Norway and Iceland, despite not being formally EU Member States
opted for participating in the new EU macroprudential framework for banks as established in the CRR
and the CRDIV.
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Risk Buffer (SRB), the Other Systemically Important Banks (O-SIB) buffer and the
Globally Systemically Important banks (G-SIB) buffer.17 The SRB aims to address
systemic risks of a long-term structural and non-cyclical nature as for instance the
accumulation of systemic risk and the degree of interconnectedness. The O-SIB and
G-SIB buffers are predominantly concerned with increasing loss absorption capacity
and reducing public costs of default of bigger and complex banks.
While the economic rationale behind the diverse types of buffers may differ in
scope and objective, all of them have to be met with an additional highest quality
Common Equity Tier1 (CET1) capital as a share of risk-weighted assets (RWA). All
SMCRs are applied at individual bank-level and levied in addition to the minimum
requirements, and they are specifically addressed to a set of both globally and na-
tionally systemically important banks (SIBs).18 The list of systemically important
banks is updated each year by national authorities following EBA guidelines. The
main criteria for systemic importance are: a) size; b) importance for the economy
of the relevant Member State or the Union, capturing substitutability/financial in-
stitution infrastructure; c) complexity, including the additional complexities from
cross-border activity; d) interconnectedness of the institution or (sub-)group with
the financial system.19
It is important to notice that not all G-SIBs or O-SIBs are subject to the SMCR
as of 2017Q3. In fact, despite the introduction of the capital based macroprudential
framework in 2014 in the EU, some national macroprudential authorities have not
yet activated any of the structural SMCRs. Under the oversight of the ESRB and the
ECB, the EU regulation allows for discretion to activate and to set the level for each
O-SIB and SRB buffer. On the one hand, these country divergences and the staggered
implementation across countries facilitate the empirical identification problem. On
the other hand, they may lead to concerns regarding the potential endogeneity of
the policy change with respect to the health of the country banking system. These
concerns are, however, alleviated by four main elements enshrined in the regulation:
i) four EU institutions coordinated oversight contribute to refraining from inaction
bias and national favoritism,20 ii) the ECB has the power to top-up the requirement
if considers it insufficient to cope with the relevant risk, or may object the decision in
case considered excessive or punitive toward foreign subsidiaries, and iii) the ESRB
can issue public warning and recommendations where an identified systemic risk
has materialised and has not yet been addressed and iv) the reciprocation framework
17The new macroprudential regulation in the EU includes also the Basel III capital conservation
buffer (CCoB) as well as the dynamic countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB). Nevertheless, the CCoB
and the CCyB are buffers set at the country-level and hence at the same level for systemic and non-
systemic banks in the country. Since these two buffers are absorbed by country-quarter fixed effects in
our empirical design they are not contributing to additional variation and to the identification of the
effects.
18Under the CRD IV/CRR capital framework, EU banks are required to hold a minimum amount of
total capital equal to at least 8% of RWA. The new regulation raises the minimum share of capital that
has to be of the highest quality CET1 capital from 2% to 4.5%. Additional capital until the minimum
threshold of 8% can be fulfilled with Tier 1 minimum capital or Tier 2 minimum capital (max. 2%).
As such, the new EU-wide CRD IV/CRR minimum capital regulation places greater emphasis on the
quality of capital.
19For more details cfr. the EBA Guidelines on the criteria to assess systemically important banks in
the EU. The EBA provides and maintains also an updated G-SIBs list and O-SIBs list in Europe over
time on its website.
20It is important to notice that in order to ensure consistent macroprudential oversight across the
Union, the ESRB develops principles tailored to the Union economy and is responsible for monitoring
their application.
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allows a Member State to request a reciprocation of a macroprudential measure.21
The calibration of the G-SIB buffer is set internationally according to the Basel G-
SIB score range for each G-SIB, BCBS, 2013. The calibration of the SRB and the O-SIB
buffers depend on the systemic importance of the bank for the country in question
and is not subject to centralized guidelines from EBA. As mentioned earlier, the ECB
has developed a framework to provide a minimum common floor when calibrating
O-SIB buffers at the national level to foster a level playing field. Above this floor,
each country calibrates the buffers using own methodologies.22
In sum, and contrary to the Basel III capital standards, the EU package is more
ambitious since instructs Member States to designate own systemically important
banks to which then a wider battery of bank-specific systemic capital buffers may be
applied. Table 3-1 provides an overview of the newly introduced capital require-
ments in the EU.
3.4 Empirical Methodology
3.4.1 Data
This study uses two main data sources to construct an integrated dataset combin-
ing bank-level financial accounts data and systemic macroprudential capital require-
ments. The source of bank-level financial accounts data is the commercial provider
SNL Financials which collects financial accounts from financial institutions around
the World. More specifically, financial accounts for all G-SIB and O-SIB in the EU
and Norway from 2006Q1 until 2017Q3, leading to a total number of 205 banks in
the sample, with 14 G-SIBs and 191 O-SIBs.23 The list of banks sorted by total assets
is presented in Appendix 3.A.24
The bank specific SMCRs are obtained from the ESRB database on macropru-
dential policies based on the notifications from the national authorities.25 Table 3-3
illustrates the evolution of capital requirements for the sample of EU G-SIBs and O-
SIBs from 2010Q1 until 2017Q3. In Panel A of Table 3-3 the simple mean of the capital
requirements for both treated and non-treated banks is shown. The first row shows
21See respectively, Article 131(7) of the Capital requirements Directive IV (CRDIV), Articles 5(1)
and 5(2) of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, Article 3 of the ESRB regulation and the
Recommendation of the ESRB/2015/2 in conjunction with Article 5 of Decision ESRB/2015/4
22For instance, the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF), the macroprudential
authority in Luxembourg adopts "a statistical approach involving linear regression and a scaling framework
with the goal to ensure consistency between O-SIBs buffers and the buffers applied to G-SIBs." See CSSF noti-
fication to the ESRB. Additional notifications may be found on the ESRB website.
23For the list of G-SIB with cut-off date 2016Q4 consult the Financial Stability Board page available
on this link.
24One caveat to keep in mind when constructing a bank-level database over a long time period is
the churning rate of financial institutions from the sample. In particular the merger of two or more
financial institutions may bias the results. To limit this possibility, When a merger happens, the study
sample is adjusted in order to reflect this change: old entities are discontinued in the sample and a
new entity is added with a separate identifier as a result of the merger. To grasp the idea of sample
construction in case of mergers, one examples of recent merger episodes over the period is shortly
summarised in this footnote. On 2nd Jan 2017 Nordea Bank Denmark merged with Nordea Bank AB,
see link. As a consequence of the merger, a Danish entity Nordea Real Kredit has been identified as
O-SIB by the Danish macroprudential authority. It follows also that Nordea Bank Denmark has been
removed from the O-SIB list in DK, and also from the list of O-SIBs in the study sample.
25The ESRB macroprudential database covers all changes in macroprudential regulation notified by
the 28 EU countries and Norway. Notifications are published on the ESRB website or disseminated
through ESRB publications. For detailed information on the national macroprudential policies in the
EU cfr.: ESRB National Policies
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the phasing-in of the SMCR after 2014. From 2014 onward the SMCR CET1 capital
requirements for EU G-SIBs and O-SIBs increase by an average of 0.21 percentage
points yearly.26
The average capital requirement is higher if we compute the average conditional
on effectively treated banks. This conditional mean is shown in Panel B of Table 3-3
and implies an average increase of the SMCR by 1.18 percentage points in 2017Q3.
This is a substantial increase in capital requirement, in particular for banks that are
closer to the minimum requirement. An inspection of the standard deviation of
SMCR shows the ample variation in capital requirement setting. This is a welcome
feature of the data since it contributes to lower the variance of the estimated coef-
ficient of interest and provide more precise estimation of the relationship between
risk-taking and capital requirements.
As explained in Section 3.3, an O-SIB may not have any SMCR if the regulator de-
cides not to implement any on it, see Table 3-1 for a summary of the macroprudential
capital requirements in the EU. In our sample 26.34% of bank-quarter observations
are not treated. In other terms, for those banks the regulator opted not to increase
the SMCR, while this is a discretionary decision, as explained in the introduction
there are substantial institutional arrangements to guarantee that the decisions are
taken objectively without favoring any national champion.
The second row of each panel of Table 3-3 shows the overall capital requirement
for CET1 capital (OCR), i.e. the sum of the Pillar I capital requirements and the
combined macroprudential capital requirement. The average banks’ supply levels
of CET1 capital are shown in the third row of each panel. The difference between the
OCR and the supply of capital by banks is then computed in order to derive a proxy
for the stringency of the binding of the capital requirement at bank-level (row four).
In fact, banks’ response to higher capital requirement are expected to be a function
of the distance to the regulatory minimum, or in other words an inverse function
of their excess capital above the minimum requirement. In particular, banks are
expected to increase their capital supply if they are close to the regulatory minimum
as shown already by Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Rime, 2001.
Table 3-4 illustrates descriptive statistics of banks’ financial accounts as extracted
from the SNL Financials database. Descriptive statistics are shown for all vari-
ables used in the later empirical analysis, when absolute values are shown these
are expressed in EUR throughout the paper. The asset side of the balance sheet
is composed by three major components: loans gross of provisions for impairment
(58.29%), securities (25.13%) and cash (15.29%).27 It is worth noting the average level
of RWA over total assets, i.e. the risk-ratio, which is 50.91%, as this measure will be a
useful benchmark for the following analysis. Securities can be further broken down
by Held for Trading (HFT), Available for Sale (AFS) and Held to Maturity (HTM). On
the liabilities side the table shows the means of the main funding sources for banks:
26Note that over the sample period, other type of country level macroprudential buffers were also
levied on EU banks, as for instance the CCoB and the CCyB. The total combined yearly average of
macroprudential buffer averaged 0.65% from 2014 until 2017Q3. However, in this paper, the focus
is exclusively on bank-level macroprudential buffers since they allow for more precise estimates and
allow to control for time varying country-level variation by including country-time fixed effects. In
other terms, the country-time fixed effects absorb the variation generated by the country-level capital
requirements. Note also that there is a small average increase (i.e. 0.01%) of the SMCR across the
sample already in 2013 since in Norway the macroprudential capital requirements where the Systemic
Risk Buffer (SRB) was introduced in 2013Q3.
27Cash includes reserves and balances at the Central Bank, operating cash, cash and cash equivalents
according to the relevant accounting standard, i.e. "short-term, highly liquid investments that are
readily convertible to known amounts of cash and which are subject to an insignificant risk of changes
in value".
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deposits (48.5% of total assets), short and long-term wholesale funding (33.3%) and
debt (17.9%).28
Importantly, the SNL Financials database also allows to capture the extent to
which systemically important financial institutions are interconnected with each
other and the wider financial system. In fact, excluding measures of bank inter-
connectedness and complexity would bias the results due to their direct correlation
with the level of the SMCR, see Section 3.3 above and EBA Guidelines on the criteria
to assess systemically important banks in the EU. Table 3-4 presents four indica-
tors used in the paper as proxies for interconnectedness and complexity, namely:
i) interbank lending as a direct measure of interconnectedness; ii) assets held for
trade as measure of complexity and interconnection with financial markets’ devel-
opments through mark-to-market trading book accounting which directly impacts
banks’ profit and loss statements; iii) over the counter (OTC) derivatives securities
held on the balance sheet as a measure of both complexity and interrelation with
the counterparty risk in he financial system; iv) cash held at the Central Bank for
interbank payments’ settlements.29
3.4.2 Empirical Design
The introduction of the CRD IV/CRR regulatory framework and of the new macro-
prudential capital requirement offers an opportunity to employ an identification
strategy based on a controlled comparison by studying the effect of a policy change
on differently affected banks. As noted in previous sections, the SMCRs are set at
individual bank-level for systemically important banks in the EU. This implies that
within a country banks are subject to different level of requirements depending on
their systemic importance. This ensures cross-country and within-country variation
at bank level, which in turn is suited for using a multi-treatment group difference-
in-difference identification strategy. 30 The baseline estimated equation is:
lnYict = αi + β∆SMCRict + ln Xic,t−1γ+ δct ++uict (3.1)
Where i, c and t are indicators for bank, country and time respectively. The spec-
ification includes bank fixed effects, αi, to control for time-invariant bank hetero-
geneity. Importantly, the parameters δct are dummy variables for capturing within
state endogenous variation, for instance time varying macroeconomic effects such
as: general economic growth, supply and demand shocks or fiscal and monetary
policy changes within a country. The country-quarter fixed effects control thus for
time varying country level factors that might simultaneously affect the SMCR and Y
are controlled for and help to isolate the impact of an increment of capital require-
ments on the outcome of interest. It is important to note that the identifying source
of variation therefore comes from time variant bank level SMCR Finally, uict is the
residual unexplained term.
28The total sum of funding sources and equity is not 100% of total assets due to few missing obser-
vations across these variables.
29Cash held at the central bank is also an important bank-level control variable for unconventional
monetary policy operations of quantitative easing whereby bank’s accounts at the ECB were credited
with cash after monetary policy operations.
30In this setting each bank is a group of treatment and is compared with other treated banks in terms
of intensity of treatment (i.e. different levels of capital requirement increases) and with the group of
banks that had not have any increase in the SMCR over the sample period. For details on the multi-
treatment group difference-in-difference estimation technique see Chapter 5.2. in Angrist and Pischke
(2008).
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The outcome variables of interest are grouped in the vector Yict, they are: the
capital ratio (CET1/RWA), the level of CET1 and the level of total capital for capital
specifications; RWA, and its decomposition in RWA/Assets and total assets for risk
specifications. The policy variable of interest is the change in the systemic macropru-
dential capital requirement ∆SMCRict. Both the outcome and the policy variables
are used at time t. The main coefficient of interest in the equation is β, which can
be interpreted as the average treatment effect of a one percentage point increase in
capital requirement on the outcome variable of interest.
The matrix Xict−1 includes bank-specific, time varying control variables lagged
by one quarter to limit simultaneity bias.31 The set of control variables is motivated
by the nature of the setting and calibration of capital requirements as per the EBA
guidelines, which both depend on the size of the bank (total assets), the value of
domestic payments (central bank reserves used for settlement of payments), the im-
portance of the bank in the financial system (deposits and loans). As mentioned
in section 3.4.1, the capital requirements are a function of the complexity and the
interconnectedness of a bank with the financial system, hence the model controls
for interbank lending, held for trading securities, OTC derivatives and cash at the
Central Bank. Finally, in order to improve the precision of the estimates the speci-
fication controls for total debt, other accounting classifications of securities holding
(i.e. available for sale and held to maturity), return on assets and the cost to income
ratio as further controls.
Bank Risk Measure
In terms of measurement, one of the most important elements of the analysis pre-
sented in this paper is the measurement of risk-taking behaviour which must be able
to identify individual bank specific risk-taking behaviour. One way to approach this
problem is to look directly at the intrinsic risk stemming from the combination and
composition of the portfolios on the assets side of banks’ balance sheet. This is the
approach followed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) under
the Basel II rules on risk sensitive capital requirements.
But how can banks adjust their CET1 ratio after an increase in the regulatory
capital requirement? A look at the CET1 ratio can help discerning the effects:
CET1Ratio =
CET1
RWa Asseta
(3.2)
where CET1 is the amount of Common Equity Tier 1 capital held by the bank, RW
represents the non-negative risk weight specific to asset a, and Asset is the amount
of nominal exposure in asset a. As Equation 3.2 shows, banks can increase their
regulatory capital ratio in three mutually non-exclusive ways: by increasing capital,
reducing the risk-weights or reducing their assets. A bank can raise capital by either
31More specifically, the full set of control variables includes the lags of: the natural logarithm of total
assets to control for size and a series of variables all divided by total assets: loans and total deposits
as controls for business model, total debt to control for leverage, total cash and like cash instruments
to control for unconventional monetary policy liquidity effects and securities held for trading (HFT),
securities classified as available for sale (AFS) and securities held to maturity (HTM) to control for
the unconventional monetary policy effects of central banks’ securities purchase programs. A series
of controls are included for market and financial institutions interconnectedness: OTC derivatives
securities, interbank loans; finally return on assets ratio and the cost to income ratio control for cyclical
and structural profitability.
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issuing new shares and/or not paying dividends to its shareholders to retain earn-
ings. The newly issued shares and retained earnings increase the CET1 ratio, pro-
vided that the bank does not increase its risk-weighted assets. Alternatively, holding
equity constant, the management of the bank can reduce risk-weighted assets, ei-
ther through shifting assets composition towards exposures with lower risk-weights
such as government securities, or reducing assets, that is by reducing lending, sell-
ing securities, impaired loans or other assets.
From Equation 3.2 a logical approach for the measurement of bank specific risk
taking behaviour lies in the Basel II rules on risk-sensitiveness of assets. The ratio
of RWA over total assets, for simplicity the risk ratio or risk density, is a natural mea-
sure of bank risk taking behaviour if we keep fixed the risk weights measurement
approach. The risk ratio provides the average risk the bank’s portfolio according to
the risk-weight associated with each asset. It has the advantage of being a simple
and very intuitive measure of bank risk taking, Berger, 1995, even if the appropri-
ateness of risk-weights has been questioned in the literature, see Hellwig, 2010. A
further benefit of using the risk ratio is that it takes into account the deterioration
of the quality of a credit portfolio, as already noted by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and
Jacques and Nigro (1997). In fact, regulatory provisions foresee higher risk-weights
for non performing exposures and impaired assets.32
In addition, the risk ratio indicator is a decision variable within the reaction func-
tion of banks’ risk-management and its decision making process to changes in capi-
tal requirements determined by the regulator. The response of the risk management
is exclusively determined by strategic decision and thus more apt to measure risk-
taking behaviour than market based risk measures such as CDS spreads which are
usually measures of solvency. In addition, the latter are of minor interest since they
are external to the decision making of the banks’ management, and are a mere re-
flection on how the financial markets judge the probability of the bank being solvent
when payments are due.33
A further advantage of the use of internal risk-weights is that they provide for
a not delayed response when an increase in capital requirements occurs. this is pri-
marily driven by supervisory interference and sanctions due to late compliance.
Some notes of caution in using the risk ratio are due. Banks using internal rat-
ing based approach (IRB) to set risk-weights on their portfolio have a competitive
advantage with respect to banks using standardized approach (SA), see for instance
praet2004; tschemernjak2004assessing; haselmann2016banks The competitive ad-
vantage arises because IRB banks use their own empirical models to estimate market
and credit risk, while SA banks use the risk weights defined in the regulation which
are on average more stringent. Internal rating models are fine-tuned to minimize the
risk weights for each risk exposure resulting in a lower risk ratio even if the bank has
effectively the same portfolio of a competing SA bank. It follows that IRB banks are
able to ’artificially’ increase the supply of capital since the denominator of the capi-
tal ratio decreases. This study controls for this heterogeneity using bank-level fixed
effects in all specifications (note that risk weights measurement approach is sticky in
32Some authors suggest to use directly non-performing loans (NPLs) as proxies for risk-taking since
granting high-return, but high-risk, loans underlines a risk-taking propensity. However, NPLs would
not be entirely apt to our task due to lags in their accounting rules, they are recognized as non-
performing starting on the 90th day past due (depending on the type of asset and the accounting
classification) implying a difficult identification problem for the econometrician regarding the timing
of the impact.
33It is also important to notice that the scope of application of CDS pricing is very limited in our
sample since CDS prices are generally available only for some of the large systemic banks. In our
sample, this translates to only 49 banks with available CDS prices.
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time), in addition it explores the extent of the competitive advantage of IRB banks by
interacting the macroprudential capital requirement with an IRB dummy in Section
3.5.
A final note of caution is due since, by construction, the risk ratio identifies risk
stemming predominantly from on-balance sheet exposures, while the risk associated
with unobserved off-balance sheet exposures is not entirely captured in this metric.
In the transposition of Basel standards in the EU, the CRR asserts that off-balance
sheet items are treated like on-balance sheet exposures and shall be risk-weighted,
however the calculation method implies a lower risk weight for off-balance sheet
exposures.34 Since off-balance sheet items are unobserved in the dataset, we can
only try to form an educated guess on the bias arising from omitted variable. Table
3-2 shows the direction of omitted variable bias given the correlation patterns be-
tween the omitted variable, the treatment variable and the dependent variable. Due
to the preferential regulatory treatment for off-balance sheet assets, it is very likely
that banks react to higher capital requirement by shifting some of their risky as-
sets to unobserved off-balance sheet positions implying a positive correlation between
regulatory capital hike and off-balance sheet activity. In addition, due to lower risk
weights of off-balance sheet exposures, the β2 coefficient in Table 3-2 should be lower
than zero. It follows that the estimates on the impact of capital requirements on risk
taking behaviour may result downward biased if the incidence stemming from off-
balance sheet items is large enough. This downward bias may underestimate the
real risk-taking behaviour in our estimates, probably even more for more complex
institutions which have a higher capacity to transfer assets off-balance sheet.
3.5 Results
By presenting the first set of results, the paper acknowledges that banks tend to
maintain a capital buffer on top of the regulatory minima as a signal of financial
health to the markets, to attract funding and to minimize supervisory interference
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro (1997). Moreover, microprudential
supervisors encourage banks to maintain an additional voluntary buffer on top of
the requirements, this indicates the adequate level of capital to be maintained in
order to withstand stressed situations.35 This study sorts banks by how binding is
the new capital requirement. To this end, an indicator of the distance from the OCR
is interacted with the change in the systemic macroprudential capital requirement.36
34Not all activities of the banks can be moved off-balance sheet, off-balance sheet items are typically
exclusively those not owned by or not a direct obligation of the bank, for instance securitised activities
and operating leases are the most common off-balance items. The key difference between off-balance
and on-balance exposures relates to the calculation method of the exposure value that should be risk-
weighted. The definition and calculation of the exposure value of off-balance sheet items is detailed in
CRR Article 166 for the IRB approach and CRR Article 111 for the SA.
35In the Banking Union framework, this is regulated via an additional Pillar 2 Guidance which is
calibrated on the basis of the adverse scenario in the supervisory stress tests. see ECB description of
the Pillar 2 Guidance
36In turn, levels of desired capital may depend on external factors such as the macroeconomic en-
vironment, the market interest rate, the degree of tax differentials between debt and equity financing
Schepens, 2016, as well as the degree of regulatory pressure. In a bank-level empirical setting, the
country-level features can be controlled for in specification 3.1 via country-time fixed-effects, these
help to absorb the bias in the estimates arising from country-level specific influences.
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3.5.1 Capital: Baseline and binding distance interaction
Before investigating the relative importance of the moral hazard versus the skin in
the game channels, it is instructive to understand how effective the capital require-
ment is at increasing the banks’ capital. This section provides evidence on whether
banks increase the numerator of the capital ratio and, as a consequence, whether
their solvency is strengthened. Table 3-5 illustrates the results of the impact of an
increase in the Systemic macroprudential Capital Requirements (SMCR) on three
measures of capital: the risk-weighted CET1 ratio, the volume of available CET1
capital and the volume of supplied total capital. All regressions follow the specifica-
tion in Equation 3.1, and include quarterly varying country-time fixed effects. The
first columns (1)-(3) present the baseline estimates, while Columns (4)-(6) differenti-
ate the impact by the cushion banks maintain from the OCR.
Column (1) shows how the resulting average impact on the risk-weighted capital
ratio is not statistically significant. For the average bank, and without categorizing
banks by distance from the minimum requirement, the impact of the SMCR is not
strictly binding. This result is however not distinguishing by the buffer banks main-
tain on top of regulatory minima.37 Column (4) indicates that once we include in
the regressions dummies for distance, and their interaction with the SMCR, a one
percentage point increase in the capital requirement induces an increase of the CET1
ratio by 0.83 percentage points, providing evidence that significant European banks
are effectively constrained by the regulatory change. The interaction effect is not
statistically different for the group of banks with a more than two percentage points
excess capital with respect to the minimum requirement. The absence of negative
sign for non capital constrained banks, provides evidence that the reaction to the
hike in capital requirement is widespread. This finding is in line with the notion that
banks have a preference to maintain a desired, or target level of capital, above the
minimum to assuage market pressure and reduce supervisory interference, Shrieves
and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro (1997).
But how this increase in the ratio occurs? In Column (2), the focus shifts to the
amount of CET1 capital, i.e. the numerator of the CET1 ratio. On average, a one
percentage point higher SMCR yields CET1 to increase by 8.9 percent. In Column
(5), we differentiate the impact by distance to OCR: the result highlights again that
banks with a relative shortage of capital have almost a double effect (17.7 percent)
with respect to the average impact in Column (2). The coefficient for the reference
group of banks with less than 2 p.p. of CET1 buffer above the minimum, translates
in a 17.7 percent increase of CET1 ratio for a 1 p.p. rise in capital requirements. This
positive impact provides evidence of the direct benefits of capital based macropru-
dential regulation in the EU. The reforms promoted widespread increase in capital
levels across the sample of systemically important banks, and in particular for banks
with lower loss absorption capacity, increasing capital for banks with lower buffers
and therefore improving the overall resilience of the system. Significant banks with
capital in excess of the minimum regulatory threshold show somewhat weaker but
still strong effects in terms of the magnitude of CET1 capital increase.38
37In the following note that the estimation sample is composed by 137 significant banks, the dis-
tribution of the OCR distance variable in the estimation sample has mean 8.7 percentage points and
median at 7.8 percentage points. Similar results are obtained with different break-down of the distance
from OCR, the results are available from the author.
38Note that the number of observations in each bucket of the distance from the OCR are: 71 for the
bucket of banks below 2pp of the OCR, 385 for the bucket with 2pp<OCR<5pp, 1836 for the bucket
with 5pp<OCR<10pp and 903 for the bucket with the OCR>10pp
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Column (3) and Column (6) corroborate the results on CET1 capital when includ-
ing additional Tier1 capital and Tier2 instruments in the numerator. The net impact
is attenuated since the bulk of the increase is borne by CET1 capital, a natural conse-
quence of the SMCR requirement. The induced higher levels of capital ratios mean
a greater loss absorption capacity for European banks when the next financial crisis
hits, Jiménez et al. (2016).
3.5.2 Risk: Baseline and binding distance interaction
This section presents the first results on the skin in the game versus moral hazard
channels. It shows how the banks react to their strengthened capital position which
was documented in the previous section.
As summarized in Section 3.2, a branch of the banking literature shows how
more regulated banks can have risk-taking incentives due to the negative effect of
higher capital requirements on bank profits.39 On the other hand, the skin in the
game argument postulates that for banks with higher capital ratios there is an incen-
tive by bank managers to avoid excessive risk-taking since more risk increases the
variance of returns with higher probability of significant losses on banks’ equity.40
This section shed lights on the capital requirements and risk-incentive relationship
using the risk ratio as a measure for riskier assets, and interacting the SMCR with
the distance from the OCR in order to study the interaction of risk-taking with the
supply of regulatory capital.
Table 3-6 presents the estimates. Columns (1)-(3) investigate the effect without
distinguishing banks by their distance from the overall capital requirement. Col-
umn (1) shows the estimates on the impact on the combined risk weighted assets,
columns (2) and (3) presents the impact on the decomposition of RWA in risk ratio
(or density) and total assets. The results suggest that, on average, banks show a
significant tendency to increase their RWA after a tightening of the capital require-
ments. In particular, as shown in Column (2), the impact stems from higher risk
taking, as the composition of the asset side of banks’ balance sheets tilts toward
more riskier assets. The risk taking behaviour manifests in considerably higher risk
ratios (RWA/Assets), with a one percentage point hike in capital requirements be-
ing associated with 6.9 percentage points increase of the risk ratio. The estimates
are significant at 1 percent confidence level and are indicative of the existence of a
risk taking channel of capital adequacy requirements, raising concerns on the non-
intended consequences and perverse effects of capital based regulation.
To understand better the magnitude of this impact, recall that the average risk
ratio level in the sample is 50.9 percent (see Table 3-4). In other words, a one per-
centage point increase in the SMCR could shift the average risk ratio to 57.8 percent.
This is an economically significant amount and, as noted in Section 3.2, the quali-
tative impact is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical work. Moreover,
we can try to extrapolate this impact to the average EU systemically important bank,
we can compare how much this risk taking relates to the effective increase in capi-
tal requirement occurred during the observation period. Table 3-3 shows that over
the four years between 2014 and 2017, the SMCR increase on average in the sample
of systemically important EU banks by 0.87 percentage points. A simple linear ap-
proximation would thus entail an average increase of risk weights by 6 percentage
points, i.e. 0.87 multiplied by 6.9 the coefficient of Column (2).
39See for instance Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), and Blum (1999).
40See for instance Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), Repullo and Suarez (2004), and Repullo
(2004)
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The second part of Table 3-6 tests the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship be-
tween capital requirement and risk taking, Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000),
Repullo and Suarez (2004), and Repullo (2004). Contrary to the predictions of this
strand of the literature, the evidence in Columns (4)-(6) does not show signs of a de-
creasing risk taking behaviour by banks with a greater supply of capital. In fact, all
the interaction terms in the specification are not significant at standard confidence
levels. All groups of banks, irrespective of their level of capital supply, show similar
propensities to take on more risk after a hike in capital requirements.
The results of this section show a clear tendency to react to more capital by shift-
ing the portfolio toward riskier assets. The predisposition to take on more risk can
be interpreted as evidence that the moral hazard channel is stronger than the skin
in the game channel of capital regulation. Potential losses to equity holders arising
from greater risk taking are not the main driver of risk management decisions in the
adjustment process. The positive aspect of the new regulation is that banks react by
increasing the amount for capital even if this does not restrain them from taking on
more risk.
3.6 Heterogeneity
3.6.1 Heterogeneity by Size and IRB
This section investigates how size and internal rating based approach affect the rela-
tionship between capital requirements and risk taking behaviour. Bank size is mea-
sured using total assets, with small banks classified as those having less than EUR
20 billions in total assets, medium banks defined as banks with assets between EUR
20 to EUR 100 billions and large banks have more than EUR 100 billions in total
assets.41
Further, banks are distinguished by their risk weights measurement approach
in order to gauge whether more sophisticated financial institutions can success-
fully circumvent the risk-weighting system and present lower risk-weights on their
books. The indicator variable for the IRB approach is constructed from SNL Finan-
cials where the risk weights measurement framework is provided and the dummy
takes value one if the bank is using either the advanced or the foundation IRB.42
A priori, we expect a positive correlation between size and IRB, due to resource
constraints smaller banks may not have the required human capital to design and
deploy the IRB approach which is more demanding in terms of modelling skills. In
our sample, size and IRB have a positive pairwise Paerson correlation coefficient of
0.31, this correlation is significant at one percent significance level. Table 3-7 presents
the evidence on the impact of a hike in capital requirements for capital indicators,
41The classification of banks follows a division of the sample in three approximately equal parts in
order not to lose observations and hence statistical power when performing heterogeneity effects, see
Table 3-I. For the smaller banks, this subdivision is also in line with the EU Banking Union criteria to
distinguish Least Significant Institutions (i.e. total assets< EUR 30 billions) and Significant Institutions
(total assets > EUR 30 billions). Other thresholds for size have been tested and results do not alter
the conclusions presented in this section. Regressions by other categorizations are available from the
author.
42There are two versions of the IRB approaches. The Advanced (A-IRB) is the most sophisticated
of two credit risk modelling approaches agreed by regulators in 2004. It allows banks to calculate the
probability of default (PD) for a loan, as well as the exposure at the point of default and the resulting
losses. Its simpler cousin, the foundation IRB, only allows PD to be modelled. In the following we
consider a dummy one for banks using either the A-IRB or the foundation IRB approaches, or a mixture
of the two. The dummy is set to zero for purely standardized approaches (SA).
3.6. Heterogeneity 145
while Table 3-8 shows the estimates for measures of risk. All regressions include
bank-level controls, bank fixed effects and country-quarter fixed effects, the latter
control for time varying macroeconomic heterogeneity.
Impact on Capital by Size and IRB
Following the results in Section 3.5.1, Table 3-7 adopts the specification with a dummy
variable for distance which is 1 if the distance from the OCR is greater than two per-
centage points, for the sake of space and according to the results of Table 3-5 the
dummy for distance takes on only two values.43 The estimates on the impact of cap-
ital do not present strong evidence of hetereogeneous impact by size or risk weights
measurement framework. The interaction with the distance from the overall capital
requirement is likewise not significant. The evidence on capital raising from Table
3-7 leads to conclude that there is no significant heterogeneous behaviour between
small and big banks or between banks adopting the IRB or the SA.
The results related to the risk taking behaviour are more informative. Table 3-8 il-
lustrates the outcome of the regression, this time without differentiating by distance
from the OCR since risk taking behaviour does not appear to be related to the buffer
of capital the bank maintains on top of the minimum requirement, this was shown
in Table 3-6. Columns (1)-(3) show the results by bank size while Columns (4)-(6)
present evidence for banks with IRB and for the interaction of size and IRB.
Impact on Risk by Size and IRB
The results related to the risk taking behaviour are more informative. Table 3-8 il-
lustrates the outcome of the regression without differentiating by distance from the
OCR since risk taking behaviour does not appear to be related to the buffer of capi-
tal the bank maintains on top of the minimum requirement, this was shown in Table
3-6. Columns (1)-(3) show the results by bank size while Columns (4)-(6) present
evidence for banks with IRB and for the interaction of size and IRB.
Column (1) of Table 3-8 indicates that RWA are increasing by approximately
seven percent for a one percentage point increase of capital requirements. The im-
pact on RWA does not appear significantly different between smaller and bigger
banks. In Column (2), RWA are divided by total assets to obtain the risk ratio.44 The
evidence indicates a clear increase of the impact on the risk ratio as the size of the
banks increases. Banks with total assets above EUR 20 billions tend to take on more
risk compared to small banks, approximately a two percentage point more for every
percentage point increase in capital requirements. Column (3) confirms further that
banks do not decrease their assets size significantly following an increase in capital
requirements.
In Column (4)-(6) we augment the specification with the risk weight measure-
ment framework represented by the indicator variable for IRB, which takes the value
one if the bank is using the internal rating based approach. Column (4) reveals that
the increase in RWA is driven exclusively by banks with assets greater than EUR
100 billions. The coefficient for large banks increased to eighteen percent following
a one percentage point hike in capital requirements. The impact for smaller banks is
43Same categories for the breakdown of distance from OCR as in the previous section, as well as
other categories of size of the bank have been experimented, the results are similar in terms of both
magnitude and statistical significance, they are available from the author.
44Notice that netting out total assets from RWA eliminates also concerns on endogeneity due to
reverse causality.
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no longer significant. Even more telling is the impact for banks with more than EUR
100 billions in assets using the IRB approach, they appear able to exploit their mod-
elling techniques for risk-weights and decrease the impact on RWA by fifteen percent
less than large banks relying on the SA for risk-weights. The marginal impact of one
percentage point increase of the SMCR on large IRB banks is a two percent increase
in RWA.
Column (5) of Table 3-8 takes a closer look by netting out the confounding effect
of the RWA ratio denominator. The first and the forth row of Column (5) confirm that
even smaller banks take more risks following a rise in capital requirements while the
IRB approach for small banks does not bring significant benefit in curtailing their
risk ratio. For smaller banks, a one percentage point increase in capital requirements
induces an increase of the risk ratio by 4.3 percentage points. More interestingly,
the second and the third row of Column (5) suggests that there is a positive relation
between risk taking behaviour and bank size. As the size of the bank increases, and
with it its systemic importance, the risk taking behaviour is more accentuated. A one
percentage point increase in capital requirements is associated with a 7.3 percentage
points increase of the risk ratio for medium banks, and with a 9.6 percentage points
increase for large banks, both at 5% significance level. These results are consistent
with the presence and intensification of agency costs as the financial institutions be-
comes larger with a more fragmented shareholders base. In fact, as pointed out by
Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000, agency problems are directly proportional with the dilu-
tion of the ownership structure, and it can be inferred that in large publicly traded
banks these are substantial.
Can IRB banks reduce the observed risk taking behaviour by exploiting the more
advanced approach to measure risk weights? The last row of Table 3-8 presents
the results. For medium banks, the interaction coefficient between size and IRB is
negative even if it is not statistically significant. Large IRB banks with total assets
above EUR 100 billions show a decrease of their risk ratio by 3.6 percentage points
with respect SA banks of similar size. They show a significantly lower propensity
to augment their risk ratio when capital requirements are incremented despite the
marginal effect is still greater than the baseline banks with assets lower than EUR 20
billions. This implies that large IRB banks are successful in presenting a reduced risk
exposure to their supervisors, suggesting overall lower levels of risk taking, even if
their balance sheet could have a similar risk profile to the one of their competitors
using the standardized approach. To what extent this risk reduction is real and ef-
fective, or is just the result of manipulating the risk weights in their own favor, it is
impossible to discern with the data used in this paper. Nevertheless, the evidence
establishes the presence of a competitive advantage for IRB banks since lower risk
weights imply a lower cost of compliance to a hike of regulatory capital require-
ments.45
45These result raise the question whether very big and sophisticated banks, the G-SIBs and their
subsidiaries across Europe, are driving this behaviour. Unfortunately, all 14 G-SIB in our sample are
sophisticated enough to adopt the IRB approach for risk weights measurement, this lack of variation
does not permit to test this hypothesis. A solution is to use a higher threshold for the size of the very
large banks and as a proxy rule we defined the threshold of EUR 300 billions for the very big banks in
the EU, but even in this case the required variation in the IRB variable was not sufficient to obtain the
estimates, see Table 3-I. Only three banks with assets greater than EUR 300 billions adopt the SA and
29 use the IRB.
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3.6.2 Heterogeneity on Risk by Profitability, Funding and Leverage
This section explores further the heterogenous impacts of a change in capital require-
ments on bank risk taking behaviour by looking at three measures of bank perfor-
mance: net interest income as a proxy for profitability, wholesale funding as a proxy
for inherent liquidity risk, and the leverage ratio as a measure of bank capitalization.
Profitability and risk taking
The low interest rate environment which characterised the past decade shrinks the
interest income margin of banks and increases pressure on their profitability. The
literature has shown convincingly this link in both theoretical and empirical contri-
butions, Samuelson (1945), Hancock (1985), and Borio, Gambacorta, and Hofmann
(2017). Therefore, less profitable banks may take more risk in order to compensate
for the reduced profitability. This argument is strictly intertwined with the propo-
nents of the charter value theory of the bank, as summarized in Section 3.2, which
support the skin in the game argument whereby banks have more incentives to oper-
ate conservatively when the amount of equity is at risk, Marcus (1984) and Benston
(1986).
If the above arguments are true, more profitable banks should show a less aggres-
sive risk taking behaviour when faced with a capital increase. To test this proposi-
tion, the specification is augmented including an interaction of the SMCR and an in-
dicator dummy of net interest income (NII) as a proxy for profitability. NII is defined
as interest income less interest expense before provisions for loan losses, and hence
is a direct measure of return stemming from interest rate. Table 3-9 presents the re-
sults for profitability in Columns (1)-(2). The dummy for profitability is switched on
if net interest income is above median (NII = 1), reporting the estimates for more
profitable banks.
The evidence suggest that there is a greater tendency to take on more risk by
the cluster of less profitable banks. This finding is shown when the dummy for
profitable banks is turned on (NII = 1). The interaction coefficient of small banks
with a net interest income above the median has a positive albeit insignificant mag-
nitude. More interestingly, profitable medium and large banks show a significantly
lower propensity to increase risk with respect to similarly sized less profitable banks.
Medium banks with above median net interest income decrease their risk ratio by
1.6 percentage points (s.d. 0.741) less than same sized banks with below median NII.
The same compensatory pattern in risk taking is observed for large profitable banks,
they decrease the risk ratio by 2.01 percentage points (s.d. 0.925) with respect large
banks with below median NII. For both median and large banks, a test of the sum of
the coefficients for above and below median NII banks, fails to reject the null.46
These results confirm the fact that more profitable banks show a less aggressive
risk taking behaviour when faced with a capital increase, and indicate that most of
the increase in risk taking associated with size is related to less profitable institutions.
This leads to the conclusion that the increase in risk taking associated with bank size
is due to less profitable banks and the tendency to gamble for resurrection.
46For median banks the null hypothesis of the linear combination 2.158-1.634=0 has a p-value=0.63
and fails to reject the null. For large banks the tested linear combination is 2.842-2.067=0 with a result-
ing p-value=0.48
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Wholesale funding and risk taking
This section introduces a link between liquidity risk and the risk taking behaviour.
In general, banks with a greater reliance on market funding are more prone to liq-
uidity runs in times of crisis, see Rajan, 2006; Brunnermeier, 2009.47 Wholesale
funded banks have to frequently rollover large amounts of funds which makes them
particularly vulnerable when market or interbank liquidity dries up. In addition,
Huang and Ratnovski, 2011 show how on the supply side of wholesale funding the
financiers do not have incentives to conduct costly monitoring of banks since they
may withdraw on short notice based on negative news signals, exacerbating further
the risk of a potential bunk run. This inherent liquidity risk residing in wholesale
funded banks poses a threat to their stability.
Based on the evidence provided in previous sections the question arises as to
whether wholesale funded banks recognize the inherent liquidity risk of their fund-
ing model when reacting to a hike in regulatory capital or not. If not, the conse-
quences of an increase in capital requirement from a systemic standpoint may be
even more worrisome since higher risk taking is more likely to lead to negative news
signals and subsequent bunk runs.
The evidence on the interaction between wholesale funding model and risk tak-
ing behaviour following an increment of the SMCR is provided in Column (3)-(4) of
Table 3-9. Wholesale funded banks are coded with a dummy being one when the
ratio of wholesale funding, short and long term, over total assets is greater than the
median. The first three rows corroborate the results observed in previous specifica-
tions. Medium and large banks show more than 2 percentage points higher reaction
of the risk ratio than smaller banks suggesting once more that agency costs may be a
driver of this difference. The results change significantly when the SMCR increase is
interacted with size and a dummy representing wholesale funded banks (WHS=1).
Smaller wholesale funded banks show a further increase in the risk ratio by 1.34
percentage points with respect to similar size non wholesale funded banks. On the
contrary, medium and large wholesale funded banks decrease their risk ratio by the
same amount of their risk increase after the hike in capital requirements.
This reduction compensates the propensity to rise the risk ratio associated with
medium and large banks and indicates that the increase of the risk ratio is largely
driven by medium and large retail funded banks. The results suggest that wholesale
funded banks have a lower incentive to increase the riskiness of their portfolio when
faced with a capital requirement hike.
This may be due to several factors, in particular can be interpreted as a strategic
need to reduce the publicly observed risk ratio in view of the already riskier funding
model. A further interpretation may be related to profitability and the results in Col-
umn (3)-(4) on wholesale funding can be reconciled with the evidence provided in
the previous section on profitability and risk taking in Columns (1)-(2). In fact, recent
literature has shown that wholesale funded banks have a competitive advantage in
a low interest rate environment since they can shift their funding globally towards
regions where monetary policy conditions are looser and exploit thus cross-border
funding to limit the negative pressure on profitability due to low interest rates, see
Bruno and Shin, 2015. It follows that wholesale banks are on average more profitable
than banks relying on standard deposit funding, this is described in Figure 3-1 for
our sample of G-SIBs and O-SIBs in the EU, and therefore have lower incentives to
increase their riskiness to compensate for lower interest income.
47For instance, Shin, 2009 notes that in the Northern Rock bank run case, wholesale funding plum-
meted by more than 50%, from 26.7 billion pounds in June to 11.5 billion pounds in December 2007.
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Leverage and risk taking
This section investigates the link between the leverage ratio and risk taking. The
relationship is expected to be positive according to the previous contributions by
Furlong and Keeley, 1989 and Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994. Leverage is measured
following the Bank of International Settlements definition by dividing Tier 1 capital
by the bank’s average total consolidated assets (i.e. the sum of the exposures of all
assets and non-balance sheet items).48 In addition, a dummy variable is defined for
above (LR=1) or below (LR=0) the median leverage ratio in the sample. The evidence
for the interlinkages between leverage and risk taking subject to a regulatory capital
increase is presented in Columns (5)-(6) of Table 3-9.
While the first three rows confirm again the incremental impact of regulatory
capital on the risk taking behaviour by bank size, the heterogeneous impact by above
median leverage ratio is not statistically significant. The sign of the interaction coef-
ficients for medium and large banks hints at a negative relationships, however the
estimates are rather noisy suggesting an absence of relationship between risk tak-
ing and leverage ratio following an increase in regulatory capital requirement. This
result is consistent with the evidence shown in the baseline regression for risk tak-
ing presented in Table 3-6 where the impact was broken down by the distance from
the minimum overall capital requirement. Despite the distance from OCR being a
risk-sensitive measure of capital due to the use of risk-weighted assets at the denom-
inator, it is positively correlated (correlation coeff. = 0.35) with the non-risk-based
leverage ratio measure and has a similar economic interpretation.
3.7 Robustness: Common Trends
The failure of the common trend assumption due to diverging behavior between
treated and control banks is a standard threat for the identification of Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) empirical strategies, Angrist and Pischke, 2008b. In the current set-
ting the common trend assumption implies that the risk taking behaviour of banks
would be same in the absence of treatment. This section presents the evidence of
three alternative tests of the common trend assumption for DiD regressions. The
first test controls for bank specific trends in the specification, the second test aug-
ments the model with bank specific leads of the policy variable to detect anticipa-
tion effects across banks, the third method distinguishes between treated and con-
trol banks pre-treatment trends during the announcement period and investigates
for diverging behavior49
3.7.1 Bank specific trends and a longer T
The first test studies the influence of confounding pre-existing trends at the level
of the policy variable by including a bank specific trend in the model as in Wolfers
48For more detailed information on the Basel III leverage ratio consult the documentation provided
on the BIS website
49It is useful to note the difference between the standard two-way DiD setting and the multi-group
setting. In the two groups setting, uniformly treated and non-treated groups are compared and the
uniform treatment variables is a dummy (1/0). In the multi-group DiD setting the intensity of treat-
ment varies across the treated group: in this paper these are represented by heterogeneous capital
requirements across banks, i.e. the treatment variable is not a simple dummy but varies across banks.
In addition, in this study the time dimension is not constituted by only two periods (after/before) as in
the standard two-way DiD approach, instead, each quarter can have progressively stricter treatment
intensity per bank introducing thus a more dynamic multi-period treatment.
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(2006). If banks’ trends are not controlled for, and treated and control banks have
diverging trend, then the estimates of the impact of capital requirements may suffer
of bias due to the confounding effect on them induced by the diverging trends across
the two groups.50
It is important to note another reason why including bank specific trends in the
regression is necessary for unbiased identification. When pre-existing bank trends
are correlated with both the change in capital requirements (i.e. main regressor of
interest) and the risk taking behaviour of banks (i.e. the dependent variable), the
inclusion of bank specific trends in the model ensures that the estimated coefficient
on the variable of interest is not affected by omitted trend bias, see Wolfers, 2006.
Formally, to test for the robustness of the inclusion of bank trends the base-
line model is augmented with bank specific trends represented by the product φi · t
where i is the indicator for banks and t stands for the time dimension (i.e. quarters):
lnYict = αi + β∆SMCRict + ln Xic,t−1γ+ φi · t + δct + uict (3.3)
If the impact of the increment in capital requirements on the risk ratio is not sta-
tistically significant after including bank-level trends then the evidence presented
should be interpreted with caution. In that case, it is very likely that divergent
trends would affect the findings, i.e. the increment in capital requirements would
have happened predominantly in banks where already a rising risk ratio was being
implemented by bank management.
The first evidence for the first test on common trends is illustrated in Table 3-
10. The Table is split in two parts, Columns (1)-(3) present the results for capital to
be compared with baseline regression without bank specific trend as in Table 3-5;
Columns (4)-(6) presents the results for risk taking behaviour to be compared with
baseline Table 3-6. After including bank specific trends the statistical significance of
the coefficients remains unchanged for both capital and risk taking. The magnitude
of the coefficients for the level of CET1 and total capital are slightly smaller than
in the baseline regressions. Similarly, the coefficient on the risk ratio decreases after
including bank trends, the impact of higher capital requirement on risk taking results
halved to 3.1 percentage point increase for a one percentage point increase of the
SMCR. While this is a considerable reduction of risk taking, it is a symptom that
bank specific trends play a significant role in the estimates driving down the overall
results.51
For the second part of the evidence on the bank specific trends, it is important to
notice that the estimated trends may depend on the length of the time series. In fact,
as shown in Wolfers, 2006, controlling for bank specific trends only works well when
there is a sufficient sample period available before the treatment period commences.
As such, the estimated trends in Equation 3.3 may require more observations to be
properly fitted to the data.52 The test is therefore repeated extending the estimation
sample to begin in 2006 rather than in 2010. This allows to estimate bank specific
50Note that trends in risk taking behaviour may diverge because of several reasons: for instance
structural changes in bank business models or because of the formation of expectations on future reg-
ulation as for example the introduction of new provision within Basel IV that may affect strategic
portfolio allocation of banks.
51Note that the coefficient of determination R-squared is considerably higher since data now ex-
plain a greater portion of the variation of dependent variables. As common when trends at the policy
variable are included standard errors are bigger implying a higher p-value.
52The problem is exacerbated when there is a structural break in the pre-existing trend of the out-
come variable as it is likely to have happened after the 2007-8 financial crisis as shown for capital in
Figure 3-2.
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trends on a full financial cycle starting in 2006 before the financial crisis and ending
with the introduction in 2014 of macroprudential capital buffers.
The second part of the evidence is shown in Figure 3-3. From left to right in
each plot, the dots represent different βs estimated when increasing progressively
the starting period of the sample by one year and shrinking thus the available ob-
servations for the estimation of the trend. The first column of Figure 3-3 presents
the evidence for capital variables with one plot each for CET1 ratio, CET1 capital
and total capital. The second column illustrates the evidence for risk with one plot
for RWA, the risk ratio and total assets. Vertical bars show confidence intervals for
every estimated β.
By looking at the results, it is confirmed that the assumption of common trends
is robust also to different lengths and starting years of the sample which allow for a
better fit of pre-existing trends to the data. Consistently with the previous results, the
risk ratio and the RWA show similar estimated coefficients as in Table 3-10. The level
of CET1 is however not always significant when the trend is allowed to be computed
prior to 2010, even if the failure to accept is due to few decimals of a percentage
points, indicating that the results for the level of CET1 may suffer marginally from
the non holding of the common trend assumption.
3.7.2 Anticipation effects
An additional method to test for the common trends assumption is to use leads of
the policy variable. If leads of SMCR turn out to be significant, the common trend
assumption may be questioned due to differential pre-treatment trends across the
banks. In other terms, some banks may anticipate the incoming change in capital
requirements and front load their compliance while others not. To grasp the idea,
Figure 3-2 shows the dynamics of the supply of capital for systemically important
banks in the EU. It is shown that CET1 capital ratio of SIBs increased by more than 6
percentage points since 2010 with strongest increase occurring in 2013 when the EU
CRDIV/CRR regulation was officially transposed into law. This may suggest that
EU banks could have foreseen a tighter macroprudential policy stance by raising
capital ratios in anticipation of the stricter capital requirements. To test the presence
of anticipation effects the baseline specification is enriched with two year leads of
the policy variable. Formally:
lnYict = αi +
2
∑
q=0
β∆SMCRic,t+q + ln Xic,t−1γ+ δct + uict (3.4)
Table 3-11 summarises the evidence for capital in Columns (1)-(3) and risk in
Columns (4)-(6). The one and two years leads are computed summing the coeffi-
cients of the four quarters prior to policy change, and standard errors are adjusted
accordingly.
The results in Table 3-11 present some novelties: Column (1) reveals that banks
adjust their capital ratio already one year prior to the policy change, probably as a
signalling effect to the markets. This adjustment seems to be driven by a deleverag-
ing policy via a reduction of total assets, see Column (6).
Importantly, none of the main results of previous section is affected by the in-
troduction of leads in the specification. The level of CET1 is statistically significant
only at the time of the policy change. The same holds for RWA and the risk ratio in
Columns (4)-(5). Overall, the findings indicate that banks in the sample had compa-
rable pre-intervention trends for the level of CET1 capital and the risk ratio.
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3.7.3 Announcement effects
A further method to test for the presence of diverging trends prior to the implemen-
tation of the policy is to look at announcement effects. This section implements a
different method in modelling bank anticipatory behavior, it does so by defining a
specific exogenous treatment status and models separate trends for a treatment and
control groups instead of modelling a bank specific trend as in Section 3.7.1, or bank
specific lead effects of the policy variable as in Section 3.7.2.
The announcement of a change in the capital requirements policy may itself lead
to strategic reactions by banks invalidating the common trend assumption. The
European Commission anticipated publicly the intention to strengthen its capital
framework for systemically important banks in September 2009, when it introduced
the possibility to increase macroprudential capital buffers in good times to be re-
leased in a downturn.53 This change of paradigm may have induced banks to an-
ticipate their reaction to the capital increase before the implementation in 2014 and
may confound the previous findings.
In order to test formally for the impact during the announcement period this
section relies on an event analysis framework akin to Alpert, 2016. In the following
set-up, the announcement period dummy is defined as the period from 2009Q4 until
2013Q4. At time of the announcement, and during the announcement period, large
European banks may expect to be levied with higher capital requirement and react
to the paradigm shift. However, being effectively levied a capital requirement and
hence assigned a treatment status after 2014 is a discretionary choice of the regulator,
and this choice is exogenous to banks’ expectations which are predetermined. In
other terms, in 2009 banks are not aware of what would be the regulators’ revealed
preferences in 2014. This framework ensures that banks cannot self-select in the
treatment group since the decision to levy a capital requirement on a specific bank is
exogenous to their expectations. As such, to define the treatment group, a dummy
takes the value of one if the bank has been subject to a positive SMCR in any quarter
after 2014q1.
Formally, variants of the following DiD equation are estimated:
lnYict = αi + β∆SMCRict +ωD(Announcement) ∗ D(Treated) + ln Xict−1γ+
+ ηD(Announcement) + θD(Treated) + δct + uict
(3.5)
This basic strategy compares deviations from trends of capital and risk taking
between a treatment and a control group of banks during the announcement pe-
riod, the coefficient of interest is the ω of the interaction term D(Announcement) ∗
D(Treated). If the coefficient is statistically significant then the trend deviations
across the treated and control groups are diverging and the common trend assump-
tion across the two groups would not hold.
The results are presented in Figure 3-4 for the level of CET1 capital and in Figure
3-5 when the dependent variable is the risk ratio. The left panels of each figure
show the ω coefficient of the interaction term D(Announcement) ∗ D(Treated) for
different starting periods of the estimation sample similar to the reasoning of Table
3-3. The right panels of each figure plot the β coefficient for ∆SMCRict as specified
in Equation 3.5.
53The proposed changes were introduced under the Commission Directive 2009/111/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC,
2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds
items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements and crisis management. A copy of this directive
may be found at this link.
3.8. Robustness: Endogeneity 153
For either capital or risk indicators, the evidence indicates that there is generally
no statistically significant difference in the reaction of treatment banks during the an-
nouncement period and in comparison to the non-treated group. For the risk ratio,
and only when the sample begins in 2006, the impact is significant at the ten percent
confidence level. The impact of the SMCR in the implementation period, i.e. after
2014, remains in line with the coefficient found in the baseline Tables 3-5 and 3-6. In
other words, the impact of the SMCRs is not absorbed or curtailed by the introduc-
tion of a dummy that captures the announcement period and we can conclude that
the estimated positive relationship between higher capital requirements and higher
capital and risk taking is robust to the inclusion of announcement periods.54
3.8 Robustness: Endogeneity
The exogeneity of the policy change may not be warranted even if the change in the
SMCR is external to the bank decision making process. A variable of interest that is
external, but not exogeneous, will not yield consistent estimates of the parameter of
interest, see Deaton, 2010.
Macroprudential capital requirements are set for each bank individually at na-
tional level by its own macroprudential authority. This leaves discretion to national
regulators and could cause the introduction of macroprudential capital requirements
to be endogenous if the Member State behaves strategically and wants to protect
(weaker) domestic banks. If it does, then undercapitalised banks may have a favor-
able treatment and the level of capital will be determining the SMCR introducing
reverse causality. As described earlier, significant regulatory provisions are aimed
at ensuring that this does not happen, nevertheless a test for this possibility is war-
ranted.
This section presents a simple procedure to test for the possibility of endogene-
ity by looking if the outcome variables of interest are correlated with the SMCR
exploiting the within variation of the fixed effect estimator. The following equation
is estimated:
SMCRict = αi + ψYict ∗ D2010Q1−2013Q4 + ln Xict−1γ+ [φi · t]
+ χD2010Q1−2013Q4 + ζYict + δct + uict
(3.6)
In Equation 3.6, the systemic macroprudential capital requirement is regressed
separately on the series of outcomes of interest Yict representing in turn the capital
and risk variables used as dependent variables throughout the paper. The dummy
variable D2010Q1−2013Q4 is turned on in the period prior to the commencement of the
phasing-in of the SMCR in the EU, that is prior to 2014. The specification controls
for bank level characteristics ln Xict−1 and a bank trend φi · t is included to control
for diverging trends across treated and control groups, as before, αi are bank fixed
effects and δct are country-time fixed effects.
The main coefficient of interest in the equation is the coefficient of the interac-
tion term Yict ∗ D2010Q1−2013Q4 estimating the relationship between pre-determined
outcome variables prior to the treatment period and the realised capital requirement
after 2014. If the coefficient ψ is significant then bank capital situation prior to the
54Alternative later periods may be considered as the beginning of the new macroprudential frame-
work in the EU as for instance since the EU Commission public consultation on the new CRD-IV in
2010Q2. Nevertheless, similar results to those presented in Figures 3-4 and 3-5 are obtained when the
announcement period is set in 2010Q2. Results are available from the author. The document of the
consultation is available at this link.
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phasing-in may have influenced the setting of the SMCR questioning the exogeneity
assumption. If this is not the case, then results will substantiate the assumption on
the absence of strategic targeting by policy makers. For simultaneity bias then it is
useful to observe the ζ coefficient of Yict.
Results are presented in Table 3-12 for capital and in Table 3-13 for risk. In both
tables any sign of correlation between outcome variables and the SMCR vanishes
as bank specific trends are included in the regression. For capital, in Table 3-12
Columns (1)-(2) the CET1 ratio is not related with the SMCR even without bank
trends. The level of CET1 in Columns (3) however shows some negative relation
prior to 2014, as a potential sign of favouritism towards weaker banks, however this
disappears once bank trends are controlled for in Column (4). For risk, in Table 3-13
Columns (1), (3) and (5) may suggest endogeneity, this however is not robust to in-
clusion of bank specific trends in Columns (2), (4) and (6). Importantly, for the risk
ratio which is the main variable of interest, the simultaneous bias does not appear
to be a problem even when bank trend are not controlled for in Column (3). Overall,
the results indicate once more the importance of bank specific trend in the estimation
and the relevance of the tests presented and discussed in Section 3.7.1.
A similar result is shown also in Table 3-14. The table presents a simple regres-
sion of the average of the SMCR by bank after 2014 on the average prior to 2014
of the bank level outcome variables. The aim is to investigate whether the average
of the outcome variables before 2014 correlates with the regulation after 2014. If
there is positive correlation then is likely that the SMCR is endogenous since bank
capital and risk taking prior to the implementation of the macroprudential capital
requirements would have affected the discretionary decision of national competent
authorities in setting the capital requirement. Note that by taking bank level aver-
ages prior and post the start of the implementation phase the bank level trend is
controlled for by construction.
Results in Table 3-14 confirm that there is no statistical relationship between the
capital and risk position of the bank prior to 2014 and the subsequently levied capital
requirements. Column (1) indicates that there is some positive relation between the
average CET1 ratio before 2014 and the later SMCR, however this relation is positive
suggesting that stronger (and not weaker) capitalised banks may have been subject
to harsher capital requirements. Nevertheless this relationship is not robust to the
inclusion of country dummies. Similarly, from Column (3) to (8) there is no system-
atically strong evidence of capital and risk prior to 2014 influencing the setting of
the SMCR post policy implementation. The absence of significant correlation is an
encouraging sign since it shows that SMCR were not systematically levied on less
capitalised banks or banks with higher risk ratios.
3.9 Solvency: Probability of Default
This section explores the impact of a hike in capital requirements on the solvency
of financial institutions. As shown previously, the tightening of the capital require-
ments has two opposing effects: i) results of Section 3.5.1 would suggest that higher
capital requirements would make banks more solvent and, consequently, reduce
their probability of default; ii) at the same time, the findings in Section 3.5.2 show
that higher capital requirements may lead to moral hazard and increased risk-taking,
thus weakening banks’ solvency. Hence, the net impact of the two opposing effects
on banks’ probability of default is ambiguous.
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In order to shed light on which of the two opposing effects on solvency is stronger,
this section uses credit ratings as a gauge of banks’ probabilities of default. The de-
fault probabilities are extrapolated from bank issuer ratings provided by three major
rating agencies.55 The probabilities of default are obtained by mapping and con-
verting of alphanumeric ratings using publicly available conversion tables on rating
agencies websites. The constructed distance to default variable informs about the
solvency of a bank by estimating the default probability over the next, two, three,
four and five years. It provides timely information reflecting current market percep-
tion, and summarises market-wide information on the drivers of default probability.
Similarly to Section 3.4.2, the phasing-in of SMCR in the EU is used as a tool
for a controlled comparison whereby different institutions across Europe are subject
to heterogeneous intensity of capital requirements. However, this section departs
fundamentally from the previous estimates since the dependent variable is now part
of the reaction function of market agents to higher capital requirements and not a
reaction of the bank itself. Results are presented in Table 3-15. The table presents in
each column the evidence for a different probability of default horizon. Estimates
are broken down by the size of the bank. The first thing to notice is that the sample
size decreased due to the limited availability of ratings for some banks with respect
to the capital and risk ratio regressions, the consequence is that results should be
interpreted with an additional ounce of caution for external consistency.56
The evidence shows that the market reaction to higher capital requirements is
bringing some benefits to medium and large banks in terms of reduced probability
of default but only with respect to smaller banks. The relative impact is slightly
greater for banks with total assets above EUR 100 millions, and increasing in the
probability of default horizon for both medium and large banks. Depending on the
maturity horizon of the probability of default, medium and large banks have a lower
probability of default with respect to small banks, i.e. 1.3-2.0 percentage points lower
for a one percentage point increase in capital requirements. This result suggests that,
relative to small banks, for medium and large banks the effect of the increase in CET1
capital is stronger than the risk taking channel.
Nevertheless, the marginal effects for medium and large banks, while having a
negative sign, is not statistically significant as shown in the second panel of Table
3-15. For instance for the one year horizon, the marginal effect of a one percentage
point increase in capital requirements for large banks is -0.938 (st.dev. 0.900). While
this indicates that the rating agencies may tend to assess the capital increase channel
to be stronger, this assessment cannot be statistically corroborated. Similar results
are obtained for the marginal effects at different time horizons and for medium sized
banks.57
The evidence on leads to conclude that the increase of capital requirements does
not improve banks’ probability of default in absolute terms. In other words, the
positive effect of accumulating more equity capital is counterbalanced by the neg-
ative substitution effect toward more riskier assets, so that the overall net effect on
55The rating agencies are Fitch, Moody’s and S&Ps
56An alternative market based measure of banks’ solvency are CDS prices. Nevertheless, contrary to
the ratings, the scope of application of CDS pricing is very limited in our sample since CDS prices are
generally available only for some of the large systemic banks. In our sample, this translates to 49 banks
with available CDS prices which is much less than the number of clusters in previous regressions. The
use of CDS prices would thus create a sample composition bias relative to previous estimates.
57This is further confirmed by a baseline regression of the probability of default without the dummy
for size, and those broken down by the distance from the OCR, the net interest income and wholesale
funding dummies. All of them do not have statistically significant results at standard confidence levels,
these specifications are available from the author.
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solvency is zero. This raises a concern for the policy maker since the improved re-
silience achieved by demanding higher capital requirements can be crowded-out by
an increase in risk taking.
3.10 Conclusions
The paper presents empirical evidence on the reaction of systemically important EU
banks to a hike in capital requirements. Endogeneity concerns related to the change
in capital requirement may arise since these are set at a country level. These are,
however, alleviated by several provisions within the EU banking regulation mitigat-
ing considerably the influence of national interest.
The evidence shows that the impact for O-SIBs and G-SIBs contributed to a sub-
stantial increase of CET1 capital levels in the EU banking sector. In response to the
implementation of the new legislative package, the overall capital levels, and hence
the solvency and the loss absorption capacity, of European systemically important
banks increased. This would likely translate in a strengthened resilience of the EU
banking sector and would presumably sustain credit growth in a downturn of the
financial cycle. The building of capital buffers would limit also the cost to the tax-
payer when next bank bankruptcies occur.
At the same time, the paper documents some unintended consequences of bank
regulation, which promoted a pronounced risk-taking behaviour by banks suggest-
ing that banks tend to exploit moral hazard when faced with higher capital require-
ments. This result indicates that there is a risk-capital trade-off: if banks consider
that higher regulatory requirements can hinder further their profitability prospects,
they will invest in potentially more profitable but riskier assets. This finding is par-
ticularly true for less profitable and large banks, suggesting that gambling for res-
urrection and agency costs may be associated the increased risk taking. The paper
documents that banks adopting the IRB approach mitigate substantially the increase
in risk taking and exploit their competitive advantage in the calibration of the risk
weights. At the same time, after a capital requirement hike, wholesale funded banks
show lower risk taking possibly due to a strategic need to reduce the observable risk
in view of the already fragile funding position.
The paper shows that the net impact of the two opposing effects on banks sol-
vency is not statistically different from zero. In other words, the increased risk taking
is compensating the positive results on solvency arising from higher shareholders’
capital so that the net effect on banks’ probabilities of default is insignificant.
This raises the question as to how policy intervention should aim at constrain-
ing bank’s risk-taking behaviour. While several suggestions are being currently dis-
cussed in the regulatory and policy fora, it is important to keep in mind that intro-
ducing policies to lower risk-taking may create further perverse incentives for banks.
For instance, it can promote a more systematic use of internal rating based models,
or it can induce banks to shift risks to off-balance sheet exposures. The regulatory
task is not a simple one, any policy change requires a comprehensive assessment of
hidden incentives behind regulatory action.
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FIGURE 3-1: Profitability and Wholesale Funding
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Note: the bar chart show some profitability measures broken down by above and below me-
dian wholesale funding reliance. For profitability it is used net overall income, net interest
income (NII) and total interest income. A standard test of mean difference is run separately
for the three income variables in a pooled panel. They are regressed on a dummy for whole-
sale funding above median. For net interest income and interest income the estimated β
coefficients are both significant and respectively 0.45 (s.d. 0.091) and 1.67 (s.d. 0.182) where
standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and serial correlation. The coefficient on
mean difference for net income is 0.04 (s.e. 0.035) and thus not statistically significant.
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FIGURE 3-2: The longer term trend of Capital
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Note: The plot illustrates the evolution of the average CET1 and Total capital across the
systemically important banks in the EU. The dashed line shows the moment of a break in
the upward trend until 2011Q1.
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FIGURE 3-3: Robustness: the impact on Capital and Risk after con-
trolling for bank specific trends
-0.29 -0.34
-0.41 -0.37
-1
.0
0
-0
.5
0
0
.5
0
0
.0
0
Sample begins at year
y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009
CET1Ratio
0.08 0.07
0.06 0.06
0
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.1
5
0
.0
0
Sample begins at year
y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009
CET1
0.08 0.08
0.07
0.08
0
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.1
5
0
.0
0
Sample begins at year
y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009
Tot. Capital
0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
0
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.1
5
0
.0
0
Sample begins at year
y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009
RWA
4.11 4.15
4.48
3.91
2
.0
0
4
.0
0
6
.0
0
8
.0
0
0
.0
0
Sample begins at year
y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009
RWA/Assets
-0.01 -0.01
-0.01 -0.01
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
Sample begins at year
y2006 y2007 y2008 y2009
Tot. Assets
Note: The figure shows the evolution of the β coefficient of equation 3.3 when the estimation
sample is progressively reduced by one year. All models have bank trends included in the
specification. On the horizontal axis every point represents the staring year of the respective
estimation sample, for each sample the last quarter is 2017Q3. Moving to the right of each
plot the sample period shrinks by one year each time and hence there are less observations
available to compute bank-level trends. On the y-axis, the coefficients represent the impact
of a hike in the macroprudential capital requirement. Vertical bars represent confidence
interval at 10% significance level. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level and robust for
serial correlation and heteroschedasticity.
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FIGURE 3-4: Robustness: Announcement effect of EU macropruden-
tial policy on CET1 Capital
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Note: The graph shows the evolution of ω and β coefficients of equation 3.5 when the
dependent variable is the level of CET1 Capital. The estimation sample is progressively
reduced by one year, notice that for each sample the last quarter used in all regressions
is 2017Q3. The announcement period is represented by a dummy for the period between
2009Q4-2013Q4, that is since the publication of the EU Commission Directive 2009/111/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September pre-announcing a change in
macroprudential regulation in the EU. Vertical bars represent confidence interval at 10% sig-
nificance level. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level and robust for serial correlation
and heteroschedasticity. Similar results are obtained when the regressions control for bank
specific trends, these results are available from the author.
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FIGURE 3-5: Robustness: Announcement effect of EU macropruden-
tial policy on the Risk Ratio
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Note: The graph shows the evolution of ω and β coefficients of equation 3.5 when the de-
pendent variable is the risk ratio (i.e. RWA/Assets). The estimation sample is progressively
reduced by one year, notice that for each sample the last quarter used in all regressions
is 2017Q3. The announcement period is represented by a dummy for the period between
2009Q4-2013Q4, that is since the publication of the EU Commission Directive 2009/111/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September pre-announcing a change in
macroprudential regulation in the EU. Vertical bars represent confidence interval at 10% sig-
nificance level. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level and robust for serial correlation
and heteroschedasticity. Similar results are obtained when the regressions control for bank
specific trends, these results are available from the author.
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TABLE 3-1: Macroprudential Capital Requirements in Europe
Buffer CRD Article Level Scope 
Capital 
conservation buffer 
(CCoB) 
 
Art. 129 
The objective is to conserve the bank’s capital. 
Mandatory capital buffer equal to 2.5% of RWAs, this 
implies a minimum CET1 ratio requirement is 7% 
C
o
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n
tr
y
-l
ev
el
  
(i
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. s
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fo
r 
a
ll
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 M
S
) 
Counter-cyclical  
Capital buffer 
(CCyB) 
 
Art. 130, 
135-140 
The purpose of this buffer is to counteract the effects of 
the economic cycle. Buffer rate calibrated on MS credit-
to-GDP gap. 
G-SIB and O-SIB 
Systemically 
Important 
Banks buffer (SIB) 
Art. 131  
For banks that are identified by the relevant authority 
as systemically important: 
1 ≤ x ≤ 3.5% of RWAs for G-SII 
0 ≤ x ≤ 2.0% of RWAs for O-SII 
B
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n
k
-l
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el
  
(i
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. s
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t 
b
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k
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h
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M
S
) 
Systemic risk 
buffer (SRB) 
Art. 133 
and 134 
To prevent and mitigate long term non-cyclical 
systemic or macro-prudential risks: 
0 ≤ x ≤ 5.0% of RWA 
Above 5% the MS must be authorized by Commission 
Note: The table summarises the four macroprudential capital requirements introduced in
EU in 2014. The CCoB and the CCyB are country-level capital requirements levied on all
banks within a country. The capital requirement for systemically important banks and the
SRB buffer are applied at bank-level. MS stands for EU Member States, Norway, despite not
being an EU Member State implemented the EU capital based macroprudential regulation.
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TABLE 3-2: Direction of Omitted Variable Bias
The table illustrates the sign of the bias due to omitted variable in a simple bivariate
model where x1 is the treatment variable and x2 is the omitted variable:
y = β1x1 + β2x2 + u
Corr(x1, x2 > 0) Corr(x1, x2 < 0)
β2 > 0 Bias > 0 Bias < 0
β2 < 0 Bias < 0 Bias > 0
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TABLE 3-3: Descriptive statistics by year: Capital, Requirements and
Distance
The table summarize the evolution over time of simple means (Panel A) and means
conditional on treatment (Panel B) and for non-treated banks (Panel C) of the sys-
temic macroprudential capital requirement (SMCR). Note that the OCR for the con-
trol group increases after 2014 due to phasing in of the CCoB and CCyB buffers, see
Section 3.3. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Panel A: Simple Means:
SMCR (%) 0 0 0 0.014 0.149 0.442 0.656 0.870
(0) (0) (0) (0.170) (0.618) (1.032) (1.070) (1.100)
Overall CET1 Req. (OCR) (%) 4.500 4.500 4.500 4.533 5.174 5.800 6.510 7.124
(0) (0) (0) (0.384) (1.414) (2.014) (1.824) (1.705)
CET1 Ratio (%) 10.70 11.51 12.58 13.90 14.90 16.16 17.09 17.58
(2.872) (3.314) (3.848) (4.752) (5.372) (6.895) (6.998) (7.415)
Distance from OCR (%) 7.190 8.043 8.523 9.806 9.993 10.33 10.50 10.47
(6.295) (6.536) (6.432) (6.935) (6.192) (6.622) (6.620) (7.270)
Tot. Capital Ratio (%) 15.26 15.92 16.12 17.44 17.83 19.08 20.17 20.83
(7.175) (8.050) (7.288) (8.015) (6.800) (7.584) (8.692) (10.59)
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 615
Panel B: Means Conditional on Treatment
SMCR (%) 0 0 0 0.020 0.203 0.600 0.892 1.184
(0) (0) (0) (0.199) (0.712) (1.163) (1.160) (1.130)
Overall CET1 Cap. Req. (OCR) (%) 4.500 4.500 4.500 4.545 5.349 6.067 6.849 7.509
(0) (0) (0) (0.447) (1.564) (2.203) (1.967) (1.809)
CET1 Ratio (%) 11.36 11.93 12.81 14.16 15.07 16.39 17.15 17.63
(2.858) (2.921) (3.278) (4.179) (5.327) (7.264) (7.301) (7.029)
Distance from OCR (%) 7.416 8.052 8.676 9.803 9.938 10.27 10.24 10.24
(4.408) (4.612) (4.352) (4.726) (5.556) (6.904) (6.766) (6.847)
Tot. Capital Ratio (%) 15.50 15.96 16.21 17.26 17.80 19.15 20.08 20.76
(5.077) (5.508) (4.972) (5.149) (5.761) (7.609) (8.090) (7.988)
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 604 604 453
Panel C: Means Controls
SMCR (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Overall CET1 Cap. Req. (OCR) (%) 4.500 4.500 4.500 4.500 4.685 5.056 5.565 6.046
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.656) (1.042) (0.778) (0.563)
CET1 Ratio (%) 8.668 10.26 11.88 13.20 14.46 15.54 16.96 17.47
(1.752) (4.026) (5.175) (5.996) (5.482) (5.795) (6.205) (8.244)
Distance from OCR (%) 6.505 8.020 8.084 9.812 10.14 10.48 11.17 11.02
(10.05) (10.20) (10.29) (10.85) (7.657) (5.828) (6.192) (8.196)
Tot. Capital Ratio (%) 14.52 15.82 15.85 17.95 17.94 18.90 20.42 21.01
(11.44) (12.93) (11.61) (13.03) (9.143) (7.529) (10.13) (15.51)
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 162
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TABLE 3-4: Descriptive statistics: EU G-SIB and O-SIB Financial Ac-
counts
The table summarizes descriptive statistics of the balance sheet variables used in the
paper. The sample is the sample of designated Systemically Important Banks (SIB)
in the EU as described in section 3.4.1. For each variable the simple mean, standard
deviation, the median, the 25th and 75th quintiles and the maximum are shown.
Time period: 2006Q1-2017Q3. The data source is SNL Financials.
Mean Std.dev. p25 p50 p75 Max.
Capital Position:
CET1 Ratio(%) 13.64 6.06 10.20 12.60 15.70 74.93
Distance from OCR (%) 8.34 6.56 4.84 7.29 10.14 82.36
Tot. Capital Ratio(%) 16.58 7.87 12.28 15.00 18.30 111.64
Leverage Ratio (%) 7.60 4.07 4.66 6.86 9.80 32.98
Risk:
RWA (bln.) 70.37 139.15 5.54 19.26 60.89 1129.63
RWA/Assets(%) 50.06 21.41 33.14 50.29 64.91 261.02
Assets:
Tot. Assets (bln.) 196.15 379.97 8.58 39.19 198.37 2506.28
Gross Loans/Assets(%) 58.29 19.62 48.08 62.57 71.59 121.83
Net Loans/Assets (%) 54.71 19.06 44.77 59.03 67.53 105.21
Securities Holdings/Assets (%) 25.13 16.92 13.86 22.15 32.22 99.56
Total Cash/Assets(%) 15.29 11.86 6.94 12.23 20.58 93.64
Securities Holdings:
Securities Held for trading/Assets (%) 7.55 9.50 1.17 4.15 10.08 65.40
Securities Available for Sale/Assets (%) 9.34 8.29 2.59 8.13 13.88 57.99
Securities Held to Maturity/Assets (%) 2.68 5.63 0.00 0.24 2.51 89.18
Funding Structure:
Deposits/Assets (%) 48.45 22.96 31.46 51.25 66.51 98.31
Total Wholesale Funding/Assets(%) 33.23 21.95 16.69 29.29 45.48 95.82
Debt/Assets (%) 17.92 18.13 4.62 13.08 24.69 95.82
Interconnectedness:
Loans to Banks/Assets (%) 10.01 11.23 3.07 6.21 12.95 92.65
Tot. HFT Assets/Assets (%) 8.34 10.63 1.23 4.22 11.40 67.32
Securities OTC derivatives/Assets (%) 5.56 10.01 0.37 1.84 6.12 74.30
Total cash balance at C.B./Assets (%) 5.34 6.08 1.13 3.09 7.19 43.88
Profitability:
ROA (%) 0.32 1.14 0.10 0.31 0.71 6.56
Cost/Income(%) 58.64 21.87 47.83 56.14 65.60 390.50
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TABLE 3-5: The Impact on Capital
The table summarises the baseline reduced form specification of the change in systemic
macroprudential capital requirements (SMCR) on bank capital in Columns (1)-(3). Columns
(4)-(6) present the heterogenous impact by bank distance from the overall CET1 capital re-
quirements (OCR). All dependent variables that are measured in levels, i.e. CET1 capital
in columns (2) and (5) and total capital in columns (3) and (6), are transformed using nat-
ural logarithms. Bank-level control variables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time period:
2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis clustered at bank-level, robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical
significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Non-Binding Binding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CET1 Ratio CET1 Tot. Capital CET1 Ratio CET1 Tot. Capital
(p.p.) (ln) (ln) (p.p.) (ln) (ln)
SMCR -0.054 0.089 0.081 0.834 0.177 0.116
(0.359) (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.402)** (0.036)*** (0.042)***
SMCR × -0.143 -0.042 -0.003
2pp< OCR distance <5pp (0.215) (0.022)* (0.026)
SMCR × 0.003 -0.047 -0.012
5pp< OCR distance <10pp (0.214) (0.024)* (0.031)
SMCR × 0.087 -0.053 -0.013
OCR distance >10pp (0.232) (0.024)** (0.031)
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 3174 3174 3174 3173 3173 3173
N. clusters 137 137 137 137 137 137
R2 0.688 0.672 0.663 0.800 0.763 0.695
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TABLE 3-6: The Impact on Risk
The table illustrates the baseline reduced form specification of the change in systemic macro-
prudential capital requirements (SMCR) on banks’ risk-taking and assets in Columns (1)-(3).
Columns (4)-(6) show the heterogenous impact by bank distance from the overall CET1 cap-
ital requirements (OCR). All dependent variables that are measured in levels, i.e. CET1
capital in column (2) and Risk-weighted Assets in column (3), are transformed using natu-
ral logarithms. Bank-level control variables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time period:
2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis clustered at bank-level, robust to
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical
significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Non-Binding Binding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RWA RWA/Assets Tot. Assets RWA RWA/Assets Tot. Assets
(ln) (p.p.) (ln) (ln) (p.p.) (ln)
SMCR 0.101 6.873 -0.007 0.065 6.073 -0.016
(0.023)*** (1.388)*** (0.008) (0.026)** (1.455)*** (0.012)
SMCR × 0.002 -0.139 -0.002
2pp< OCR distance <5pp (0.009) (0.419) (0.006)
SMCR × 0.011 -0.219 0.005
5pp< OCR distance <10pp (0.011) (0.533) (0.005)
SMCR × 0.013 0.242 0.004
OCR distance >10pp (0.011) (0.523) (0.005)
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 3277 3277 3277 3195 3195 3195
N. clusters 137 137 137 137 137 137
R2 0.749 0.646 0.875 0.768 0.677 0.875
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TABLE 3-7: The Impact on Capital: the role of bank size and internal
rating approach (IRB)
The table summarises the reduced form specification of the change in systemic macropru-
dential capital requirements (SMCR) on bank capital. Columns (1)-(3) present the heteroge-
nous impact by bank size and distance from the overall CET1 capital requirements (OCR).
Columns (4)-(6) show the heterogeneous impact by IRB and distance from the OCR. Bank-
level control variables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time period: 2010Q1-2017Q3. Stan-
dard errors are shown in parenthesis clustered at bank-level, robust to heteroscedasticity
and serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical significance levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Size IRB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CET1 Ratio CET1 Tot. Capital CET1 Ratio CET1 Tot. Capital
(p.p.) (ln) (ln) (p.p.) (ln) (ln)
SMCR 0.214 0.133 0.057 -0.006 0.149 0.099
(0.680) (0.049)*** (0.056) (0.543) (0.046)*** (0.049)**
SMCR ×
OCR distance >2pp 0.131 -0.027 -0.006 0.164 -0.049 -0.025
(0.463) (0.024) (0.031) (0.503) (0.035) (0.038)
SMCR ×
20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln 0.701 0.458 0.013
(3.232) (0.503) (0.420)
SMCR ×
Tot.Ass>100bln. -0.506 -0.043 -0.055
(0.655) (0.062) (0.070)
SMCR ×
OCR distance >2pp ×
20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln -0.683 -0.455 0.006
(3.213) (0.504) (0.421)
SMCR ×
OCR distance >2pp ×
Tot.Ass>100bln. -0.300 0.011 0.065
(0.622) (0.056) (0.068)
SMCR × IRB -0.229 -0.075 -0.100
(0.495) (0.056) (0.069)
SMCR ×
OCR distance >2pp × IRB 0.051 0.065 0.097
(0.555) (0.056) (0.070)
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 3312 3312 3312 3298 3298 3298
N. clusters 144 144 144 143 143 143
R2 0.692 0.711 0.662 0.696 0.706 0.656
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TABLE 3-8: The Impact on Risk: the role of bank size and internal
rating approach (IRB)
The table illustrates the estimates of a reduced form specification for the impact of the change
in systemic macroprudential capital requirements (SMCR) on banks’ risk-taking and assets.
Columns (1)-(3) show the heterogenous impact by bank size. Columns (4)-(6) show the het-
erogenous impact by bank size and IRB. Variables measured in levels, i.e. risk-weighted
Assets and total assets, are transformed using natural logarithms. Bank-level control vari-
ables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time period: 2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis clustered at bank-level, robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correla-
tion. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Size Size and IRB Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RWA RWA/Assets Tot.Assets RWA RWA/Assets Tot.Assets
(ln) (p.p.) (ln) (ln) (p.p) (ln)
SMCR 0.071 3.944 -0.004 0.066 4.345 -0.020
(0.036)* (1.731)** (0.018) (0.043) (1.904)** (0.019)
SMCR ×
20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. 0.020 1.864 -0.002 0.030 2.963 -0.006
(0.019) (1.073)* (0.010) (0.024) (1.224)** (0.010)
SMCR ×
Tot.Ass>100bln. 0.022 2.079 -0.001 0.181 5.324 0.004
(0.024) (1.149)* (0.011) (0.049)*** (2.149)** (0.018)
SMCR × IRB 0.001 -0.034 0.008
(0.014) (0.901) (0.004)*
SMCR × IRB ×
20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. -0.009 -1.498 0.008
(0.031) (1.469) (0.010)
SMCR × IRB ×
Tot.Ass >100bln. -0.157 -3.595 -0.002
(0.042)*** (1.802)** (0.016)
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 3277 3277 3277 3277 3277 3277
N. clusters 137 137 137 137 137 137
R2 0.750 0.648 0.878 0.756 0.655 0.878
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TABLE 3-9: Profitability, Funding and Leverage
The table illustrates the reduced form specification for the impact of the change in systemic
macroprudential capital requirements (SMCR) on banks’ risk-taking. Columns (1)-(2) show
the heterogenous impact by bank profitability as measured with a dummy equal to one if
the bank has above the sample median net interest income (NII). Columns (3)-(4) show the
heterogenous impact by wholesale funding (WSF) as captured by a dummy equal to one for
above median WSF. Columns (5)-(6) illustrate the impact by bank leverage as measured by
a dummy above median for the ratio of Tier1 capital on total assets (LR). Bank-level control
variables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time period: 2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors are
shown in parenthesis clustered at bank-level, robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correla-
tion. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.10.
NII Wholesale Funding Leverage Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RWA RWA/Assets RWA RWA/Assets RWA RWA/Assets
(ln) (p.p.) (ln) (p.p.) (ln) (p.p.)
SMCR 0.070 4.296 0.066 3.699 0.052 3.943
(0.029)** (1.262)*** (0.032)** (1.341)*** (0.032) (1.389)***
SMCR × 0.026 2.158 0.022 2.101 0.030 2.199
>20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. (0.017) (0.815)*** (0.018) (0.897)** (0.024) (1.226)*
SMCR × 0.055 2.842 0.027 2.310 0.033 2.605
Tot.Ass>100bln. (0.025)** (0.993)*** (0.027) (1.104)** (0.026) (1.141)**
SMCR × NII 0.018 1.142
(0.013) (0.741)
SMCR × NII × -0.029 -1.634
>20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. (0.013)** (0.761)**
SMCR × NII × -0.055 -2.067
Tot.Ass >100bln. (0.020)*** (0.925)**
SMCR ×WSF 0.011 1.339
(0.011) (0.633)**
SMCR ×WSF × -0.059 -2.124
>20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. (0.025)** (1.132)*
SMCR ×WSF × -0.060 -2.110
Tot.Ass >100bln. (0.025)** (0.994)**
SMCR × LR 0.026 0.456
(0.027) (1.328)
SMCR × LR × -0.014 -0.451
>20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. (0.027) (1.355)
SMCR × LR × -0.021 -1.010
>20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. (0.027) (1.396)
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 2794 2794 2713 2713 2794 2794
N. clusters 142 142 142 142 142 142
R2 0.747 0.644 0.747 0.649 0.748 0.644
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TABLE 3-10: Bank Trends
The table presents the reduced form specification augmented with bank specific trends to
control for the presence of diverging trend across banks. SMCR stands for systemic macro-
prudential capital requirement. Columns (1)-(3) present the estimates for the impact on cap-
ital differentiated by the distance from the OCR. Columns (4)-(5) show the evidence for risk
and assets without differentiating by distance from OCR since risk and capital are not sensi-
tive to distance from OCR, see 3-6. Bank-level control variables are as specified in equation
3.1. Time period: 2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis clustered at
bank-level, robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects.
Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Capital Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CET1 Ratio CET1 Tot. Capital RWA RWA/Assets Tot. Assets
(p.p.) (ln) (ln) (ln) (p.p.) (ln)
SMCR -0.265 0.064 0.074 0.061 3.115 -0.008
(0.371) (0.037)* (0.028)*** (0.029)** (1.555)** (0.012)
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 3312 3312 3312 3312 3312 3312
N. clusters 144 144 144 144 144 144
R2 0.804 0.778 0.791 0.845 0.824 0.898
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TABLE 3-11: Anticipation Effects
The table shows the impact of the change in systemic macroprudential capital requirements
(SMCR) on bank capital, it includes two years leads of the impact to assess the presence of
anticipation effects. Columns (1)-(3) present the impact on capital variables while Columns
(4)-(6) present the estimates for the RWA and its components. Bank-level control variables
are as specified in equation 3.4. Time period: 2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis clustered at bank-level, and robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.10.
Capital Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CET1 Ratio CET1 Tot. Capital RWA RWA/Assets Tot. Assets
(p.p.) (ln) (ln) (ln) (p.p.) (ln)
SMCR 0.132 0.107 0.072 0.107 7.009 0.014
(0.168) (0.028)*** (0.017)*** (0.028)*** (2.608)*** (0.017)
SMCRt+1 year 1.084 0.067 0.060 -0.002 1.630 -0.050
(0.302)*** (0.042) (0.026)** (0.036) (2.198) (0.026)*
SMCRt+2 years -0.288 -0.057 -0.047 -0.013 -0.265 0.025
(0.411) (0.054) (0.041) (0.043) (1.502) (0.006)***
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 3126 3126 3126 3126 3126 3126
N. clusters 137 137 137 137 137 137
R2 0.750 0.768 0.740 0.772 0.655 0.911
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TABLE 3-12: Endogeneity: Capital
The table shows the relation between SMCR and the main dependent variables for capital. A
dummy representing the period prior to the commencement of the phasing-in of the SMCR
is interacted with the main outcomes of interest for capital. The table presents the estimates
with bank specific trends. Bank-level control variables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time
period: 2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis clustered at bank-level,
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate
statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
SMCR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 -1.420 -2.612 -0.484 -2.859 -0.576 -2.302
(0.161)*** (1.561)* (0.480) (1.621)* (0.488) (1.749)
CET1 Ratio 0.002 -0.000
(0.004) (0.002)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 × CET1 Ratio -0.005 -0.002
(0.006) (0.002)
ln(CET1) 0.145 0.028
(0.075)* (0.039)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 × ln(CET1) -0.059 0.014
(0.027)** (0.016)
ln(Tot. Capital) 0.126 0.045
(0.076) (0.036)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 × ln(Tot. Capital) -0.056 0.014
(0.027)** (0.015)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank Trends yes yes yes
Obs. 3334 3334 3330 3330 3405 3405
N. clusters 144 144 144 144 144 144
R2 0.991 0.996 0.991 0.996 0.991 0.996
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TABLE 3-13: Endogeneity: Risk
The table presents the reduced form specification augmented with bank specific trends to
control for the presence of diverging trend across banks. SMCR stands for systemic macro-
prudential capital requirement. Columns (1)-(3) present the estimates for the impact on cap-
ital differentiated by the distance from the OCR. Columns (4)-(5) show the evidence for risk.
Bank-level control variables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time period: 2010Q1-2017Q3.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis clustered at bank-level, robust to heteroscedastic-
ity and serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
SMCR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 -0.560 -2.940 -1.640 -2.606 0.074 -3.019
(0.441) (1.646)* (0.163)*** (1.598) (0.608) (1.624)*
ln(RWA) 0.214 0.065
(0.118)* (0.057)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 × ln(RWA) -0.051 0.018
(0.023)** (0.015)
RWA/Assets 0.005 0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 × RWA/Assets 0.003 -0.000
(0.002)** (0.001)
ln(Tot.Assets) -0.006 -0.050
(0.041) (0.036)
D2010Q1−2013Q4 × ln(Tot.Assets) -0.079 0.021
(0.030)*** (0.018)
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Bank Trends yes yes yes
Obs. 3423 3423 3423 3423 3573 3573
N. clusters 144 144 144 144 144 144
R2 0.991 0.996 0.991 0.996 0.990 0.996
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TABLE 3-14: Endogeneity: Averaging pre and post treatment periods
The table presents a simple OLS regression of the macroprudential capital requirement
(SMCR) at bank level averaged for the period 2014-2017Q. this is rtegressed on the bank-
level averages of outcome variables for the period prior to the implementation of the macro-
prudential policy 2010-2014. The aim is to investigate whether the average of the outcome
variables before 2014 correlates with the regulation after 2014 which may hint that weaker
banks were protected by national authorities. Bank-level control variables are also averaged
prior to 2014 and are the ones as specified in equation 3.1. Standard errors are shown in
parenthesis robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects.
Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
SMCR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CET1 Ratio 0.049 0.011
(0.021)** (0.007)
ln(CET1) 0.274 -0.024
(0.231) (0.057)
ln(RWA) -0.278 -0.169
(0.229) (0.106)
RWA/Ass. -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.003)*
Bank-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Obs. 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
R2 0.292 0.968 0.264 0.967 0.263 0.968 0.265 0.969
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TABLE 3-15: Impact on the Probability of Default
The table presents the baseline reduced form specification for the impact of the change in
the SMCR on the probability of default as inferred from banks’ ratings. Bank-level control
variables are as specified in equation 3.1. Time period: 2010Q1-2017Q3. Standard errors
are shown in parenthesis and are clustered at bank-level, robust to heteroscedasticity and
serial correlation. FE stands for fixed-effects. Stars indicate statistical significance levels: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
Probability of Default Horizon
5yrs 4yrs 3yrs 2yrs 1yr
(p.p.) (p.p.) (p.p.) (p.p.) (p.p.)
SMCR 1.346 1.293 1.161 0.930 0.533
(1.044) (1.042) (1.028) (0.981) (0.776)
SMCR ×
>20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. -1.843 -1.840 -1.811 -1.717 -1.345
(0.833)** (0.835)** (0.831)** (0.803)** (0.654)**
SMCR ×
Tot.Ass>100bln. -2.011 -1.999 -1.960 -1.868 -1.471
(0.893)** (0.895)** (0.888)** (0.858)** (0.699)**
Bank Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Bank FE yes yes yes yes yes
Country-quarter FE yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 1969 1969 1969 1969 1969
N. clusters 87 87 87 87 87
R2 0.451 0.451 0.446 0.433 0.396
Marginal Effects
SMCR ×
>20bln.< Tot.Ass <100bln. -0.497 -0.548 -0.650 -0.787 -0.811
(1.100) (1.101) (1.094) (1.052) (0.840)
SMCR ×
Tot.Ass>100bln. -0.665 -0.706 -0.799 -0.938 -0.938
(1.183) (1.182) (1.172) (1.126) (0.900)
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3.A List of Banks
TABLE 3-I: List of GSIBs and O-SIBs with more than EUR 300 billions
in total assets as of 2016Q4
Number Country GSI-OSI Bank Name Euro Area Total Assets IRB
1 UK GSI HSBC Holdings Plc No 2251961725 1
2 FR GSI BNP Paribas SA Yes 2076959000 1
3 DE GSI Deutsche Bank AG Yes 1590546000 1
4 FR GSI Credit Agricole SA Yes 1524232000 1
5 UK GSI Barclays Bank Plc No 1421778818 1
6 FR GSI Societe Generale SA Yes 1382241000 1
7 ES GSI Banco Santander, SA Yes 1339124751 1
8 UK OSI Lloyds Banking Group Plc No 957795606 1
9 UK GSI Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc No 935382435 1
10 UK OSI Goldman Sachs International No 885924120 1
11 IT GSI UniCredit SpA Yes 859532774 1
12 NL GSI ING Groep N.V. Yes 845081000 1
13 FR OSI Credit Mutuel Group Yes 793522000 1
14 FR GSI BPCE SA Yes 765069000 1
15 ES GSI Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA Yes 731855527 1
16 IT OSI Intesa Sanpaolo SpA Yes 725100000 1
17 SE GSI Nordea Bank AB (publ) No 615659000 1
18 UK GSI Standard Chartered Plc No 613193354 1
19 UK OSI J.P. Morgan Capital Holdings Ltd. No 555986552 0
20 UK OSI Nomura Europe Holdings plc No 548007616 1
21 DE OSI DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank Yes 509447000 1
22 NL OSI Rabobank Yes 498468992 1
23 DE OSI Commerzbank AG Yes 480450000 n/a
24 DK OSI Danske Bank A/S No 468501389 0
25 UK OSI Morgan Stanley & Co. International Plc No 401416677 1
26 UK OSI Merrill Lynch International No 395201226 1
27 NL OSI ABN AMRO Group NV Yes 394482000 1
28 UK OSI Santander UK Plc No 355038592 0
29 ES OSI CaixaBank, SA Yes 347927262 1
30 UK OSI Citigroup Global Markets Ltd. No 327705506 1
31 UK OSI Credit Suisse International No 315163664 1
32 DE OSI UniCredit Bank AG Yes 302090000 1
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TABLE 3-II: Banks with total assets between EUR 100 and EUR 300
billions in total assets as of 2016Q4
Number Country GSI-OSI Bank Name Euro Area Total Assets IRB
33 BE OSI BNP Paribas Fortis SA Yes 297790000 1
34 BE OSI KBC Group NV Yes 275200000 1
35 SE OSI Svenska Handelsbanken AB (publ) No 274321632 1
36 SE OSI Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ.) No 273597716 1
37 UK OSI Nationwide Building Society No 263401902 1
38 NO OSI DNB Bank ASA No 258682038 1
39 DE OSI Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg Yes 243620000 0
40 FI OSI Nordea Pankki Suomi Oyj Yes 238775000 1
41 FR OSI La Banque Postale, SA Yes 229577420 1
42 SE OSI Swedbank AB (publ) No 224900662 1
43 ES OSI Banco de Sabadell, SA Yes 212507719 1
44 DE OSI Bayerische Landesbank Yes 212150000 1
45 AT OSI Erste Group Bank AG Yes 208227070 1
46 ES OSI Bankia, SA Yes 190167459 1
47 DK OSI Nykredit Realkredit A/S No 188360510 1
48 BE OSI Belfius Banque SA Yes 176720926 1
49 DE OSI NORD/LB Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Yes 174797000 1
50 DE OSI Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen Girozentrale Yes 165164000 0
51 DE OSI ING-DiBa AG Yes 157553000 1
52 NL OSI NV Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten Yes 154000000 1
53 IT OSI Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Yes 153178466 1
54 BE OSI ING Belgie NV Yes 150418720 0
55 ES OSI Banco Popular Espanol, SA Yes 147925728 1
56 DE OSI NRW.BANK Yes 142065678 1
57 AT OSI Raiffeisen Zentralbank osterreich AG Yes 134846575 0
58 FI OSI OP Financial Group Yes 133747000 1
59 DE OSI Volkswagen Financial Services AG Yes 130148000 1
60 NL OSI SNS REAAL NV Yes 124806000 1
61 IE OSI Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland Yes 123129000 1
62 UK OSI Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd. No 112791235 1
63 AT OSI Raiffeisen Bank International AG Yes 111863845 0
64 DK OSI Nordea Bank Danmark A/S No 108970440 1
65 AT OSI UniCredit Bank Austria AG Yes 105785411 1
66 DE OSI Landesbank Berlin Holding AG Yes 102437000 1
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TABLE 3-III: Banks with total assets between EUR 20 and EUR 100
billions in total assets as of 2016Q4
Number Country GSI-OSI Bank Name Euro Area Total Assets IRB
67 IE OSI Allied Irish Banks, Plc Yes 95622000 0
68 DE OSI Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank Yes 95045800 1
69 PT OSI Caixa Geral de Depositos, SA Yes 93547313 1
70 DE OSI Westdeutsche Genossenschafts-Zentralbank AG Yes 89794496 1
71 DE OSI DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale Yes 85954700 1
72 DE OSI HSH Nordbank AG Yes 84365000 1
73 GR OSI Piraeus Bank SA Yes 81500534 1
74 DK OSI Jyske Bank A/S No 78902758 1
75 GR OSI National Bank of Greece SA Yes 78531000 1
76 NO OSI Nordea Bank Norge ASA No 73744593 1
77 PT OSI Banco Comercial Português, SA Yes 71264811 0
78 GR OSI Eurobank Ergasias SA Yes 66393000 n/a
79 GR OSI Alpha Bank AE Yes 64872266 n/a
80 PL OSI Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA No 64851280 1
81 PT OSI Novo Banco, SA Yes 52332672 1
82 LU OSI Deutsche Bank Luxembourg SA Yes 51787398 1
83 UK OSI UBS Ltd. No 47624329 1
84 IE OSI Citibank Europe Plc Yes 46729176 1
85 NO OSI Kommunalbanken AS No 46082260 1
86 LU OSI CACEIS Bank Luxembourg SA Yes 46081972 0
87 PT OSI Santander Totta, SGPS SA Yes 44991681 1
88 LU OSI BGL BNP Paribas SA Yes 44980200 0
89 LU OSI Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat, Luxembourg Yes 43468625 0
90 LU OSI Societe Generale Bank & Trust SA Yes 42187856 0
91 CZ OSI ceskoslovenska obchodní banka, a.s. No 40177083 0
92 AT OSI Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft und Osterreichische Postsparkasse AG Yes 39743000 1
93 PL OSI Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA No 39562822 1
94 CZ OSI ceska sporˇitelna, a.s. No 39473826 0
95 AT OSI Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberosterreich AG Yes 39385129 0
96 PT OSI Banco BPI, SA Yes 38284652 1
97 BE OSI Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV Yes 36427299 1
98 HU OSI OTP Bank Nyrt. No 36291787 1
99 BE OSI Argenta Spaarbank NV Yes 36156329 1
100 CZ OSI Komercní banka, a.s. No 34151966 0
101 PL OSI Bank Zachodni WBK SA No 34086447 1
102 FI OSI Kuntarahoitus Oyj Yes 34052186 0
103 IE OSI Ulster Bank Ireland DAC Yes 30694000 1
104 PL OSI mBank SA No 30372081 1
105 FI OSI Danske Bank Oyj Yes 28962100 1
106 BE OSI AXA Bank Belgium SA Yes 27994508 0
107 IE OSI DEPFA BANK Plc Yes 27596000 0
108 PL OSI ING Bank slaski SA No 26678248 1
109 AT OSI Raiffeisenlandesbank Niederosterreich-Wien AG Yes 25404784 1
110 IE OSI Permanent TSB Group Holdings Plc Yes 23601000 1
111 CZ OSI UniCredit Bank Czech Republic and Slovakia, a.s. No 23503916 0
112 LU OSI Banque Internationale a Luxembourg SA Yes 23148659 0
113 CY OSI Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd. Yes 22171935 1
114 PT OSI Caixa Economica Montepio Geral, caixa economica bancaria, SA Yes 21345909 0
115 DK OSI DLR Kredit A/S No 20944292 0
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TABLE 3-IV: Banks with total assets lower than EUR 20 billions in
total assets as of 2016Q4
Number Country GSI-OSI Bank Name Euro Area Total Assets IRB
116 IE OSI UniCredit Bank Ireland Plc Yes 19987653 1
117 DK OSI Sydbank A/S No 19727068 1
118 HR OSI Zagrebacka banka d.d. No 16980269 0
119 PL OSI Bank BGZ˙ BNP Paribas SA No 16419888 1
120 PL OSI Bank Millennium SA No 15622293 0
121 AT OSI HYPO NOE Landesbank fur Niederosterreich und Wien AG Yes 15392051 0
122 PL OSI Getin Noble Bank SA No 15105513 0
123 BE OSI Euroclear Bank SA/NV Yes 14885444 1
124 RO OSI Banca Comerciala Romana SA No 14873912 0
125 SK OSI Slovenska Sporitelna, a.s. Yes 14825374 0
126 CY OSI Cyprus Cooperative Bank Ltd. Yes 14100791 1
127 SK OSI Vseobecna uverova banka, a.s. Yes 14037154 0
128 AT OSI Sberbank Europe AG Yes 12709542 0
129 PL OSI Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA No 12094460 1
130 SI OSI Nova Ljubljanska banka d.d., Ljubljana Yes 12039011 0
131 CZ OSI Raiffeisenbank a.s. No 11984202 1
132 RO OSI Banca Transilvania SA No 11443660 1
133 RO OSI BRD-Groupe Societe Generale SA No 11429840 1
134 SK OSI Tatra banka, a.s. Yes 11373028 0
135 MT OSI Bank of Valletta Plc Yes 11014330 0
136 HR OSI Privredna Banka Zagreb d.d. No 10867118 1
137 BG OSI UniCredit Bulbank AD No 10424208 1
138 PL OSI Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA No 10266811 1
139 EE OSI Swedbank AS Yes 10233000 1
140 HU OSI K&H Bank Zrt. No 9148828 1
141 HU OSI UniCredit Bank Hungary Zrt. No 8861671 1
142 AT OSI Oberosterreichische Landesbank AG Yes 8756780 1
143 CY OSI RCB Bank Ltd. Yes 8699021 0
144 HR OSI Erste&Steiermarkische Bank d.d. No 8680694 0
145 SK OSI Ceskoslovenska obchodna banka, a.s. Yes 8543773 0
146 RO OSI UniCredit Bank SA No 8284788 0
147 AT OSI Hypo Tirol Bank AG Yes 7632172 1
148 LT OSI AB SEB bankas Yes 7517939 1
149 RO OSI Raiffeisen Bank SA No 7371604 0
150 LT OSI Swedbank, AB Yes 7324953 0
151 MT OSI HSBC Bank Malta Plc Yes 7305964 1
152 CY OSI Hellenic Bank Public Company Ltd. Yes 7037604 0
153 HU OSI MKB Bank Zrt. No 6804454 1
154 HU OSI Magyar Takarekszovetkezeti Bank Zrt. No 6776778 0
155 HU OSI Erste Bank Hungary Zrt. No 6627237 1
156 HU OSI Raiffeisen Bank Zrt. No 6457088 n/a
157 RO OSI CEC Bank SA No 6204473 0
158 BG OSI DSK Bank EAD No 6050100 0
159 EE OSI AS SEB Pank Yes 5775400 0
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TABLE 3-IV: Ctd. Banks with total assets lower than EUR 20 billions
in total assets as of 2016Q4
Number Country GSI-OSI Bank Name Euro Area Total Assets IRB
160 HU OSI CIB Bank Zrt. No 5277329 0
161 LV OSI Swedbank AS Yes 5242209 0
162 CZ OSI PPF banka a.s. No 5063556 0
163 CZ OSI J&T Banka, a.s. No 4926761 0
164 CY OSI Eurobank Cyprus Ltd. Yes 4879262 n/a
165 SI OSI Nova Kreditna banka Maribor d.d. Yes 4823450 0
166 HR OSI Raiffeisenbank Austria d.d. No 4679339 0
167 BG OSI First Investment Bank AD No 4647865 1
168 PL OSI Bank Polskiej Spoldzielczosci SA No 4578087 0
169 SK OSI Postova banka, a.s. Yes 4261460 0
170 LT OSI Luminor Bank AB Yes 3988565 n/a
171 LV OSI ABLV Bank, AS Yes 3973323 0
172 PL OSI SGB-Bank SA No 3947797 1
173 SI OSI Abanka d.d. Yes 3614833 0
174 HR OSI Splitska banka d.d. No 3577384 0
175 LV OSI AS SEB banka Yes 3523911 0
176 BG OSI United Bulgarian Bank AD No 3495997 0
177 BG OSI Eurobank Bulgaria AD No 3486344 0
178 LV OSI JSC "Rietumu Banka" Yes 3473590 1
179 LV OSI AS Citadele banka Yes 3349515 0
180 BG OSI Raiffeisenbank (Bulgaria) EAD No 3329009 0
181 BG OSI Societe Generale Expressbank AD No 3246381 0
182 RO OSI Alpha Bank Romania SA No 3245660 1
183 SI OSI SKB banka d.d., Ljubljana Yes 2955262 0
184 HR OSI Addiko Bank d.d. No 2777215 0
185 BG OSI Central Cooperative Bank AD No 2651696 0
186 SI OSI UniCredit Banka Slovenija d.d. Yes 2642950 0
187 HR OSI Hrvatska postanska banka, d.d. No 2611695 1
188 CY OSI Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd. Yes 2596415 0
189 SI OSI SID - Slovenska izvozna in razvojna banka, d.d., Ljubljana Yes 2596076 0
190 RO OSI SC Bancpost SA No 2564081 n/a
191 MT OSI MeDirect Group Ltd. Yes 2489506 0
192 SI OSI Banka Intesa Sanpaolo d.d. Yes 2325663 0
193 LV OSI Luminor Bank AS Yes 2259247 0
194 RO OSI Garanti Bank SA No 1973878 0
195 HU OSI FHB Jelzalogbank Nyrt. No 1921279 0
196 LT OSI siauliu bankas AB Yes 1861278 0
197 SI OSI Sberbank banka d. d. Yes 1846119 n/a
198 RO OSI OTP Bank Romania SA No 1808437 1
199 CY OSI Alfa Capital Holdings (Cyprus) Ltd. Yes 1803745 1
200 HR OSI OTP banka Hrvatska d.d. No 1694090 n/a
201 BG OSI CIBANK EAD No 1584441 1
202 BG OSI Piraeus Bank Bulgaria AD No 1508035 1
203 RO OSI Piraeus Bank Romania SA No 1446053 1
204 RO OSI Banca Romaneasca SA No 1418917 n/a
205 HR OSI Sberbank d.d. No 1225733 n/a
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